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
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CREATION AND MAN

BY THE

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Dedicated
TO THE
SACRED MEMORY
OF THE
REV. AUBREY MOORE, M.A.
WHO PROVED BY HIS OWN EXAMPLE
THAT CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS CAN CONSISTENTLY
REJOICE IN, AND UTILIZE, THE RESULTS
OF PROGRESS IN NATURAL SCIENCE

PREFACE

MORE than in any other volume of the series to which it belongs, the writer has had in this book to define his attitude towards the results of modern physical and biological investigation. These results do not and cannot affect the validity of catholic doctrines, when the speculative accretions which have been added to them are removed; but they afford important data for theological science.

The theological and natural sciences describe different sections, so to speak, cut through the sphere of the knowable — sections which differ widely, but which at certain points mutually intersect. Where they intersect the sciences mentioned deal with the same data; but theology treats of their divine aspects, while natural science is concerned with their phenomenal aspects. Neither can be barred from the field, and theologians can neither repudiate nor neglect the data which natural scientists bring to light — that is, such as have theological aspects — without defeating their purpose of building up an adequate science of divine things. The primitive catholic faith is unalterable in its substance, for it came from God. But the larger science of theology, based though it always must be upon the established premises of the catholic faith, is in other respects progressive.

Among the adjustments in speculative theology which modern inquiries have made necessary are the removal of certain provincial and non-primitive elements in the theology of sin and a restatement of the catholic doctrine in its original and permanent content. The writer has already endeavoured to face this task in his *Evolution and the Fall*, to which occasional references are given in these pages. He believes that St. Augustine, while retaining the catholic doctrine of sin, enveloped it in a speculative theology which in certain particulars neither has catholic authority nor can be reconciled with modern knowledge and reflection.

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CREATION AND MAN

CHAPTER I

THE WILL OF GOD

I. *Its Relation to the Finite*

§ 1. Every finite being owes its coming into existence, its continuance, and its development, to the will of God, whose purpose and immanent operations constitute the ultimate explanation and philosophy of the universe, whether we consider its origin and previous development, its present order, or its future progress. In order, therefore, to investigate intelligently the subject-matter of this volume it is important that we should first consider the will of God itself, and define our mental attitude towards certain initial problems which are raised by the production of finite, temporal, and contingent effects by an infinite and eternal will.

In a previous volume we considered the will of God,¹ but were compelled by lack of space in that

¹ *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. xii. esp. § 2. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. xix; A. P. Forbes, *Nicene Creed*, pp. 47, 56-61; H. P. Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, pp. 56, 57, 184-190; Wilhelm and Scannell, *Cath. Theol.*, Vol. I. pp. 227-233; Petavius, *de Deo*, V. i-iv; Franzelin, *de Deo Uno*, Thes. xlv-xlvi; Hastings, *Dic. of the Bible*, s. v. "Will," iii.

connection to deal very briefly with the subject. It seems necessary now to recapitulate what was there said, and to face with more detail the problems involved.

We say that in its own nature the will of an infinite God is necessarily absolute, unconditioned, and eternal. God possesses and exercises power absolutely to determine His operations and their effects; and His will *in se* cannot be conditioned or limited by any conditions or causes external to Himself. To be infinite means to be subject to no external or extraneous limitations, and this precludes any such limitation in relation to the will and operations of God. His will, therefore, is immutable; and the operations which are determined thereby cannot be thwarted in their eternal purpose. The truth of these propositions is established not only by necessities of thought concerning an infinite being, but also by the plain teaching of Scripture.¹

Yet both supernatural revelation and natural experience teach us that the external effects of God's will are finite, temporal, and contingent, and that among the factors which determine the course of events in this universe are numerous creaturely wills. These wills seem, within their limits, to be capable of a certain amount of self-determined con-

¹ Cf. Psa. cii. 26, 27; Heb. i. 12; Eccles. iii. 14; Mal. iii. 6; Rom. xi. 29; St. James i. 17. See *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. xi. § 3; ch. xii. § 2 (a).

trol of the effects which we believe should ultimately be explained by the will of God. The limitations of our own wills are too apparent to be denied; but that they are truly wills, capable within certain limits of modifying physical effects, and of imparting an element of contingency to the course of things, is a fact which is too abundantly verified by every-day experience to be banished from human belief by any sceptical philosophy. Moreover, the teaching of Scripture concerning the contingency of events, the moral probation of men, and their capacity to determine their own conduct and the course of events with a certain amount of freedom, is not open to serious dispute among Christians.¹

§ 2. The truths which we have recapitulated, when brought into juxtaposition, appear in certain ways to be mutually opposed and raise problems which we cannot solve. The antitheses which emerge are inevitable products of any effort to combine and describe together the divine and the creaturely aspects of the operations of God — the creation of the world and its subsequent development and divine government. But the impossibility

¹ Gen. iv. 6-10; Isa. i. 18-20; St. Matt. xvi. 27; St. John vii. 17. The philosophical theory of determinism, adopted by John Stuart Mill and others, reduces the data of consciousness to illusion. See W. G. Ward, *Philos. of Theism*, Essays vi-xi, xvii; J. Rickaby, *Free Will*; W. James, *Prins. of Psychology*, Vol. II. pp. 569-579; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Determinism"; F. Ballard, *Determinism, False and True*; Hubert Gruender, *Free Will, the Greatest of the Seven World-Riddles*; Hastings, *Encyc. of Religion*, s. v. "Contingency."

of explaining the mutual harmony of these aspects has persuaded many that each given antithesis represents a real contradiction, a form of opposition which demands a surrender of one branch of the antithesis in the interest of the other. Naturally that doctrine is selected for abandonment which is least congenial to the mental temperament of the baffled inquirer.

Such a procedure does not, however, represent an elimination of contradiction, but a partial sacrifice of truth in the interests of a simplicity of view that is inconsistent therewith. The antitheses with which we are concerned cannot rightly be regarded as mutually contradictory. In each case the truths which are brought into seeming opposition, when severally considered, are perceived to be abundantly established, so abundantly indeed that to abandon either is to undermine the validity of all reasons for belief, including those in view of which the other truth is retained. It is necessary, therefore, to explain the appearance of mutual opposition on some other ground than that of real contradiction. There is but one other ground which can be accepted; and that is the mysteriousness of the truths involved and the fragmentariness and inadequacy of our knowledge of each. We know enough of each truth to have the beginnings of a true conception concerning it, and we possess in each case sufficient evidence of the correctness of the direction of our line of thought; but our knowledge does not enable us to formulate an

adequate description¹ of either truth in the given antithesis, and to attain to a rational understanding of the harmony of one truth with the other. Yet valid lines of thought are available which save us from feeling utterly stultified; and they enable us to combine in our apprehensions the truths which we cannot rationally harmonize without fear of committing ourselves to an acceptance of contradictories.²

The antitheses which we have to consider are chiefly (*a*) between the eternal, infinite, and absolute nature of the divine will and the temporal, conditional, and limited nature of its effects; (*b*) between the timelessness of divine operations and the temporal origin and processes of creation; (*c*) between divine predestination and human freedom.

§ 3. We shall first reckon with the antithesis between the divine will and the temporal, conditional, and limited; and to facilitate our thinking we shall make use of the well-known illustration of the circle — its centre, circumference, and radii. In this figure the centre is a point which has no dimensions, divisions, or boundaries. It is described indeed as in a place, but this does not signify intrinsic spatial

¹ Our descriptions are symbolical, that is, determined by the nearest analogies which our temporal and spiritual experience affords. Cf. *Being and Attrib. of God*, pp. 15 (n. 2), 32-33; ch. ii. §12 (*c*); ch. x. §§ 3-4.

² It is to be emphasized that we do not, and may not, appeal to mystery as a refuge from real contradiction. See *Introd. to Dog. Theol.*, ch. vi. § 19; Thos. Richey, *Truth and Counter Truth*, Introd.; J. B. Mozley, *Predestination*, ch. ii.

attributes so much as a purely relative connection with space. Therefore it conveniently symbolizes the infinite. The circumference, on the other hand, is a line capable of division and measure, and exhibits a succession of parts and sequences. It is indeed endless, because ever returning upon itself,¹ but is dependent upon the centre for its existence, properties, and meaning. It may stand for the finite, whether successive in time, spatial, or contingent. The radii represent relations between the centre and the circumference. Like the circumference they are described in terms of spatial relation, division, and succession, and are distinguished by their separate and successive points of contact with the circumference. They indeed meet at the centre, but cannot either divide or change the centre, constituting, so to speak, nothing more than extrinsic relations between the centre and the circumference. They may be treated as symbols of the relations between the infinite and eternal, on the one hand, and the spatial and temporal, on the other.

The illustration is, of course, inadequate; for the circle is a purely mechanical figure, and neither the infinite Being, nor the universe, nor the relations between them, can be correctly described in purely mechanical terms. One of its inadequacies should

¹ So long as one pursues its course, he can never get beyond it. Similarly we can never get beyond time on temporal lines. There is no time before or after time. Yet the circumference has boundaries, and time began to be.

especially be borne in mind. In a circle the radii represent separation and distance between the centre and the circumference. It will be necessary in our use of the figure to ignore this peculiarity and to treat the radii as symbolizing relations of immediacy, whether spatial or temporal, between God and the contents and sequences of the universe. As has been said, God is a being whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference nowhere.¹ To use a modification of certain well-known lines —

Though God is bounded not by nature's rim,
In every atom is the whole of Him.²

The application of our illustration to the subject before us is accentuated by the fact that just as the relations between the centre of a circle and its circumference have to be described in terms borrowed from the circumference rather than from the centre, so the relations between the will of God and its creaturely effects are necessarily described in terms borrowed from these effects.

§ 4. The antithesis between the will of God and the events of the world-drama may be treated as threefold, being suggested by the temporal, by the

¹ Attributed to St. Bonaventura. Cf. *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. xi. § 5, on divine immensity.

² The original is —

"Though God extends beyond creation's rim,
Each smallest atom holds the whole of Him."

The change is made in order to avoid the spatial implications of "extends beyond" and "holds."

conditional, and by the limited nature of these events. In the first branch of the antithesis the eternal, and therefore immutable, will of God has to be combined in our apprehension with the temporal sequences that appear in its effects. The problem thus raised is concerned with the manner in which it is possible for an eternal, timeless, and changeless will and operation to exhibit itself in temporal processes, in sequent events and changes — effects which we have to describe in terms of past, present, and future and in those of antecedence and consequence. Thus God is said to will anything antecedently, *secundum se*, in so far as the effects of His will take place without reference to any particular and preceding events or effects in time. He is thus said to will the redemption of our race. Again, He is said to will a thing consequently when it takes place as consequent upon some preceding event known to God. In brief, although the will of God is in itself eternal, its effects are temporal, and it is described in the terms of these effects, as antecedent and consequent.

The problem which is involved is really insoluble. We cannot explain the harmony which must be assumed to exist between a will which is not in itself subject to temporal relations and its production of effects which occur under the antecedent and consequent conditions of time. But the cause of our inability is the inadequacy of our knowledge of the several factors of the problem and the inscrutability of the infinite. Our incapacity to explain being

thus accounted for, we are not compelled to assume that we are facing a contradiction; and the convincing reasons for our belief in the eternal immutability of the divine will, on the one hand, and in the temporal conditions of its observed effects, on the other, forbid such a supposition. The illustration, moreover, which is employed in the previous section gives evidence that theology is not the only sphere of thought in which indivisible and non-measurable things are related to, and relatively described by, the measurable, divisible, and successive, without being thereby brought within the category of such things.

We do not, of course, imagine that the existence of relations such as we have described between a non-spatial point and a linear circumference, and their description in terms borrowed from the circumference, afford the slightest evidence of the existence of relations between a changeless will and changing events of the kind here considered. We need no such proof, for the reasons which justify the belief that God cannot change or condition His will, and yet that He both can and does will a changing and contingent course of events, are sufficiently abundant and convincing.¹ Furthermore, to describe the will of God in terms of its effects as antecedent and consequent does not, when rightly interpreted, involve the mistake of subjecting the eternal to the temporal — of attributing the sequences of the temporal effects to their eternal cause as proper-

¹ Cf. *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. xi. § 3.

ties thereof — but is a species of symbolical language by which we embrace in single propositions the ascription of the world-drama to the eternal will of God and an assertion of the temporal and contingent nature of that drama.¹

§ 5. The will of God is also distinguished in theology by the antithetic terms “absolute” and “conditional”; as though the uncontingent and immutable might also be conditioned and mutable. The illustration and the considerations which have been employed in the two previous sections will help us to perceive that the antithesis exhibits not a contradiction, but a symbolical use of language, in which we combine in one proposition truths which are severally certain, but which baffle attempts to explain their harmony. It is certain that no will that is truly infinite can be in itself subject to finite conditions; for to be thus limited is to be finite, and the doctrine that God is in Himself wholly infinite is indisputable among those who accept the Christian revelation of God. It is, on the other hand, a matter of common observation that the world-drama is a contingent drama, the events of which depend to an important extent upon conditions that may or may not be actualized. Yet Christian

¹ On the distinctions described in this section and in that following, see J. B. Franzelin, *de Deo Uno*, Thes. xlix; C. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, Vol. I. pp. 404-405; F. X. Schouppe, *Elem. Theol. Dogm.*, Tr. V. § 157; Ad. Tanquerey, *de Deo*, §§ 107, 108; Thos. Jackson, *Works*, Vol. V. pp. 331-336.

believers are committed to the doctrine that the world-drama is an effect and revelation of the will of God, and that that will is all sovereign — incapable of defeat.

To return to our illustration: if we travel along the circumference of a circle we can reach a given point therein only by first passing through the points which lie between our starting place and the point at which we seek to arrive. And this may well symbolize the necessity which exists in the temporal course of events that requires the occurrence of one event as the antecedent condition of another. The events of each historical moment not only follow upon preceding events, but cannot be actualized in finite experience except as dependent for form upon, and conditioned by, what precedes.

On the other hand, if we assume the standpoint of the centre of the circle, we find ourselves equally near to, abreast of, every successive point in the circumference, so that our relation to all such points, signified by the radii, is in no wise affected by the successions and sequent conditions which determine the points in the circumference in their mutual relations. We do not have to travel through intervening points of the circumference in order to pass from being abreast one point to being abreast another, for without movement from the point of our observation we find ourselves simultaneously abreast of the whole circumference in all its parts. Moreover, while the fact that the existence of the circumfer-

ence depends upon its centre is significant, its size has no bearing on our illustrative use of it; for, if the circumference were indefinitely enlarged, what we have said would hold true.

This combination of conditioning sequences, and their absence, which we discover in the factors of a circle, proves nothing as to the combination of an absolute will and purpose in God with a conditional course of events caused thereby. But it may help us to accept the reasons for believing that such combination is real, and to escape any feeling of mental self-stultification which the consideration of such a mysterious antithesis may engender. It may help us to acknowledge without disturbance of mind that, while the effects of the divine will and operation in the universe are to a considerable extent and in relation to each other conditional — the later events in the drama depending for their historical occurrence upon preceding events, without which they do not take place — this manner of exhibition does not permit us to infer that the will of God itself is thereby shown to be lacking in absoluteness. The will of God may not be thought of as separated from certain of its effects by the conditioning antecedents which precede them in history. The eternal mind and will of God are immediate to the whole circle of time, and God does not have to move, so to speak, through successive moments and effects in order to reach and operate in subsequent events. God can indeed will a drama of sequences and conditional

effects, but His willing them is an eternal act, and does not in itself constitute a contingent drama. The elements of contingency pertain exclusively to the effects which He wills and to their mutual relations. They are not, and cannot be, properties of His will.¹ His will cannot be made in itself conditional, but He can and does will effects which constitute a drama containing conditional relations.

These considerations will help us to understand what is meant by distinguishing between the absolute and the conditional will of God. These terms are symbolic descriptions, in which a will that is necessarily eternal and unconditioned is distinguished in its relations to the world-drama by terms borrowed from the mutual relations of its effects. In thus distinguishing we call the will of God absolute when the effects considered are not historically conditioned by previous events in time — for example, the creation of the world. And we call His will conditional when we have in mind effects that follow and depend for occurrence upon preceding events in time — for example, the glorification of the blessed, which depends upon conditions previously to be fulfilled. But in any case the nature of what is willed is one thing, and the nature and method of the will which causes it is another; and the limitations of the former may not be thought to belong to the latter.

¹ Their contingency is their relation to other temporal effects — not any dependence of God's will upon its effects.

§ 6. We now come to a third antithesis — that between the infinite nature of all divine attributes and the finite or externally limited nature of the effects in history which we attribute to the will of God. This and the antitheses which we have been considering are closely related forms or aspects of the general antithesis between the nature of the divine will *in se* and the nature of its effects.

Both revelation and the necessities of human thought require us to believe that God is infinite. But in declaring Him to be this we do not mean that He has no limitations. Such a notion is purely abstract, and cannot from the nature of things be accepted as having any counterpart in the sphere of reality. Nothing can be distinguished, or even exist, unless it is a determinate somewhat — that is, unless it is limited by the attributes or properties which make it what it is. There are, however, two kinds of limitations; *viz.* the external and the internal, the extrinsic and the intrinsic; and a finite being is externally and extrinsically limited and conditioned, whereas an infinite being, as hypothecated in theology, is a being whose limitations are wholly internal and intrinsic.¹ The Infinite, in so far as He is a reality, is possessed of determinate attributes and is limited by them. He is somewhat. But these limitations

¹These considerations meet the agnostic argument that the notion of an infinite being is self-contradictory. See *Being and Attrib. of God*, pp. 36-38.

are not external to His essence, nor is He dependent upon extraneous things and relations to be what He is in His own nature and operations. In themselves these are limited only by being what they are — real attributes and operations of the supreme God.¹

Yet it is God's will and purpose to operate for the production of a series of effects which appear, in the human way of viewing them, to impose upon their worker certain laws of working, or methods of procedure, that can only be described as limited and finite. And this fact has led certain writers to assert that the mystery of creation involves self-limitation by God — a real *kenosis*, or reduction to finitude of the divine will and operation.²

We believe this inference to be unwarranted and inconsistent with divine infinity; but the antithesis between the infinite Operator in creation and the limitations, both temporal and spatial, which are seen to inhere in creaturely processes and developments, is too clearly apparent to be denied; and the problem of their rational harmony is too deep for us to explain. The fallacy involved in the kenotic view is that it sacrifices one factor of the mystery in

¹ On divine infinity, see *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. x. § 5, and the references there given.

² More or less kenotic views of creation have been expressed by J. O. Dykes, *Divine Worker*, pp. 190-201; R. L. Ottley, *Incarnation*, Vol. II. p. 285; Chas. Gore, *Dissertations*, pp. 222-224; T. B. Strong, *Manual of Theol.*, pp. 235-236; Jas. Martineau, *Study of Religion*, Bk. III. ch. ii. § 4.

the interests of the other, and the factor which is sacrificed, when viewed by itself, can be perceived to be as certainly established as is the factor which is retained. It is, of course, possible for theologians to speak of the will and operation of God as limited without intending more than symbolically to describe that will and operation in terms of its effects. No other terms are available; and the reasons above given, that justify our speaking of the antecedent and consequent, or of the absolute and conditional, will of God, also justify our saying that the will of God is limited by the limitations of its effects. But this should mean simply that what is willed to take place is a finite scheme of effects. It cannot rightly signify that the will itself, or the Operator who thus wills, is reduced to finitude by the nature of the effects which He wills.

To say that the limitation is self-imposed does not remove the error if we mean more than that He wills to produce limited effects, His will remaining what it is by essential nature, infinite and eternal. To impose limits upon what one wills to bring to pass, or to will and cause limited effects, is one thing; to reduce the will itself, and the operative power connected therewith, to the limitations of the effects is obviously quite another. Having the capacity and power to will and achieve great effects, I do not lose this capacity and power by willing and achieving small ones, and to direct one's action within narrow and habitually observed limits often affords evidence of

will power and resourcefulness rather than of self-limitation strictly understood.¹

These thoughts may help us, but they are not given as affording an explanation of the antithesis with which we are concerned. We are taught by everyday experience to realize that the will capacity and executive power of an agent is not to be treated necessarily as wholly exerted in, and to be measured by the extent of, its external manifestations or effects. But the problem before us is, How can a will and power that is essentially infinite, which therefore cannot rightly be regarded as finite in operation, or as susceptible of degrees, stages, and other finite limitations in exercise, be concerned with the production of effects wherein such limitations are apparent? The problem, as we have confessed, is too great for us.

But constrained as we are to acknowledge both factors of the problem, severally considered, we are enabled to escape any sense of real contradiction — two truths cannot contradict each other — by reckoning with the limitations of our knowledge and understanding. We may also gain help in this regard by contemplating the already considered paradoxical properties of a circle, in spite of the fact that the figure is purely mechanical and cannot adequately illustrate the mystery by which we are baffled. In a circle the point which constitutes its

¹ See the writer's *Kenotic Theory*, pp. 107-111, wherein the whole subject is considered in its various branches. Certain aspects of it will have to be dealt with again in the next volume of this series.

centre and determining factor is wholly exempt from measure, division, and sequence. The circumference, on the other hand, is subject to these properties. In spite of its close relation to the immeasurable centre, it is measurable, has parts and sequences, and is determined in its course by laws which limit its possibilities. Moreover, the immeasurable quality of the central point is not removed or reduced by its constituting the centre and determining factor of a measurable circumference. The centre may indeed be described by spatial relations, borrowed from the circumference and signified by the radii. But the description is symbolic and relative, for the centre continues in itself to be exempt from every measure.

So, in a higher order of being and relation, God is the centre of the circumference of time and space. He is its determinative principle, apart from which its measures, divisions, and sequences do not exist. He is abreast of, and immediate to, the whole circle of finite realities and events, and does not have to become subject to its conditions, finite measures, and sequences in order to reach and determine any element therein, whether temporal or spatial. The truth is that the infinite, because infinite, cannot exercise a finite or changing will and power, although He both can and does will and cause finite and changing effects.¹ And the "cannot" in this case repre-

¹ God-incarnate did indeed submit to act in a finite way and under finite limitations, but only in the finite nature which He assumed — not in His divine nature.

sents not an external limitation, but an internal and unalterable perfection.

II. *Predestination and Freedom*

§ 7. The *Westminster Confession*¹ says, "God from all eternity did by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass:² yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin,³ nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."⁴ Whatever may be our view of the predestinarian theory at large which the *Westminster Confession* sets forth, the symbolical truth of the particular phrases which we have quoted is undeniable. All things come to pass by the will of God, "with whom can be no variation, neither shadow that is cast by turning."⁵ Yet the truth is not less certain that many of the things which God ordains are brought to pass by creaturely wills, by wills which, within their limits, are truly free and capable of self-determination. That is, they are true causes of events and real factors in the working out of human destinies. Their part in determining

¹ Ch. iii. § 1.

² Isa. xlv. 6-7; Ephes. i. 11; Heb. vi. 17.

³ Psa. v. 4; St. James i. 13-14.

⁴ The two aspects are combined in St. John xix. 11; Acts ii. 23; iv. 27-28; xxvii. 23-24, 34.

⁵ St. James i. 17.

human conduct and in manipulating the course of events contributes to the world-drama an element of contingency; by which is meant a dependence of events upon causes that are not so determined beforehand that all the particular issues are necessary and inevitable. The least baffling way in which we can express this combination of truths is to say that, while the will of God is eternal, immutable, and all-prevailing, the thing that is willed is a changing and contingent drama — one which is to a significant extent determined as to its course by creaturely and mutable wills.¹ God can neither change His will nor make it contingent, but He can will a changing and contingent course of events.²

The truth of divine omniscience is connected in the history of Christian thought with this mystery; and God's foreknowledge of human conduct has been thought to explain His foreordination, at least so far as it concerns the final destinies of men. But the mystery of divine foreknowledge of contingent events³ is as baffling as is that of their foreordination. It is as impossible for us to understand how

¹ See Geo. Moberly, *Admin. of the Holy Spirit*, pp. 17-24.

² On the whole subject of divine predestination, see J. B. Mozley, *Augustinian, Doctr. of Predestination*; W. A. Copinger, *Treatise on Predestination, Election, and Grace*; Geo. S. Faber, *Primitive Doctr. of Election*; Darwell Stone, *Outlines of Christ. Dogma*, ch. xiii; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. xxiii; J. Pohle, in *Cath. Encyc.*, q. v.; Petavius, *de Deo*, IX-X.

³ Cf. 1 Sam. xxiii. 10-12; Dan. ii. 28-29; St. Matt. xxiv. 36; Acts xv. 18; Rom. viii. 29; xi. 2; 1 St. Pet. i. 2. See *Being and Attrib. of God*, pp. 284-285.

God can foreknow events which are contingent and not yet ¹ certain, as it is for us to understand how He can foreordain such events without making them non-contingent and inevitable. The appeal to divine foreknowledge, while it has helped many to escape the inference that God's will is capricious and unrelated to human deservings, does not provide us with an explanation of the harmony which we must suppose to exist between divine predestination and human freedom, but simply presents the antithesis in another form.

§ 8. The witness of Scripture to the opposite truths of divine predestination and foreknowledge, on the one hand, and of human freedom and the consequent contingency of human conduct, on the other, is unmistakable. And the Bible affords no warrant for sacrificing either truth for the sake of the other.

In considering the predestinarian passages of Scripture, we ought not to assume beforehand that they necessarily have reference to an unconditional foreordination of individuals, as such, to final glory. Predestination may concern either individuals or the Church as a body; it may have reference either to privileges and vocations in this world or to final destinies hereafter; and it may point either to an unconditional result or to a conditional one.² The

¹ "Not yet" implies our temporal standpoint. The divine standpoint has no "not yet" limitation.

² According to St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. xxiv. 1, predestination is "a certain divine foreordination from eternity concerning those things which are to be accomplished in time by the grace of God."

passages to be considered may be conveniently grouped in three classes.

(a) Those of the first group have reference to the final glory of the Church. Whatever may be the destiny of its particular members, the Church as a body is to be established without "spot or wrinkle or any such thing";¹ and in the Church a remnant of the chosen race of fleshly Israel is to be saved.² This predestination appears to be unconditional.³

(b) The second and by far the largest group contains passages which testify to a predestination of certain to peculiar spiritual vocations and privileges of grace in this world. Some of them indicate that the privileges referred to are intended to prepare the elect for future glory; but none of them either assert or imply that the final destiny of the elect is unconditionally predetermined. Thus the Israelites were elected to be God's people of inheritance⁴ and were given a peculiar vocation.⁵ Particular men are called into the Christian Church,⁶ and the members of the Church on earth are reckoned as

¹ Ephes. v. 25-27. Cf. Revel. xix. 7-9.

² Isa. x. 20-23 (with Rom. ix. 27); xxxvii. 31-32; Jerem. xxiii. 3-8; xxxiii. 14-26; Joel ii. 32-iii. 2; Mic. ii. 12; Rom. xi. 1-7, 25-27.

³ St. Matt. xvi. 18.

⁴ Deut. iv. 20; Psa. xxxiii. 12; cvi. 4-5; cxxxv. 4; Jerem. xxxiii. 25-26; Rom. ix. 6 *et seq.*; xi. 1, 5, 7.

⁵ Gen. xii. 3; Rom. iii. 1-2. Cf. Deut. vii. 8.

⁶ St. Matt. xx. 1-16; xxii. 2-14; St. John xv. 19; xvii. 6, 12; Rom. i. 6-7; 1 Cor. i. 2; Ephes. i. 1-14; 2 Tim. i. 9.

constituting the elect.¹ But, although many are called, we are told that few are chosen;² and the possibility of falling from the grace of election is plainly intimated.³ Moreover, this election is not designed for the exclusive benefit of those who are called. All the nations of the earth are to be blessed in the chosen seed,⁴ and even those who are called to the more exalted privileges of the Christian dispensation are described as "firstfruits."⁵

(c) The third group consists of a few passages which are thought by many to teach that certain individuals, as such, are unconditionally predestined to glory.⁶ But it is only by refusing to compare Scripture with Scripture that we can make them bear the burden of proof imposed upon them. They contain no denial of the truth, frequently set forth

¹ Col. iii. 12; 1 Thess. i. 14; 2 Thess. ii. 13-14; 1 St. Pet. i. 1-2; ii. 9-10; v. 13. Cf. Rom. i. 6-7; 1 Cor. i. 2, 26; Ephes. i. 1-14.

² St. Matt. xxii. 14.

³ 1 Cor. ix. 27; Phil. ii. 12; Heb. vi. 4-8; 2 St. Pet. i. 10. G. S. Faber, *Prim. Doctr. of Election*, esp. Bk. II. chh. iv-vii, makes this the only predestination of individuals in Scripture.

⁴ Gen. xii. 3 (cf. Gal. iii. 14); Jerem. iii. 17; Joel ii. 28-32; Mic. iv. 1-4; Zech. viii. 20-23; St. Matt. iii. 9; viii. 11; Acts xi. 18; xiii. 46-47; xv. 15-17; Rom. i. 5; xi. 11-12.

⁵ St. James. i. 18. Cf. Rom. xi. 15; Revel. xiv. 4.

⁶ St. Matt. xxiv. 24; xxv. 34; St. Luke x. 20; St. John vi. 37, 39, 44; x. 27-29 (cf. xvii. 12); Acts ii. 47 (cf. xiii. 48); Rom. viii. 28-31; ix. 21-23; 1 Thess. ii. 12; 2 Thess. ii. 13; 2 Tim. i. 9. The argument of Rom. ix-xi has reference to God's earthly dealings with Israel as a nation and with the Gentiles — that is, to the inequalities of existing human privileges. Cf. Sanday and Headlam, *Epis. to the Romans*, pp. 341-350.

in Scripture, that human salvation is conditionally offered; but merely assert that the glorification in Christ which lies beyond and explains the whole mystery of election and grace is God's eternal purpose. The predestination of individuals is a branch of God's will, elsewhere declared, to save all men;¹ and in the absence of proof to the contrary, should be regarded as leaving unremoved the scripturally attested conditions and uncertainties which attend the salvation of human beings.

In any case, predestination to damnation is nowhere asserted in Scripture. St. Paul mentions the potter's right over the clay to illustrate earthly dispensations towards Jacob and Esau and towards Pharaoh.² If in his argument he describes "vessels of mercy" as "prepared unto glory," he does not assert that this preparation exempts their glorification from contingency; and we may not infer that the "vessels of wrath" are never to be saved, but are inevitably to be damned forever, because, under the earthly conditions to which St. Paul is referring, they are "fitted unto destruction."

The conclusion to which biblical teaching on the subject of predestination points is that, while God has from eternity, and for righteous reasons not fully revealed to us,³ predestined certain individuals

¹ 1 Tim. ii. 4. It is incredible that God should at once will the salvation of all and unconditionally predestine some to damnation.

² Rom. ix. 19-24. Cf. Sanday and Headlam, *op. cit.*, *in loc.*

³ In Rom. viii. 29 predestination is confined in application to

to peculiar privileges — privileges which bring men into line with future glory — he has not thereby excluded the element of contingency from human conduct and destiny, but subjects all men to a probation, the issues of which are determined to a significant degree by the free choices of men.

This element of contingency is implied and declared in all parts of Scripture, and in many ways. It is implied, for example, in the conditional nature of the promises which are annexed to the divine covenants with man,¹ in men's personal accountability for sin,² in their responsibility for their use of special privileges and gifts,³ and in the unmistakable teaching that men are to be judged according to their works.⁴ In brief, this life is conceived of as a probation,⁵ in which, although to will as well as to work God's good pleasure is made possible by His grace,⁶ we require diligence to make our calling sure⁷ and

those whom God foreknew. What he foreknew would seem to afford the reason for foreordaining. But the point is not declared.

¹ Old Covenant: Exod. xv. 26; xix. 5; Levit. xxvi. 3-43; Deut. xi. 26-28; xxviii. New Covenant: Col. i. 22, 23; Heb. iii. 6, 14; Rev. ii. 10.

² Jerem. xviii. 8-10; Ezek. xviii; xxxiii; 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10; Gal. v. 19-21; vi. 7-8.

³ St. Matt. xxv. 14-30 (cf. St. Luke xix. 12-27); St. John iii. 18, 19; xv. 22, 24; Rom. xi. 19-23.

⁴ Job. xxxiv. 11; Isa. iii. 10; Jerem. xvii. 10; St. Matt. xii. 37; St. Luke xiii. 6-9; Rom. ii. 5-12, 27; 1 Cor. iii. 8; Gal. vi. 5-9; Col. iii. 25; Heb. ii. 2, 3; x. 26-30; St. James ii. 12-13; 1 St. Pet. i. 17; Rev. ii. 23; xx. 12-13.

⁵ Rom. v. 4.

⁶ Phil. ii. 13.

⁷ 2 St. Pet. i. 10.

have to work out our own salvation with fear and trembling,¹ remembering that he that thinketh he standeth must take heed lest he fall.² It is impossible to evade all this teaching without assuming an unreality in divine dispensations and "ifs" that is absolutely inconsistent with the truthfulness of God.

§ 9. The doctrines of predestination and of human freedom have had a checkered history, and it is desirable to make a rapid survey of it.³

Previously to the time of St. Augustine other subjects of controversy occupied the attention of the Church, and theologians were content to accept both of the truths with which we are concerned, without disturbing themselves over the problem of reconciling them. But in their opposition to the necessitarian views of pagan philosophers, the Easterns were apt to give especial emphasis to human freedom, and were inclined to optimistic views of human capacity for moral achievement and progress.⁴

St. Augustine was deterred from this optimism by

¹ Phil. ii. 12.

² 1 Cor. x. 12.

³ On the history of the doctrines of predestination and freedom, see J. B. Mozley, *Predestination*; W. A. Copinger, *Predestination, Election and Grace*, pp. 1-114; Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctr.*, §§ 57, 107-114, 175 (6-7), 249-250, 301; E. S. Ffoulkes, in *Dic. of Christ. Biog.*, s. v. "Predestination"; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Early Hist. of Christ. Doctr.*, ch. xvii; D. Stone, *Outlines of Christ. Dogm.*, ch. xiii.

⁴ St. John Chrysostom was particularly strong in his emphasis on human freedom and responsibility. See W. Bright, *Lessons*, app. viii.

his personal experience, as exhibited in his wonderful *Confessions*. To him our dependence upon the will and assistance of God seemed to demand especial emphasis — an emphasis which was somewhat one-sided and which had serious consequences upon subsequent Christian thought. Early in his Christian career he began to lay stress on divine predestination, basing it at first, and contrary to his later view, upon foreknowledge.¹ He also maintained, and rightly, that even the beginnings of a good will in man are made possible by prevenient grace. He tersely expressed this in the prayer, "Give what Thou commandest, and command what Thou wilt."²

In opposition to this, Pelagius and his followers insisted that the giving of commands by God necessarily presupposes on our part the power to obey. The Pelagian position constituted a protest against a spiritual inertia that prevailed in certain quarters, and which was thought to flow from excessive reliance upon the work of grace. Some of the issues involved will be considered in a later chapter of this volume,³ but the one which is germane to our present subject was an assertion of the autonomy and sufficient spiritual capacity of the human will, as against the

¹ He retracts this in *de Predest.*, ch. 7. It had been customary since the time of Clement of Alexandria to base predestination on foreknowledge. Cf. G. S. Faber, *Election*, Bk. II. ch. iii.

² *Confessions*, X. 40, 60. Cf. *de Dono Persev.*, 53, where he defends the expression.

³ Ch. ix.

need of supernatural assistance¹ and the doctrine of an absolute predestination.

The victory lay in the main with St. Augustine, who was led by his controversy with Pelagians to accentuate the doctrines of predestination and of irresistible grace. Divine predestination he declared to be absolute and to determine those who are finally to be saved and glorified. The moving cause of this predestination is secret to us. But that it is lacking in ethical basis, and purely capricious, is not the thought either of St. Augustine or of John Calvin. Moreover, St. Augustine did not formally apply the principle of predestination to damnation, treating exclusively of predestination to life and glory. The significance of his view was also limited by his acceptance of baptismal regeneration, and his acknowledgment that certain of the regenerate fail to persevere.²

For a right understanding of the predestinarian doctrine of St. Augustine, and of the majority of those who have supported it in later ages, it should be remembered that the doctrine of original sin in the Augustinian sense of transmitted guilt and loss of freedom is presupposed. All men, by reason of the fall, are said to deserve damnation and to be

¹ Bright, *Lessons*, pp. 162-165. In app. xix. he shows that Pelagians used the word "grace," but in neologian senses: (1) the natural endowments of the will; (2) revelations of duty; (3) Christ's example.

² *De Peccatorum Meritis*, lib. I; *de Nupt. et Concup.*, I. § 22; *de Corr. et Grat.*, § 18.

incapable of exercising true freedom, which consists in a good will.¹ To consign them all to the fate which they deserve, it is urged, would involve no violation of justice. That God has chosen some, for holy reasons known to Himself, to be the subjects of predestination to grace of recovery and final perseverance is purely an act of mercy, and its being withheld from the rest cannot be objected to — as if this act of mercy undermined the justice with which the laws of accountability are allowed to hold their course in the case of the damned.² This argument is more plausible than convincing. The doctrine of transmitted guilt, upon which it is based, cannot be accepted, and we may not distribute the justice and mercy of God into separate and mutually exclusive spheres of exercise. God's mercy is over all His works, and His justice is not infringed upon by its exercise. Whatever God is, He is in every conceivable sphere of His manifestation.

Along with St. Augustine's doctrine of predestination went his doctrine of grace. Men cannot even initiate a turning to God except by the aid of grace given beforehand — prevenient grace;³ and divine

¹ That the Augustinian view of original sin is not ecumenical, see ch. ix. §§ 7, 9, below.

² *De Nat. et Grat.*, iv, v; *Epis.*, 194. cc. 2, 6, 8; *Enchirid.*, 99.

³ *De Grat. Christi*, esp. 14, 18, 34 (written in 418); *de Grat. et Libero Arb.* (written in 426-427); *de Predest. Sanc.* and *de Dono Persev.* (428-429, as against the semi-Pelagianism of Cassian). On semi-Pelagianism, see W. Bright, *Lessons*, pp. 174-177 and app. xx; *Age*

grace, so far as the elect are concerned, is inevitably effectual, since it determines the disposition and the persevering direction of spiritual choice.¹ He repudiated the charge that he had shut out human freedom, denying that grace is an externally compelling force. The will, he said, is determined from within, with the result that it spontaneously turns toward the good. This condition, he maintained, constitutes an emancipation of the will, the freedom of which consists — not in a state of non-determination and contingency as between good and evil choice — but in its harmony with the sovereign force of God's will and in its established disposition to choose the good.²

It will be observed that he hypothecates at the beginning of the spiritual life that fixing of the will which our experience teaches us is invariably the result of progressive development, and is contingent upon the working out of laws pertaining to human

of the Fathers, Vol. II. pp. 399-403; R. Rainy, *The Ancient Catholic Church*, ch. xxx.

¹ This appears in the works above cited. Cf. Mozley, *op. cit.*, ch. vi; W. Bright, *Lessons*, p. 178 (n. 3), app. xvii, and pp. 299-301. He held all the baptized to be regenerate, but that the non-elect would fall away. It is the grace of perseverance that distinguishes the elect: *de Corr. et Grat.*, § 18.

² Adam's original freedom to choose either to persevere or to sin is acknowledged in *de Corr. et Grat.*, 26 *et seq.* Since the fall men have either a good will, determined by grace, or a bad will, caused by Adam's sin: *De Grat. Christi*, 19; *de Grat. et Lib. Arb.*, 31. For his general view of freedom, see *de Spir. et Lit.*, 52-54, 60. Cf. Mozley, *op. cit.*, ch. viii.

nature which appear to be inviolable. The truth which St. Augustine neglected in the interest of the doctrine of predestination is that of the contingency which pertains to human freedom in its progressive stages — the truth of human probation.¹

§ 10. St. Augustine's doctrine of predestination required for its logical completion that it should be applied to the lost as well as to the saved; for to make an exclusive choice of certain for salvation and glory appears to imply, in view of the conception of divine power that is presupposed, a willing of everlasting loss for the rest. This inference was made by a predestinarian party which appeared soon after the position of St. Augustine had gained currency;² although it was rejected by the important Council of Orange in 529 A.D.,³ and also, in the ninth century, as against the twofold predestinarian view of Gottschalk, by the Synods of Mainz and Quiercy.⁴ The

¹ On St. Augustine's position at large, see J. B. Mozley, *op. cit.*, esp. chh. v-viii; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-312; W. Bright, *Anti-Pelagian Treatises of St. Augustine*, Introd.; *Lessons from the Lives of Three Great Fathers*, pp. 157 *et seq.* and app. xix-xxi; B. B. Warfield, Introd. Essay in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 1st Series, Vol. V., and in Hastings, *Dic. of Religion*, s. v. "Augustine"; J. Orr, *Progress of Dogma*, Lec. v; Hagenbach, *op. cit.*, §§ 110-114; Seeberg, *Hist. of Doctr.*, ch. iv; Hefele, *Hist. of the Councils*, Vol. II. pp. 446-460; R. Rainy, *Ancient Cath. Church*, ch. xxix, esp. pp. 479-482.

² On the predestinarians, see Hefele, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV. § 212; W. A. Copinger, *Predestination*, pp. 19-20.

³ See Hefele, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV. § 242; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Orange, Councils of."

⁴ See J. B. Mozley, *op. cit.*, app. xx; W. A. Copinger, *op. cit.*,

Augustinian position held its own throughout the scholastic period and was crystallized by St. Thomas Aquinas,¹ although the doctrine of meritorious works and the emphasis on will by the Scotists produced a contrary tendency.² In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the same opposition appeared between the Dominicans and Jansenists on the one side and the Molinists and Jesuits on the other.³

It was John Calvin's most notable achievement to give the predestinarian view a fairly complete elaboration and an enduring place in modern thought.⁴ His view prevailed among the Reformers of Switzerland, France, Holland, and Scotland, gaining expression in various Confessions. The Calvinistic position has been summarized in five points: (a) Absolute predestination, by the secret counsel of God, of certain to glory and of the rest to damnation — a

pp. 21-30; Michael Ott, in *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Gottschalk of Orbais."

¹ J. B. Mozley, *op. cit.*, chh. ix-x.

² Hagenbach, *op. cit.*, §§ 151 (11), 177 (4), 186; A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Vol. VI. pp. 308-312.

³ W. Bright, *Lessons*, app. xxi; Neander, *Hist. of Christ. Dogmas*, Vol. II. pp. 681-684; W. A. Copinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-44; G. P. Fisher, *Hist. of Christ. Doctr.*, pp. 332-335; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Molinism," "Noailles," and "Pascal"; Blunt, *Dict. of Sects*, s. v. "Molinists"; *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, s. v. "Bajus, Michael," "Molina," "Jansen," and "Quesnel."

⁴ On the predestinarianism of Calvin and the Reformers, see Calvin's *Institutes*, Bk. III. chh. xxi-xxiv; *Westminster Confess.*, ch. iii; *Decrees of Dort*, ch. vii; Neander, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. pp. 666-681; J. Orr, *Progress of Dogma*, pp. 290-299; R. Seeberg, *Hist. of Doctr.*, §§ 79, 82; G. P. Fisher, *Hist. of Doctr.*, Period IV. ch. iii.

predestination not based upon foreknowledge; (*b*) Total depravity, or the absence from fallen man of any capacity for good, or of any moral fitness — merit of congruity — that can serve as a reason for the bestowal of grace; (*c*) Particular redemption, or the view that Christ died for the elect only; (*d*) Irresistible grace; (*e*) Final perseverance, treated as inevitable on the part of the elect.¹ The element in this system which determines its practical significance for many, and which explains its persuasive power, is its emphasis upon the sovereignty of God and its reference of all that we receive and hope for to divine mercy. But in giving the first place to divine sovereignty it apparently excludes the element of contingency and deprives the doctrine of probation of any real meaning.²

Two forms of recoil have taken place. Seventeenth-century Arminianism returned to the first view of St. Augustine that divine predestination is based upon foreknowledge of men's use of grace;³ and the

¹ These points were formulated at the Synod of Dort, as against Arminian views. Cf. G. S. Faber, *Election*, Bk. I. ch. iv.

² If an event is certain because decreed, the fact that it is decreed to happen as dependent upon previous voluntary acts of creatures (also decreed) does not make it really contingent. The Calvinist A. Hodge, *Outlines of Theol.*, p. 207, says, "But that the decree of God can be regarded as suspended upon conditions which are not themselves determined by the decree is evidently impossible."

³ On Arminianism, see Hastings, *Dict. of Relig.*, q. v.; J. and W. Nichols, *Life and Works of Arminius*; Blunt, *Dic. of Theol.*, q. v.; *Cath. Encyc.*, q. v.; J. Orr, *op. cit.*, pp. 295-299; J. A. Dorner, *Hist. of Protest. Theol.*, Vol. I. pp. 417-427.

Socinians and humanitarians generally have received the Pelagian view that man possesses by nature the capacity and power to will the good and, by obedience to the will of God, to work out his salvation without supernatural assistance.¹ The Arminian view leaves unsolved the antithesis between divine foreknowledge, so-called, and human freedom; and Pelagianism sacrifices the truth of divine predestination, and of grace as well, to that of human freedom.

§ 11. Both the Pelagian and the Calvinistic views fail to do justice to some portion of scriptural teaching. In each case one-sidedness is apparent and rational coherence is sought at the expense of one or other side of what is an antithetic mystery. Each constitutes a caricature of truth, whereas what is true in the one should be held in a manner that permits full acknowledgment of what is true in the other. The limitations of our understanding should be acquiesced in and allowed for; and we should refrain from giving a disproportionate place to speculative inferences that can never acquire the status of saving doctrine.

Pelagianism is inconsistent with more than one revealed doctrine. (a) It is based upon a denial of the catholic doctrines of the primitive state and fall of man — not less so because the Augustinian definition of original sin contains elements which have

¹ Hagenbach, *op. cit.*, § 249 (4); Schaff-Herzog *Encyc.*, s. v. "Socinus, Faustus," II. 3; Neander, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. pp. 644-645, 683-684.

no ecumenical authority and goes beyond the teaching of Scripture.¹ (b) It involves a perverted view of our Lord's manhood in relation to sin, inasmuch as it treats what is called concupiscence as an essential property of the nature which He assumed, and thus in effect ascribes to Him a native and internally rooted tendency to sin.² (c) It militates against the scriptural doctrine of atonement, in so far as this doctrine exhibits the death of Christ as a remedy for the fall,³ and subverts the doctrine of baptismal regeneration and of its necessity.⁴ (d) Its denial of the necessity of supernatural assistance undermines the principle of dependence upon God, a sense of which pertains to the perfection of man as a religious being. (e) By excluding from view the deeper roots of human sinfulness, and by exaggerating the natural strength of the human will in relation to the good, it engenders a moral optimism which dulls the sense of sin and is more pagan than Christian.⁵

Pelagius was right in maintaining the scriptural principle which limits personal responsibility for sin

¹ See J. B. Mozley, *op. cit.*, ch. iii. Pt. III. 1.

² There was a latent sympathy between Nestorians and Pelagians. Hefele, *op. cit.*, Vol. III. pp. 11, 69, 73, 74, 98; W. Bright, *Age of the Fathers*, Vol. II. pp. 161-162, 200, 224-225, 229-230; J. B. Mozley, *op. cit.*, ch. iii. Pt. III. 2.

³ J. B. Mozley, *op. cit.*, ch. iii. Pt. III. 3.

⁴ *Idem.*

⁵ Cf. ch. ix. § 12 (a-b, e), below. On the difficulties of the Pelagian view in general, see W. Bright, *Age of the Fathers*, Vol. II. pp. 225-227.

— guilt in the strict sense of that term — to those who voluntarily and wittingly commit sinful actions; and the Augustinian definition of original sin, in so far as inconsistent with this principle, is both unscriptural and without ecumenical authority. Moreover, the theory which, in recoil from Pelagian error, erects the mystery of predestination into a self-sufficient premise of theological inference and declares that divine grace in the elect is irresistible, has caused several grave difficulties: (*a*) Inasmuch as the peculiar definition of original sin upon which any defence of the harmony of the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination with divine justice must be based is itself open to objection on grounds of justice, the appearance of injustice in arbitrarily saving some and punishing others cannot be removed. Moreover, assuming that all mankind deserves everlasting punishment as the result of Adam's sin, a love which shows itself in selecting only a portion of the race for mercy cannot be regarded as other than finite in quality. (*b*) In Scripture the love of God is emphasized as His primary ethical attribute, whereas in this system divine sovereignty is made paramount. (*c*) To some extent St. Augustine, and more unmistakably Calvin, treat the spheres within which the mercy and justice of God are severally exhibited as if mutually exclusive, whereas God is both just and merciful in every relation, if both of these attributes are really divine. In particular, the only limit which can be placed upon

divine mercy is the possibility of its application. God willeth that all men shall be saved who can be saved.¹ (*d*) In Scripture the dispensations of God are everywhere revealed as having the ultimate benefit of mankind for their purpose, and the mystery of predestination is in many places revealed as connected with such purpose.²

§ 12. The sum of the matter is that an antithesis of truth and counter-truth is involved which we may not permit ourselves to evade. Both of the doctrines contained in this antithesis are certainly true, and truths cannot really contradict each other. Confessing our inability to afford a rational explanation of their harmony, we have need to retain both. Our knowledge of each is incipient and inadequate, too inadequate to justify our making inferences from either one which are inconsistent with the truth of the other. This is not to evade contradiction by a blind appeal to mystery, but is to acknowledge our mental limitations and to recognize that truths are not less valid and important because too profound for us to define in terms that can be harmonized with our definitions of other truths.

The terms which we have to employ are symbolical, being derived from finite and partial analogies. And the appearance of mutual contradiction is due

¹ 1 Tim. ii. 4-5.

² Gen. xii. 3 with Gal. iii. 14; St. James i. 18. A sound estimate of St. Augustine's predestinarian view is given by Bright, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. pp. 217-220.

to this fact. It has been said that the doctrine of predestination describes the salvation of believers *sub specie aeternitatis*.¹ A truer statement would be that it describes an eternal will and operation *sub specie temporis* — as if there were a *pre* in the divine, an interval of time between the will of God and its effects in time. It is this necessity of saying *pre* and *fore* in describing the eternal that causes the difficulty. We are able, however, to perceive that only in a symbolical sense of language does God, in relation to the events which we describe as future, occupy the standpoint of temporal priority; and there is no temporal interval between either His ordaining will or His knowledge and the events which we describe as foreordained and foreknown by Him. He knows and ordains all things from the eternal standpoint; and, as our figure of the circle is designed to suggest, that standpoint is abreast of, and immediate to, the whole circle of time. The will and knowledge of God does not have to pass through previous moments in that circle in order to reach those moments which by us have to be approached under the laws of temporal sequence. Yet, knowing this to be so, we have no other than temporal terms to employ in describing His will and knowledge.

¹ E.g. by J. Orr, *Progress of Dogma*, pp. 166-167, 294.

CHAPTER II

CREATION

I. *The Doctrine*

§ 1. The doctrine of creation is that the will and operation of God is the true and only ultimate cause of the existence, continuance, and development of the universe and of its contents, whether material or spiritual.¹ Two corollaries are involved in this doctrine: (a) Inasmuch as space and time exist only as finite relations, the former of material substance and the latter of changes and events, they came into existence with the things and events to which they pertain, and creation began in the beginning of time; (b) Since all things owe their being to God, the first materials of which finite things are fashioned were made *ex nihilo* — that is, without the use of pre-

¹ On the doctrine of creation at large, see St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. xlv-xlix; Bishop Pearson, *Apos. Creed*, fol. 47-68; H. P. Liddon, *Some Elem. of Religion*, pp. 55-66; Ad. Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol. Dogm. Specialis*, Tom. I. pp. 260-290; Wilhelm and Scannell, *Cath. Theol.*, Bk. III. Pt. I. chh. i-iv; B. Boedder, *Natural Theol.*, Bk. I. ch. iv; Bk. III; P. Ch. Pesch, *de Deo Creante*; J. O. Dykes, *Divine Worker in Creation*, etc., chh. i-v; D. Stone, *Outl. of Christ. Dogm.*, ch. iv; H. Goodwin, *Found. of the Creed*, pp. 57-70; H. Cotterill, *Does Science Aid Faith with Regard to Creation*; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Cosmology" and "Creation"; S. R. Driver, *Genesis*, pp. 1-36; Hastings, *Encyc. of Religion*, s. v. "Creation."

existing materials. In other words, their coming into being had an efficient cause — the will of God — but they had no substantial source.

This doctrine is exceedingly mysterious. The propositions included in it describe mere beginnings of thought, the lines of which quickly reach the boundary of things intelligible to human understandings, and are lost in the realms of the unknown. For this reason the doctrine suggests problems which no human science or philosophy can hope to solve. Those who undertake to solve them, or are overmuch absorbed in contemplating them, are apt to lose hold upon the doctrine by which they are suggested and to regard it as unintelligible and absurd.

Yet when the propositions with which we are concerned are examined, they are perceived to be both definite and intelligible. If they were not so, they could not have retained, as they have, a permanent place in the conscious beliefs of Christians at large. Many propositions, no doubt, gain acceptance from time to time that can be shown by careful analysis to be mere words, conveying no coherent meaning; but such propositions sooner or later are abandoned and cease to trouble the minds of serious seekers after truth. The doctrine of creation has not met with this fate. It has been assailed from many quarters and has been scrutinized from the most diverse points of view. Yet it retains its place, without substantial alteration from the form in which it was accepted in ancient days; and, although certain

views concerning the external methods and temporal accidents of creation, which formerly prevailed, have given way to modern investigation, no sign appears that the doctrine of creation, strictly considered, is in danger of overthrow.¹

That this doctrine should be mysterious and raise baffling problems is inevitable, for it is concerned with ultimate origins. These lie beyond the boundary of human experience, and therefore can neither become the subject-matter of scientific investigation nor be pictured by human imagination.² If the truth in this direction is to be known at all, it must be known through supernatural revelation; and upon such revelation our certainty depends, whatever partial confirmations of the truth of this revelation we may seem to discover in the phenomena of nature.

§ 2. Among the problems suggested by the doctrine of creation those which have chiefly engaged attention are two: (a) the relation of creation to

¹ On the history of the doctrine of creation, see Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctr.*, §§ 47-48, 127-130, 165-167, 171, 264, 296; Neander, *Hist. of Dogmas*, Vol. I. pp. 112-127; Vol. II. pp. 564-568; J. A. Macculloch, *Compar. Theol.*, ch. v; Hastings, *Encyc. of Relig.*, s. v. "Creation"; *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, s. v. "Creation," etc., II, III. Of patristic treatments may be noted: Theophilus, *ad Autol.*, II. x-xxviii; St. Irenæus, *adv. Haer.*, esp. II; St. Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, XI; St. Anselm, *Monol.*, viii-ix.

² The agnostic form of this difficulty is given by Herbert Spencer, *First Princ.* (6th ed.), pp. 30-36. He is answered by H. Cotterill, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-111. In general see W. G. T. Shedd, *Syst. Theol.*, Vol. I. pp. 470-471.

time; (b) the possibility of creation *ex nihilo*. The first of these is partly scientific and partly philosophical. We first reckon with its scientific aspect, or the antiquity of the visible universe.

On this subject theology must look to the natural sciences, and to the results of natural investigation, for such light as can be had. This has often been forgotten; and, because the Bible is given to us by God, many have inferred that it can be applied to the infallible solution of non-spiritual problems — in particular to a determination of the external order and method of creation and of its date. As this mistake has been considered in a previous volume¹ and is no longer common among the intelligent, we need not again dwell upon it. It is sufficient to say that, while the range of natural science is limited — being confined to a description and co-ordination of such facts and phenomena as are open to natural investigation — within this sphere the conclusions of scientific experts are the most trustworthy that can be had, and ought to be accepted until further investigation leads to their modification. The fact that natural sciences are progressive, and often make progress by correcting previous conclusions, does not in the least alter the necessity of depending upon

¹ *Authority, Eccles. and Biblical*, ch. vii. §§ 5-6. The point is that Holy Scripture is a human literature which God has given us for a certain spiritual end, the fulfilment of which does not depend upon the value of that literature for other ends. Cf. H. C. Cotterill, *op. cit.*, Pt. I. ch. ii. pp. 63-74.

them for such knowledge as can be had concerning their proper subject-matters.

The ultimate origin of the universe is not open to natural investigation; but the physical sciences have thrown important light upon subsequent developments, and upon the antiquity of the visible order. It is no longer possible to defend the opinions concerning the age of the world which have been deduced from the narratives of Genesis. The remotest date which can be thus obtained belongs, comparatively speaking, to a very modern period in the natural history of the universe.¹

Various lines of investigation have established beyond all reasonable doubt that man existed previously to the earliest date to which his origin is referred by those who depend upon biblical chronologies for its determination.² Archæological investigations show that at Ussher's date for man's origin, 4004 B.C., civilizations existed in Eastern lands which must have required many previous generations for their development.³ Whatever may have been the mental

¹ On biblical dates of creation, see *Authority, Eccles. and Biblical*, p. 226, note; Hastings, *Dict. of Bible*, s. v. "Chronology of the Old Test.," i; Cheyne, *Encyc. Biblica*, s. v. "Bible," A. 5 (1), and "Genesis," v; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Chronology, Biblical," (1)-(3); *Church Quarterly Review*, April, 1893, Art. I; *Commentaries on Genesis* by S. R. Driver, Jas. Skinner, etc.

² Dr. Driver says that man has existed not less than 20,000 years. Many conservative writers say at least 10,000 years. The materialistic Haeckel, on the other hand, says more than 100,000 years.

³ This appears in almost all recent histories of oriental nations, and in descriptions of archæological research in Babylonia.

capacity of Adam, even the biblical narrative shows him to have been entirely innocent of the elements of material civilization; and the invention of the arts upon which its development depends are there attributed to his descendants. The existence of radically different languages is now known to have preceded the biblical date of the confusion of tongues by many centuries. These divergences represent differences in forms of thought which appear to require ages for their development, and the several languages of which we have ancient specimens are stamped with the traces of such development. Ethnology corroborates these conclusions. The differences which now distinguish the races, *e.g.* white and black, are known to be at least more ancient than the date assigned by biblical chronologies to the deluge.¹ We must therefore either abandon the belief that both races are descended from the same human parents, or conclude that the long ages required for the growth of their characteristic differences commenced before the biblical date of Adam. Relics of human activity have been found beneath the present crust of the earth's surface which appear to carry man's origin back to a time which is more ancient than any date which can be deduced from scriptural indications.² It is true that the antiquity

¹ S. R. Driver, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxiv-xxxv; Hastings, *Encyc. of Religion*, s. v. "Deluge" (by F. H. Woods).

² S. R. Driver, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxvii-xl. Human remains are found in the Pleistocene period — the early quarternary or post-tertiary.

of some of these relics is doubtful, and that the geological measures of time are relative and far from exact. But the evidence of paleontology is sufficient in quantity and quality, when combined with the other evidence which we have rapidly summarized, to convince all who are not hampered by belief in the historical and scientific inerrancy of biblical writers that the human race had existed many generations before 4004 B.C.

This conclusion fits in with, and is confirmed by, the results of investigation into the age of the earth and of the heavenly bodies. The conclusion that the changes in the earth's surface which have occurred in past ages were brought about by causes which still operate is now generally considered to be established. The law of dissipation of energy is also generally accepted, and it is probable that the earth's surface is not changing so rapidly at the present time as in the early ages of its history. But after every credible allowance has been made for this law, the evidence of the rocks as exhibited in geological science appears to establish beyond reasonable doubt the conclusion that many hundred-thousands of years have elapsed since the earth began to be. Whatever sudden upheavals may have occurred in former ages, many of the changes which have occurred—such as cooling of the earth's crust and the formation of rocks and deposits of various kinds—cannot have been produced by these upheavals alone, but must have taken place gradually and have required

many long ages for their accomplishment. It is no doubt thinkable that God should, for the testing of our faith, have suddenly created the seeming evidences of antiquity which we are considering; but consideration of the known methods of divine operations makes such a supposition quite incredible.

Geological evidences are corroborated by astronomy. It has come to be recognized that the light that comes from some of the heavenly bodies has taken thousands of years to reach us, and we must push back the time of their development to the condition in which men have observed them to a date that is much more ancient than the period at which they began to be observed. Moreover, we are compelled, by all the probabilities which scientific knowledge has established, to assume that these bodies had required many ages to reach the stellar shape and condition which they had attained when their light began its protracted journey through the space which separates them from this earth.¹

The theory of evolution, incapable of direct demonstration though it be, is based upon an accumulation of circumstantial evidence which cannot reasonably be rejected.² This theory is applicable, in different forms, both to the organic and to the inorganic universe. The world has grown to be what it is

¹ T. R. Birks, *Scrip. Doctr. of Creation*, pp. 89-103; S. R. Driver, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-25 (gives other references).

² See ch. iii, below; and the writer's *Evolution and the Fall*, Lects. i-iii.

to-day through many successive stages of development, and the amount of time required for the changes which have occurred is exceedingly great — beyond computing. The evidences that this is so have rudely shaken men's previous conceptions, but have immensely enlarged our ideas of the power, wisdom, and resourcefulness of the Creator. So far from affording just reasons for doubt, the phenomena which modern science has brought to our attention impart a fulness of meaning to the doctrine of creation which it has never before possessed for believers.

If a scientifically ignorant writer of old could say, "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth His handiwork,"¹ his modern successors can repeat his words with a fulness of meaning of which the ancients did not dream.

§ 3. Yet time is finite, for it is nothing else than a relation and measure of finite changes. It is susceptible of division, and only in the sense that the circumference of a limited circle is endless can it be said to be without beginning. The circumference of time must have come into existence; and since it exists only as a relation of the changes in the finite universe, its origin must have coincided with the origin of the universe.

These considerations force upon our attention a problem which was mentioned in the previous chapter — that of the relation between the necessarily eternal and timeless quality of divine action and the

¹ Psa. xix. 1.

temporal quality of the processes of nature wherein the work of God is exhibited. Several paradoxes are involved. The universe began to be, but temporally speaking it is everlasting, since its beginning coincided with that of time, and before it began to be there was no time. There were no previous ages in which God existed in solitude, and the whole problem as to what God was doing before creation is meaningless. There was no "before creation," for "before" implies time, and before creation can only mean time before time — an obvious impossibility. Scripture, indeed, uses such phrases as "before the world was";¹ but this language is symbolical. It describes in temporal terms — the only terms which are practically available — that aspect of transcendence which becomes apparent when eternity is contemplated in relation to antiquity, *a parte ante*. Eternity did not begin when the world began to be, but transcends past as well as all other time. This transcendence is symbolized by the word "before"; and the expression is not misleading, unless we make the transcendence of eternity mean an extension of time. Eternity is not longer time. It is a non-temporal centre, so to speak, which is equally and directly abreast of every part of the whole circle of time, and could not fail to be so if that circle were indefinitely enlarged.

In a sense creation may be said to have existed forever. The meaning is that it is as ancient as

¹ St. John xvii. 5.

time itself. Apart from creaturely changes no time exists. On the other hand, our incapacity to compute the duration of the world affords no evidence that it had no beginning. We cannot demonstrate the impossibility that a thing which is naturally subject to change should be without origin or beginning. But a sense of incongruity is unavoidable when we thus combine such ideas; and the truth that some date, however remote, must be set for the beginning of created things is made certain by supernatural revelation. This date is indeed beyond our computing, but all things temporal began to be. To doubt it is to doubt the Word of God. Yet the act of creating, in so far as it is a divine act, is eternal; and an eternal act can neither begin nor end, but is always complete and is never over with.¹ No predications which imply a subjection to temporal limitations can be applied to a divine act except in a purely symbolical sense. Thus we are confronted by an eternal act issuing in a temporal effect — an undated cause revealed in a dated event. The single word

¹ Cf. Tertullian, *Apol.*, xxvi. St. Augustine confesses that God has always had creatures over which to be Lord, and that creatures have always existed; but explains "always" to mean "in all time," and says that time itself has been created. *De Civ. Dei*, xii. 15. Cf. *de Trin.*, I. i. 3; *de Gen. et Lit.*, v. 5. The idea that creation is not an origination, but an eternal relation of dependence upon God, is found in Jas. Martineau, *Religion*, Vol. II. pp. 137-141, and Roger's *Religious Concep. of the World*, pp. 164-167. St. Augustine unsnarls the confusion of thought involved, in *de Civ. Dei*, xi. 4-6. Cf. B. Boedder, *Natural Theol.*, pp. 138-145; T. A. Lacey, *Elem. of Christ. Doctr.*, pp. 92-93.

“creation” combines these truths in the most paradoxical juxtaposition. Creation as an act of God is eternal and timeless; but creation as an effect of divine action is temporal and had a beginning. The nature of the act and the nature of the effect, when contemplated together, exhibit the insoluble antithesis which emerges whenever we consider the eternal and the temporal in mutual relations.¹ To borrow once more the terms by which a circle is described, the temporal circumference is a thing of measure and of succession, while the eternal centre is exempt from both; and the close relation between the two leaves the contrast between them unremoved and the reality of both untouched.

§ 4. The proposition that God created the first material of the universe out of nothing, *ex nihilo*, constitutes an obvious inference from the doctrine that the substance of the universe as well as its form ultimately owes its origin to the will of God.² This inference is nowhere directly asserted in the proto-canonical Scriptures.³ The nearest approximation to

¹ Cf. St. Augustine, *Confess.* XI. x-xxxi; T. R. Birks, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-89. Eternity is treated of in *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. xi. § 2.

² On creation *ex nihilo*, see C. M. Walsh, *Doctr. of Creation* (historical and noncommittal); St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. xlv. 1-2; C. J. Ellicott, *Found. of Sacred Study*, 1st Series, pp. 125-130; Thomas Jackson, *Works*, Vol. V. pp. 224-258; J. O. Dykes, *Divine Worker*, ch. iii; B. Boedder, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-112, 209-210; W. Profeit, *Creation of Matter*.

³ The word בָּרָא in Gen. i. 1, Dr. Driver says, “is used exclusively of God, to denote *vis.* the production of something fundamentally

such assertion is found in the words, "By faith we understand that the worlds, *τοὺς αἰῶνας*, have been framed by the word of God, so that what is seen hath not been made out of things which do appear."¹ But things which do not appear are not, by the very meaning of terms, necessarily equivalent to nothing. In another passage we are told that in the Son "were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible," etc.²

The nature of invisible spirits appears to preclude the supposition that, if created, they were made from pre-existing materials. But this conclusion is an inference rather than an express statement of Scripture. The only express assertion of an *ex nihilo* creation contained in the Bible is found in the deuterocanonical Scriptures: "I beseech thee, my son, look upon the heaven and the earth, and upon all that is therein, and consider that God made them of things that were not."³

The truth of such language cannot be evaded except from either a pantheistic, an atheistic, or a dualistic standpoint.⁴ If all things owe their existence, by the exercise of a sovereign originative power, altogether transcending that of man." But it does not necessarily exclude pre-existing materials. Cf. C. M. Walsh, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-13; Jas. Skinner, *Genesis*, i. 1, pp. 12-16.

¹ Heb. xi. 3. Cf. B. F. Westcott, *in loc.*, and on *τοὺς αἰῶνας* in Heb. i. 2. Hebrew thought conceived of the world as an unrolling drama.

² Col. i. 16. See J. B. Lightfoot and T. K. Abbott, *in loc.*

³ 2 Macc. vii. 28.

⁴ On which see § 7, below.

ence to creation, the first things made cannot have been made of things already existing. They had a cause — the will of God — but no material source, for none existed. The ancient fathers perceived the necessity of this conclusion,¹ and its denial has ever been regarded as fatal to Christian doctrine at large.

Such a doctrine is perfectly intelligible in meaning. Were it not so, it would not have been a subject of rational controversy. But the production of substance without the use of pre-existing substance is unimaginable, and many have hastily inferred that it is unthinkable. It is unimaginable because only its products come within the sphere of things which can be imaged. It is conceivable, for all the terms involved — will-causation, substances resulting, and the exclusion of other factors — lie within the range of human conceptions. That it is unimaginable does not prove its impossibility, for the opposite theory — the eternity of matter — also baffles imagination. Whatever may be our ultimate theory of substance, that theory must involve aspects

¹ Patristic opinion is given by C. M. Walsh, *op. cit.*, chh. iii-iv. The first definite assertion of $\xi\ \delta\acute{o}\kappa\ \delta\upsilon\tau\omega\upsilon\varsigma$ appears in *Pastor of Hermas*, 1st Vision, I. i-vi. It was emphasized frequently against gnostic and Manichæan ideas. St. Augustine fixed the doctrine of the West: e.g. in *Conf.*, xii. 7; *de Civ. Dei*, xii. 2. St. John Damasc. *Orth. Fid.*, II. v, did so for the East. Subsequent classical references are St. Anselm, *Monol.*, vi-xi; St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. lxxv. 3 (“Creation is the production of a thing according to its whole substance, nothing being presupposed”); 4th Lateran Council, *Decreta*, cap. 1 (in Denzinger, *Enchirid.*, 335).

which cannot be imagined. Imagination is exclusively concerned with finites and concretes, their forms, properties, and phenomena, regarded, ideally at least, as existing. It is inapplicable to eternity of existence, for eternity is neither a finite nor a concrete. It is inapplicable to creation out of nothing, for the non-existence of anything imaginable is presupposed until the production is completed.

We are told in the name of science, although the assertion is ancient, that nothing can come from nothing, *ex nihilo nihil fit*. If by *ex nihilo* is meant without a cause, the assertion is true, although philosophical rather than scientific; and the Christian doctrine teaches that creation was caused by the will of God. If it means that we cannot truly regard "nothing" as a source or cause of something, such a statement is a self-evident truism. The Christian doctrine does not treat "nothing" as a source, but simply says that primitive substance had no pre-existing source, although it had a cause. If the assertion we are considering means that no cause open to scientific scrutiny is capable of producing something out of nothing, we must again agree, for science is concerned with finite causation, and creation *ex nihilo* obviously transcends finite power.¹ The question at issue is, admitting as we must that the first

¹ On *ex nihilo nihil fit*, see H. Calderwood, *Philos. of Infin.*, pp. 355-361; J. O. Dykes, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-63. The difficulty was faced by St. Anselm, *Monol.*, viii, and by St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. xlv. 1 *ad tert.*

substances cannot have come from pre-existing materials, Did they have an origin at all? If they did, they were necessarily caused to be without the use of pre-existing materials. In brief, they were created *ex nihilo*. To deny the power of God thus to create is to venture beyond the sphere of natural science, which has nothing to do with ultimate origins, and is to indulge in a negative dogmatism for which neither science nor philosophy can afford warrant.¹

II. Evidence

§ 5. The doctrine of creation is not peculiar to Christianity, but pertains to natural theology and finds many witnesses among pagan writers.² Pagan notions of creation, indeed, are often grotesque and mixed with mythological conceptions of polytheistic nature. But polytheism has rarely been able wholly to extinguish an underlying belief in some kind of creation of all things by God, or by the gods. This belief is so connected with theism that, like that doctrine, it is supported by a *consensus gentium*, traces of which students of comparative theology discover in all religions.

But it is a mistake to suppose that creation can be formally demonstrated by unassisted natural

¹ Thomas Huxley acknowledged this in *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1886, pp. 201-202. Elsewhere he describes the doctrine of creation as unscientific. It is so in this sense, that it lies beyond the range of physical investigation. That does not make it unknowable.

² Cf. J. A. Macculloch, *Compar. Theol.*, ch. v.

reason. The natural argument for creation shares in the limitations as well as in the validity of theistic argument.¹ Although the being of God is abundantly confirmed by evidences drawn from nature and reason, so that men are without excuse who reject theistic doctrine, the fact remains that the evidence for such doctrine is probable rather than demonstrative — sufficient to warrant what is called moral certainty, but not compelling assent even among intelligent investigators. Apart from grace and a disposition to believe, men easily yield to a tendency to hold down the truth in unrighteousness.² The same is true of the doctrine of creation, belief in which depends upon belief in God the Creator.

Positively speaking, the evidences which confirm our belief in God also confirm our belief in creation. This is partly because the only idea of God that can stand the test of rational analysis involves a dependence of all else upon Him for being and development, and partly because some of the arguments by which the existence of God is confirmed are in themselves arguments for the creation of the universe by Him. The ætiological argument is based upon the axiomatic assumption that finite things and events require a true cause, and nothing can satisfy this requirement except an uncaused cause of all.³ To exclude substance from the application of this principle is

¹ On which see *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. iii. §§ 3, 7.

² Rom. i. 18-22.

³ Cf. *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. v., esp. pp. 150-151.

to place an external limitation upon God which reduces Him to finitude and nullifies the only tenable idea of God. Strictly speaking, the teleological argument has reference to a Fashioner rather than to a Creator of the universe. But it presupposes the ætiological argument, and a close scrutiny of the elementary constituents of the world of substance tends to show that even in their original forms they are adapted to ends, and are therefore manufactured articles.¹

The word "substance" — that which stands under — denotes in popular usage something solid and enduring. Recent investigations have led many to doubt whether the elements of matter are either solid or permanent, and the word "substance" has seemed for the moment to be unsuitable. Yet in any case we have to postulate some reality behind material phenomena, and no better word than "substance" is available to denote this. The use of the word in the doctrine of creation involves no further contention than that the realities, *whatever* they may be, which underlie external phenomena have been created by God.²

The discoveries made in connection with radio-

¹ *Op. cit.*, ch. vi. 5. On the natural evidence of creation, see W. Profeit, *Creation of Matter*, esp. ch. xi; Jas. Martineau, *Religion*, Vol. I. pp. 305-313; R. Flint, *Theism*, pp. 170-174; V. F. Storr, *Devel. and Divine Purpose*, pp. 197-198.

² See Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, and Fleming, *Vocab. of Philos.*, q. vii. On other theological uses of the term, see *The Trinity*, ch. iii. § 6 and pp. 203-204, where further references are given.

activity are still very fresh, and insufficient time has elapsed to make a final estimate of the theories to which they have given birth. These discoveries show that the so-called atoms are not solid, but contain a large number of smaller particles, called corpuscles or electrons, which are combined in eddying systems controlled by electrical energy. The corpuscles appear to be charged with negative electricity and the centre of the atom with positive electricity. We need not enter into further details.¹

It is significant for our subject, however, to call attention to the problem which is raised with regard to the nature of corpuscles. If they are the ultimates of matter and are solid, the problem of creation *ex nihilo* is not changed in complexion. If they are strains or modifications of ether, we are confronted by the mystery of ether, still unsolved. If they are simply phenomena of force or motion, and force is the ultimate reality denoted by substance, then creation *ex nihilo* means only the production of finite forces by the infinite power and will of God. These forces are subject to mechanical laws which from the beginning display harmonious adaptation to the ends which are realized in the universe. The conclusion of the matter is that, if recent discoveries have any bearing on the doctrine of creation, they harmonize with it and require no essential modification of it.

§ 6. The Christian's definite assurance of crea-

¹ On this subject, see W. C. D. Whetham, *Recent Develop. of Phys. Science*, chh. vi-vii; R. K. Duncan, *The New Knowledge*.

tion is derived from supernatural revelation, and apart from such assurance men have never been able to retain a secure and unperverted doctrine on the subject. Scripture begins with the proclamation, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth";¹ and this teaching finds a clear iteration in all parts of the Bible. "Thou art the Lord, even Thou alone; Thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth and all things that are thereon, the seas and all that is in them, and Thou preservest them all."² "By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made: and all the hosts of them by the Breath of His mouth."³ "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever Thou hadst formed the earth, and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, Thou art God."⁴ "Thou sendest forth Thy Spirit, and they are created."⁵ "Thou hast established the earth, and it abideth. They abide this day according to Thine ordinances; for all things are Thy servants."⁶ "The Lord hath made everything for His own purpose: yea even the wicked for the day of evil."⁷ "I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil."⁸

The New Testament repeats the teaching of the Old, and reveals more clearly the relations of the

¹ Gen. i. 1. ² Neh. ix. 6. ³ Psa. xxxiii. 6. ⁴ Psa. xc. 2.

⁵ Psa. civ. 30. ⁶ Psa. cxix. 90-91.

⁷ Prov. xvi. 4. This does not mean that God is the Author of their wickedness, but of their being.

⁸ Isa. xlv. 7. A similar explanation applies. God creates those who sin and does not prevent their sinning.

Son to creation. Addressing the Athenians, St. Paul said, "The God that made the world and all things therein, . . . giveth to all life, and breath, and all things; and He made of one every nation, . . . in Him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain even of your own poets have said, For we are also His offspring."¹ "Of Him, and through Him, and unto Him are all things."² "To us there is one God, the Father of whom are all things, and we unto Him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through Him."³ It is declared of Christ, "the firstborn of all creation," that "in Him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible, . . . all things through Him and unto Him; . . . and in Him all things hold together."⁴ The Son of God is described as one "through whom also He made the worlds . . . upholding all things by the word of His power."⁵ "By faith we understand that the worlds have been framed by the Word of God, so that what is seen hath not been made out of things which do appear."⁶ To the Lord it is said, "Thou didst create all things, and because of Thy will they were, and were created."⁷

§ 7. No substitute for the doctrine of creation either has been or can be formulated which does not

¹ Acts xvii. 24-28.

² Rom. xi. 36.

³ 1 Cor. viii. 6.

⁴ Col. i. 15-17.

⁵ Heb. i. 2-3.

⁶ Heb. xi. 4.

⁷ Rev. iv. 11. On the biblical doctrine of creation, see Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. *vv.* "Cosmogony" and "Creature."

in some manner involve one or other of the three positions ordinarily described as pantheistic, atheistic, and dualistic.¹ In other words, to reject the Christian doctrine requires, logically speaking, that one should hold either that the world has no distinct reality of its own, or that there is no God, or that God and the world are both ultimates and co-eternal. One may indeed take refuge in sceptical agnosticism, but to do this is not to find a substitute for the doctrine of creation. It is rather to evade the exercise of one's reason on the subject.²

Demonstration, whether of truth or falsity, is inapplicable to theories concerning ultimate reality; and the only way that the credibility of such theories can be tested is by their results in working. Christian theism, of which the doctrine of creation is an inseparable corollary, has stood the test far better than any rival hypothesis. Pantheism nullifies the distinction between right and wrong, reduces moral responsibility to illusion, and thus fails to accord with fundamental postulates of human thought and life. Atheism does likewise, and has no shred of

¹Emanation theories, in ultimate analysis, are pantheistic, although ancient gnosticism attempted to combine them with a dualistic view of the relation between God and matter. See *The Trinity*, pp. 55-57, and references there given. If the creature is either an emanation from or a modification of divine substance, the Christian doctrine of God, as well as of creation, is untrue. If matter is eternal, there are two eternals—God and matter—and God is externally limited and finite.

²On Agnosticism, see *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. ii.

evidence in its favor. The exclusively mechanical or naturalistic interpretation of nature can only be justified by repudiating many of the data with which psychological science is concerned and which are attested by the universal testimony of consciousness. Dualism violates the principle of unity which the human reason instinctively seeks to find at the root of the totality of things. All these alternatives are plainly opposed to every genuine form of Christianity. As this is not a treatise in apologetics and the systems referred to have already been considered in a previous volume, any further consideration of them is not here to be expected.¹

A few words should be said, however, with regard to the theory of an eternal creation — the theory that finite things constitute an eternal sphere and condition of the external operations of God, although having their ground of being in God and being essentially dependent upon His will. Traces of this theory can be found in a few ancient writers, and it was defended by the late Dr. James Martineau.² The abstract possibility of eternal creation has been discussed by St. Thomas and other writers, who have reached

¹ See *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. ix, where other references are given.

² It is found in Origen, *De Prin.*, ii. 4; iii. 5; Jas. Martineau, *Religion*, Vol. I. pp. 381-390; *Seat of Authority*, pp. 29-36; A. C. Fraser, *Philos. of Theism*, pp. 128-131; A. K. Rogers, *Relig. Conception of the World*, pp. 164-167. *Per contra*, the writer's *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. v. § 7.

different conclusions.¹ Only a unitarian standpoint affords logical basis for the view that it is necessary. Trinitarian doctrine vindicates the self-sufficiency of God independently of creatures,² and the impossibility of creation *ex nihilo*, as has been shown in this chapter, is not open to demonstration.

The objection that such creation involves a cataclysmal breach of continuity has no validity. The principle of continuity cannot, indeed, be repudiated without impugning the wisdom of God and the coherent orderliness with which all events are made by Him to work together for the fulfilment of His world-plan. But this principle presupposes the existence of the universe and is applicable only to its phenomena. The origin of the universe is the initiation in time of the sequences to which continuity is applicable, and in which it becomes apparent. That initiation itself is the *prius* of continuity rather than an event within the sequences to which it can be applied.³

We have seen that neither the eternal existence of finite substance nor its creation in time can be demonstrated on grounds of natural investigation and reason. Such light on the subject as can be had must therefore come from supernatural revelation, and the temporal origin of the universe is plainly

¹ St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. xlv. 1; B. Boedder, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-141; Wilhelm and Scannell, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 363; J. O. Dykes, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-58.

² Cf. *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. x. § 8; *The Trinity*, ch. vi. § 11.

³ Cf. H. C. Cotterill, *Does Science Aid Faith*, pp. 111-112.

taught in Holy Scripture. In particular it is shown in the passages which speak of God as existing before He created the world, "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever Thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting Thou art God."¹ The "before" is of course symbolical. The meaning is that, if there had been a "before" creation, its existence would have presupposed the being of God.

III. *Method and Purpose*

§ 8. The cause of creation, summarily speaking, is the will of God. Coming to particulars, the moving cause is the bountiful goodness of God; the Agent is the eternal Son; the efficient perfecting cause is the Holy Spirit; the final cause is the glory of God. The effect includes temporal continuance and development, as well as origination, and involves both the immanence of God in the world and His transcendence. The development of the universe proceeds in an orderly manner, without breach in the continuity of the divine plan; but with parts assigned to creaturely wills. All is overruled by divine providence, and is designed for the development of a kingdom of saints, wherein God shall be glorified and enjoyed forever.

The doctrine of the Trinity shows that God is in

¹ Psa. ix. 2. Cf. Prov. viii. 23-25; St. John xvii. 5.

nowise dependent upon the existence of creatures in order to be self-sufficient; for within His indivisible being all the conditions of full personal life and blessedness eternally exist. The act of creation, therefore, was not due to any deficiency in God apart from creatures, but was voluntary.¹ God was moved to create by His goodness — His bountifulness. That is, He willed that His blessedness should be participated in by others, who were created to that end. Creation being supposed, the glory of God must be its chief end, for God is by eternal necessity the *Summum Bonum* of all that is or can be.² But the act of creation is not simply self-centred. It is an act of goodness. The eternal mind of God contemplates potential creatures as objects of His abounding love, and His will causes them to exist that they may not only glorify Him, but also enjoy Him forever.³

§ 9. The operations of God proceed from the indivisible Trinity, and whatever God does the eternal Three do inseparably. But since the divine Persons are mutually distinct in the mode of their subsistence, their relations to their common operations are also distinct,⁴ and this appears in the man-

¹ Bishop Pearson, *op. cit.*, fol. 56-58; B. Boedder, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-137.

² St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. xlv. 4; H. P. Liddon, *Advent Serms.*, pp. 545-547.

³ T. B. Strong, *Manual of Theol.*, pp. 204-206; H. P. Liddon, *Sermons on the Old Test.*, pp. 13-15.

⁴ *The Trinity*, ch. viii. § 1. Cf. W. H. Hutchings, *Person and*

ner in which the mystery of creation is revealed to us. Although the will of God is to be ascribed without qualification to all the divine Persons,¹ the truth that the Father is, so to speak, the Fountain of Deity,² makes it proper to ascribe creation primarily to the Father's will, and to "appropriate"³ the name Creator to the Father.⁴ The Father's will is indeed treated in Scripture as the determining principle of all external operations of the Trinity, and therefore of the missions and economies of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. The times and seasons are set within the Father's own authority.⁵

In harmony with all this, the relations of the second and third Persons to the act of creation are exhibited in subordinate terms. The Son is the Agent or mediating cause of all things, for through Him God made the worlds.⁶ He is "the beginning of

Work of the Holy Ghost, pp. 49-50. St. Augustine, *de Trin.*, iv. 30, says that "the operation of the Trinity is . . . inseparable in each severally of those things which are said to pertain properly to the manifesting of either the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit."

¹ Creation is ascribed to more than one divine Person in 1 Cor. viii. 6. Cf. *Psa.* xxxiii. 6; *civ.* 30. See J. O. Dykes, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-328.

² *The Trinity*, ch. vii. § 8.

³ *Op. cit.*, ch. viii. § 3. Appropriation is "the practice of distributing to particular Persons in the Trinity certain names, attributes, and operations which . . . belong to them all."

⁴ *Isa.* lxiv. 8; *Mal.* ii. 10.

⁵ *Acts* i. 7.

⁶ *Heb.* i. 2. Cf. *Psa.* xxxiii. 6; *St. John* i. 3, 10; 1 *Cor.* viii. 6; *Col.* i. 16; *Heb.* i. 10.

the creation of God,"¹ and the Logos and Wisdom of God, whom the Lord possessed in the beginning of His way, "as a Master-workman."² He is the Image³ or exemplary cause, according to which all things were made, as recapitulated and completed in man; who is said to have been made in God's own image,⁴ to the end that in "a dispensation of the fulness of the times," God might "sum up all things in Christ."⁵ The climax of the eternal purpose in creation is that, when man is "fullgrown," he will attain "unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ."⁶ So it is declared that, being "the image of the invisible God," Christ is the "firstborn" in relation to "all creation; for in Him were all things created . . . through Him and unto Him, . . . and in Him all things hold together."⁷

These truths were emphasized by ancient writers, who appropriated Platonic terms from Philo to describe the Logos as the Reason for things, in whom the Father eternally contemplates the patterns (*παράδειγματα*) of things.⁸ As eternally existing in the Father He is *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*; and as proceeding forth to create He is *λόγος προφορικός*. This going forth was called generation (*γέννησις*), a use of terms which

¹ Revel. iii. 14. ² Prov. viii. 22, 30. ³ Heb. i. 3; 2 Cor. iv. 4.

⁴ Gen. i. 26, 27. ⁵ Eph. i. 10. ⁶ Eph. iv. 13. ⁷ Col. i. 15-17.

⁸ On Philo's Logos doctrine, see Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, extra volume, s. v. "Philo" (by Jas. Drummond), pp. 205-207; Chas. Bigg, *Christ. Platonists*, pp. 14-23; H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of Our Lord*, pp. 63 *et seq.*

was afterwards abandoned as prejudicial to the doctrine of the Son's eternal generation.¹

The sum of the matter is that the Son is (*a*) the eternal Word,² Wisdom,³ and Image of God,⁴ according to which all things are made; (*b*) the Agent through whom they are created;⁵ (*c*) the end and goal unto whom they are ordered;⁶ (*d*) the immanent principle of coherence in all things;⁷ (*e*) the Light of the world and Source of creaturely reason and intelligence;⁸ (*f*) the Lord of all;⁹ (*g*) the Mediator between God and all else, especially between God and man.¹⁰ The mystery of mediation is not to be limited to the work of redemption, nor even to the dispensation of the Incarnation more comprehensively regarded. It is involved in the eternal relations of the Trinity and became actual with the origin of creatures. The Incarnation constitutes a critical moment in the mediatorial drama, and one which was willed from eternity; but whether it pertains to what is called the antecedent will of God, or was willed as a conse-

¹ The Trinity, ch. iii. § 3, where references are given on the early Logos theology.

² St. John i. 1 with i. 14; Rev. xix. 13.

³ Prov. viii. 12; 1 Cor. i. 24.

⁴ 2 Cor. iv. 4; Col. i. 15; Heb. i. 3. Cf. Gen. i. 26-27; ix. 6.

⁵ Psa. xxxiii. 6 (cf. Gen. i. 3, etc.); 1 Cor. viii. 6; Ephes. iii. 9; Heb. i. 2; xi. 3; St. John i. 3, 10; Col. i. 16; Rev. iv. 11.

⁶ Ephes. i. 10; Col. i. 16.

⁷ Col. i. 17. Cf. Rev. xxii. 13; Heb. i. 2; Ephes. i. 23.

⁸ St. John i. 4, 9; viii. 12.

⁹ Acts x. 36; Col. i. 15-19; Rev. xix. 16.

¹⁰ 1 Tim. ii. 5. Cf. St. John v. 17-20.

quence of the fall, is not revealed.¹ The need of mediation, however, grows out of the coming into being of creatures, and the Son of God is the one and only Mediator.²

The part of the Holy Spirit in creation is that of energizing, life-giving, and perfecting. The psalmist says, "Thou sendest forth Thy Spirit, they are created,"³ and declares that all the hosts of the heavens were made by the Breath of God's mouth.⁴ The Spirit is said to have brooded over the primitive waters,⁵ and to His presence and operation is ascribed a quickening and life-giving effect.⁶ By the Spirit of God "the heavens are garnished."⁷ In the completed Nicene Creed He is called the Life-giver.⁸

Creation *ex nihilo* is plainly a work of infinite power, and no creature can have been employed as agent.

¹ For the history of this question, see B. F. Westcott, *Epp. of St. John*, pp. 286-328. Cf. D. Stone, *Outl. of Christ. Dogma*, pp. 54-56. The subject is to be considered in our next volume.

² On the Son's part in creation, see P. G. Medd, *One Mediator*, esp. Lects. i-ii; J. B. Lightfoot, *Colossians*, i. 15-17; Bishop Pearson, *op. cit.*, fol. 113-115; Van Oosterzee, *Christ. Dogmatics*, §§ lv-lvi. Of earlier writers, St. Athanasius, *c. Gent.*, 40; St. Cyril Jerus., *Catech.*, xi. 21-24; St. Anselm, *Monol.*, ix-xi.

³ Psa. civ. 30.

⁴ Psa. xxxiii. 6.

⁵ Gen. i. 2.

⁶ Job xxvii. 3; xxxiii. 4. Cf. Gen. ii. 7; St. John vi. 63; Rom. viii. 14; 2 Cor. iii. 6; 1 St. Pet. iii. 18.

⁷ Job xxvi. 13.

⁸ On the part of the Holy Spirit, see W. H. Hutchings, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-49; A. B. Webb, *Presence and Office of the Holy Spirit*, pp. 5-17. The subject has been neglected.

This truth had to be vindicated as against certain gnostic speculations; and also to refute the Arian heresy, which treated the Son as the first of creatures and the agent by whom other creatures were made.¹

§ 10. The relations subsisting between the Creator and the universe are manifold, but may be conveniently summarized under what are called the relative attributes of God—omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. They are not relative in the sense of being dependent for reality upon the existence of the universe. When adequately interpreted they denote what is eternal and essential to the divine nature itself. They signify that in His eternal essence God is such a being that, whenever He is manifested in the spheres of power, knowledge, and presence, He is necessarily revealed as all-powerful, all-knowing, and omnipresent. And these attributes do not describe mere potentialities. God is the almighty Cause of all that is and happens. He never ceases to energize, because He is eternal in His operations, and because nothing can be or happen except by His ultimate causation. His knowledge is also eternal and can neither come into actuality nor pass into forgetfulness, but is ever immediate and “alive to” all spatial things and to all temporal

¹ Col. i. 16. Cf. St. Irenæus, *adv. Hæc.*, ii. 2. 4; ii. 8. 3; iv. 41. 1; St. Athanasius, *c. Arian.*, II. xvi-xvii; St. Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, xii. 24-26; St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. xlv. 5; J. B. Lightfoot and T. K. Abbott, on Col. i. 16.

events. Neither spatial nor temporal relations and intervals can separate Him from His creatures, and nothing can escape His all-pervading presence.¹

These relations are philosophically summed up in the terms "immanence" and "transcendence," which signify antithetic but mutually connected truths, neither of which can be disregarded without a caricature of the other being involved.² Divine immanence signifies the internal and immediate relation of the divine presence, knowledge, and operation to the universe, to its contents, and to its phenomena. God is a being whose centre is everywhere and who energizes beneath and within everything and every sphere of events. "Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit? Or whither shall I flee from Thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, Thou art there: If I make my bed in Sheol, behold Thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, And dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; Even there shall Thy hand lead me, and Thy right hand shall hold me."³ God "worketh all things in all"⁴ with an ever-continuing and ever-immediate energy; so that every fluttering leaf⁵ and every hidden impulse

¹ On the relative attributes, see *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. xii. §§ 1, 3, 4.

² *Op. cit.*, ch. xi. § 5; ch. xii. § 4. Also J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, esp. ch. iii; *Divine Transcendence*, chh. i-iv, *passim*; *Trinity*, pp. 193-203; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Immanence"; Van Oosterzee, *op. cit.*, § xlv. 4-5; J. O. Dykes, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-94; C. Gore, *New Theol.*, etc., Lec. iii.

³ Psa. cxxxix. 7-10. ⁴ 1 Cor. xii. 6. ⁵ Cf. St. Matt. x. 29.

is the manifestation of Him, who is never far from any one of us.¹

But God is also a being whose circumference is nowhere. His presence is not only within but around His handiwork. He transcends all; and it is because of this fact that in each smallest thing the whole of Him, so to speak, is energetically present. In Him, as in an enviroing atmosphere of life, "we live, and move, and have our being."² "The heaven of heavens cannot contain Thee."³ "Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off?"⁴ No relations with creatures can limit God, neither space nor time, neither substance nor finite effects. Creating, upholding, energizing, and pervading all, He transcends in essence, power, knowledge, and presence all that is or can be except Himself. Revealing Himself in very truth through His handiwork, He is infinitely above our measures and apprehensions; so that although we know Him in part, our knowledge is inadequate and symbolical,⁵ and His greatness is ineffable.

Deistic thought placed God outside His universe, so to speak, and sought to magnify Him at the expense of His immanence and resourceful control of finite events. The naturalistic type of evolutionary thought, when directed upon God, tends to make Him the immanent principle of development in the

¹ Acts xvii. 27.

² Acts xvii. 28.

³ 1 Kings viii. 27.

⁴ Jerem. xxiii. 23.

⁵ Cf. *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. ii. § 12.

world, and nothing more.¹ The goal of this is pantheism, which caricatures divine immanence at the cost not only of the truth of transcendence, but of belief in a personal God.

The Incarnation teaches us the truth. Christ is God, dwelling in flesh, but revealing relations with the Father that no human mind can fathom, or even know in part, except so far as Christ has revealed them.² The personal spirit in the human body affords a partial analogy. Our spirits are immanent in our bodies and yet transcend them, and in finite measure control them. The world is not the body of God, nor is God the soul of the world. But God pervades the world, which reveals Him; and yet He is its infinite Creator and ever-sovereign Lord—"over all, and through all, and in all."³

§ II. God is the cause not only of the origin of creatures, but also of their continuance in being and of their operations. In other words He is the Conservator of creatures⁴ and the energizing principle of creaturely action. Nothing can continue to exist except by positive divine causation. As the body ceases to live when its inhabiting spirit is withdrawn,

¹ B. P. Bowne, *Immanence of God*, affords a typical example of exclusive emphasis on immanence.

² Cf. H. P. Liddon, *op. cit.*, Lec. viii. I; J. R. Illingworth, *Trinity*, pp. 202-208.

³ Ephes. iv. 6.

⁴ On conservation, see St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. civ; Rich. Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, I. iii. 2; B. Boedder, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-355; J. O. Dykes, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-33; Wilhelm and Scannell, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. pp. 363-365.

and as the moon would cease to shine if the sun's light were taken away, so creatures would sink into nothingness if God ceased to uphold them in being.¹ All things are upheld by the word of the Son of God's power,² and in God "we live, and move, and have our being."³ And this law holds good with reference to the life of creatures. "Thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust."⁴ This power of sustaining in being, and of returning things to nothingness, is exclusively divine. Physical forces and human manipulations can only change the form and conditions of being; and neither the origination nor the annihilation of substance pertains to creaturely power.⁵ That God wills the annihilation of any created substance can neither be proved nor disproved.⁶ The predicted destruction of this world, and the making of a new heavens and earth,⁷ appears, however, to be a transformation and renovation rather than an annihilation; and all natural analogies point to endless continuance. Such continuance of spiritual creatures appears to be demanded by moral necessity.⁸

¹ The theory of a continued or ever repeated creation from moment to moment is considered adversely by J. O. Dykes, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

² Heb. i. 3.

³ Acts xvii. 28. Cf. Wisd. xi. 25.

⁴ Psa. civ. 29.

⁵ Cf. § 9, *fin*, above.

⁶ St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. civ. 3; Wilhelm and Scannell, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. pp. 364-365. Cf. Eccles. iii. 14; Wisd. i. 13-14.

⁷ 2 St. Pet. iii. 11-13; Rev. xxi. 1, 5; Cf. St. Matt. xxiv. 35.

⁸ Natural science postulates the continuance of substance and its laws. On immortality, see ch. vi. §§ 9-12, below.

All creaturely action requires divine causation, and this causation has been called *concursum*.¹ Whether creatures are endowed with powers of their own — as secondary causes — or exhibit in their operations the immediate action of God,² in any case the immanent energy of God is the condition and ultimate explanation of creaturely operations and events. Not a sparrow can fall to the ground without the Father, and the very hairs of our heads are all numbered.³ It is God Himself that “giveth to all life, and breath, and all things,” in whom we move as well as live and have our being.⁴ In brief, the causation of world-events, including human actions, is not less divine because these events are so ordered that they also flow from physical conditions and in part from creaturely wills.

Modern thought is right in discerning the hand of God not less clearly in natural operations than in the supernatural. The difference between them lies partly in the more articulate revelation of divine purpose which can be perceived in the supernatural, and partly in the fact that miraculous events constitute new and peculiarly visible steps in the working out of the divine plan. Divine miracles cannot destroy the continuity of events, but have a rational

¹ On divine *concursum*, see Wilhelm and Scannell, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. pp. 365-368; B. Boedder, *op. cit.*, pp. 355-370; St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. cv; *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, s. v. “Concursum Divinum.”

² On secondary causation, see ch. iii. § 4, below.

³ St. Matt. x. 29-30.

⁴ Acts xvii. 28.

place in the world-drama, every part of which is from God.¹

§ 12. The drama of creation is twofold. The origination of creaturely substance is followed by its fashioning, ordering, and growth into the world in which we live. The former is called immediate, the latter mediate creation. In modern terms, mediate creation is called development and evolution, and the laws of evolution, so far as scientists can discover them, exhibit methods of God in mediate creation — the manner in which He causes the physical universe to play its part in bringing about

“ one far off divine event,
To which the whole creation moves.”

When regarded from either a theological or a philosophical standpoint, evolution can be seen to presuppose involution — an imparting to created substances of the resident forces and potentialities by virtue of which development occurs. When these forces and potentialities are once involved, physical science tells us, the matter of the universe “passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and . . . the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.”²

But evolution has plainly transcended the resi-

¹ *Introd. to Dogm. Theol.*, ch. ii; *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 162-169. The charge that Christians contrast the supernatural and the natural as respectively divine and undivine cannot be established,

² Herbert Spencer, *First Princ.*, p. 367.

dent forces and possibilities of primitive matter, and this cannot be explained unless further involutions are hypothecated. The forces known to be naturally resident in matter could not of themselves enable it to develop into forms of organic life. The phenomena of life can neither be described in terms of mechanical force nor explained by its causation. Similarly, the development of rational and moral agents cannot be explained by the possibilities previously contained in non-rational and non-moral forms of life. At these transitional points at least, if not at others, the evolution of the universe must have been dependent upon involution of higher causes and potentialities, such as were capable of lifting the lower natures into a higher level of development. Such involutions constitute signs of a supernatural mind and worker and critical stages in the fulfilment of the eternal plan of God.¹

But the evolution of visible things, significant though it be, does not constitute the whole of this plan. The invisible world is as real as the visible, and the part which angelic hosts play in the general scheme of things needs to be allowed for in an adequate view of the universe.² Our knowledge of the

¹ We ought not to conceive of involution as coming from an external source. God is immanent. But we must remember that He is also other than the creatures in whom He is and operates. Evolution has been treated by the writer in *Evolution and the Fall*. See also ch. iii. §§ 4 *et seq.*, below.

² On angels, see ch. v, below.

unseen universe is exceedingly limited, and physical science cannot help us here. But we know enough through supernatural revelation to perceive that the world-plan is more vast and complex than we can imagine, but that all is being developed and ordered for the good of those who love God.

CHAPTER III

DIVINE PROVIDENCE

I. *The Plan and Method*

§ 1. The doctrine of Creation, comprehensively regarded, includes four leading truths: creation *ex nihilo*, preservation, *concursum*, and providence. The first three have been dealt with, and it remains only to consider divine providence.¹ By divine providence is meant the control which God exercises over the course of creaturely events, both in general and in particular, for the furtherance of His plan in creating and for the fulfilment of a purpose to which all things are made to minister.

In speaking of a "divine plan" we use symbolical language—language suggested by the temporal and sequent effects of the divine will as they are apprehended by our minds. No other mode of speech is practically available, but we should not be under-

¹ On providence at large, see St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. ciii-cv; Rich. Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, Bk. I; H. P. Liddon, *Christmastide Serms.*, xviii. pp. 290-302; *Words of Christ*, iii; A. B. Bruce, *Providential Order of the World*; J. O. Dykes, *Divine Worker in Creation and Providence*, esp. chh. xi-xiii; H. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Bk. II; *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, and *Cath. Encyc.*, q. v.; B. Boedder, *Natural Theol.*, Bk. III. chh. ii-iii.

stood to imply that the mind of God operates in a temporal manner. It has been sufficiently emphasized in our first chapter that there can be no temporal interval between God's purpose and its fulfilment; and when we speak of a divine plan we do not assume that God literally has to wait while the temporal effects of His will are being actualized in history. His mind is eternal, and therefore immediate to all time and to all temporal events. Yet His will is revealed to us in temporal effects and sequences, in a progressive series of events which, if it were caused by a finite will like our own, we would call the fulfilment of a plan. The term is therefore suitably applied to the eternal mind of God with reference to creatures, and need not mislead the thoughtful.

God eternally provides for all things, both in general and in detail; that is, His providence is both general and particular. And this is another symbolical use of language. It does not signify that His mind passes by temporal process, or by division of attention, from one particular to another. The mind of God does not geometrize, but utterly transcends the divisions of attention between particulars which distract human minds in attempting to consider many details at once. God indeed perceives the distinctions between particulars, for they are due to His will. But all things, whether general or particular, are with equal facility comprehended and provided for by His mind and will, without effort and without that disturbance which makes it undig-

nified for a human ruler to concern himself with details which can be committed to subordinates.

The providence of God extends even to the contingencies of voluntary creaturely action. That is, He so orders the course of events that the actions of free agents are made to minister to His purpose even when intended by them to thwart His will.¹ The creature's will is given power within its appointed limits to pursue evil courses, and evil results ensue; but even the evils which creatures achieve are overruled and used by God for His own purpose. Every evil is provided for, and the righteous purpose of God cannot be thwarted. In brief, if evil is a by-product for which God is not responsible, it is not permitted to become a useless by-product, but is overruled so as to minister in spite of itself to the divine will.

§ 2. The more significant and determinative elements of the divine plan are made known to us by supernatural revelation. We may not deny that a scientific study of nature, when accompanied by recognition that the visible order constitutes the handiwork of God, throws important light upon the plan of its Creator and Governor. But the ideas thus gained are both partial and subject to modification. They are partial because the visible order does not constitute the totality of factors involved in God's purpose, and are subject to modification because natural sciences are progressive, and can never attain

¹ Cf. ch. i. § 7, above.

to a really complete knowledge of natural processes. Yet the physical sciences have achieved certain results which may be regarded as permanent, and these results are being constantly increased in range and significance. Their validity is shown by their working value, by the accuracy of predictions which are based upon them, and by the progress which they have made possible of man's mastery over the forces of nature. The fact that the unknown is far more extensive than the known does not nullify the fact that what is known enables us to describe laws which obviously constitute more or less central and determining methods in the general development and control of nature. To the natural sciences, as well as to supernatural revelation, we must go if we would learn all that can be learned concerning the divine plan.¹

Theologians have need, of course, to bear in mind the provisional nature of many of the conclusions which scientists accept, and not to attach finality to theological inferences based upon them. The controversies between theologians and physical scientists have been largely due to forgetfulness of this, and to the continued dependence by theologians upon scientific views which experts in natural investigation have modified or abandoned.

¹ The true value and limits of physical science are clearly defined by W. C. D. Whetham, *Recent Devel. of Phys. Science*, ch. i. Saving doctrine does not constitute all that we can learn about divine things. The science of theology assumes the truth of such doctrine,

It should also be remembered that physical sciences are descriptive. They generalize what can be observed in the visible order, and the laws which they define are nothing more than descriptions of ascertained phenomenal sequences in the physical universe. So far as they exhibit the method of divine operations in nature, they afford data for theological science; but they lie wholly outside the range of saving doctrine, and no article of the faith can be determined or modified by natural science.

§ 3. According to Holy Scripture the plan of God in creation is Christocentric — to sum up all things in Christ,¹ and to develop a kingdom of persons who shall enjoy fellowship with their Maker, through Jesus Christ the Mediator, and in His body the Church.² The world, in brief, was created and developed for man. In man the whole lower creation is recapitulated. He is created in the image of God and given a share in divine reason, so that he may bring nature into due subjection, in order that it may minister to his necessities and become a sphere and handmaid of his friendship with God. In Christ this plan is fulfilled.

The knowledge of this purpose was to be revealed to man in the fulness of time, when he had become

but has a wider range, and in this wider field has the same progressive nature that pertains to all human sciences.

¹ See J. B. Lightfoot, *Notes on the Epp. of St. Paul*, pp. 321-322, on ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι.

² Ephes. i. 3-6, 9-12, 20-22; ii. 19-20; iii. 9-11; iv. 9-16; Col. i. 15-20.

capable of assimilating it.¹ The taking of human nature by the Son of God, and His victory in flesh over death, at once completed the revelation of God's purpose and afforded the conditions under which, through the Holy Spirit, man is enabled to advance to his eternally predestined goal of development and to share in divine blessedness through Jesus Christ.

To this end all things visible and invisible are directed. Matter is made for, and is useful to, spirit; and apart from spirit it has no meaning or value.² Its arrangement and the forms which it assumes, whether inorganic or organic, its present uniformities, and even its deficiencies and limitations, constitute conditions and provisions designed for man's probation and development after the spiritual likeness of God. Sin has come in to delay the consummation; but the dispensation of redemption has renewed the possibilities of future glory, and enables men, through Christ, to overrule and even to utilize evil in fulfilling their destiny.

At some future time the present order of nature will have fulfilled its function, and will be transformed into a higher order,—a new heaven and earth,—wherein the creature will no longer be subjected to the vanity of an unfulfilled destiny,³ but will be transfigured and adapted to the ultimate and spirit-

¹ Heb. i. 1-2.

² Cf. J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, ch. i.

³ 2 St. Pet. iii. 10-13; Rev. xxi. 1, 5; Rom. viii. 19-23.

ual uses for which it was originally made.¹ In that day the promise will be fulfilled which is wrapped up in the words "Thou hast made him" (man) "a little lower than the angels, and crowned him with glory and honour";² and even the angels are made to be "ministering spirits, sent forth to do service for the sake of them that shall inherit salvation."³

In brief, man is the supreme and significant product of evolution. For him all other things are made, and to him in Christ they all minister. Their value lies here, and the life that is in them is summed up in his life. Moreover, man is constituted for immortality,⁴ and eternal life is to know God and Jesus Christ whom God hath sent.⁵ This is the real meaning of the universe, the philosophy that can never be stultified, an acceptance and application of which transforms all knowledge into everlasting joy and glory and makes us participators in the Wisdom that "was set up from everlasting," the daily delight of God.⁶

§ 4. The method by which the divine plan in creation is fulfilled, so far as we can learn what it is, is

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 50-54. St. Paul does not say, as certain recent scholars seem to think, that flesh and blood *will* not inherit. He says they *cannot*, that is, have no natural power to inherit. Then he proceeds to argue that the body will be given the power, so that τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο (which certainly refers to the σῶμα ψυχικόν of which he has been speaking) must put on ἀφθαρσίαν, with the result of victory over death.

² Psa. viii. 5-7.

³ Heb. i. 14.

⁴ 2 Tim. i. 9-10; Tit. i. 2.

⁵ St. John xvii. 3.

⁶ Prov. viii. 23, 30.

summed up in the phrase "secondary causation."¹ This causation is partly physical and partly through creaturely wills, partly natural and partly supernatural, and results in an evolution of the universe through physical, moral, and spiritual stages.

The phrase "secondary causation" symbolizes the truth that the factors which are observed to operate in the production of the effects in our experience are not ultimate, but depend for their existence and operation upon a first cause of all, which is the will of God.² In its application to purely physical factors the phrase in question is highly symbolical and describes effects which constitute antecedent conditions of other effects — links in the process of causation. The purely physical cannot cause anything, for in its ultimate analysis causation signifies determination of what shall happen, that is, an act of will.³ But physical things may be real instruments and factors in causation, and the phrase in question implies that they are such instruments — possessed of resident forces imparted to them by God. With our imperfect knowledge of the nature of matter we cannot demonstrate the truth of such an assumption on natural grounds. It has been held that physical bodies are nothing more than centres and modes of

¹ On secondary causation, see *Introd. to Dogm. Theol.*, note on pp. 39-41; St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. cv. 3-5; J. O. Dykes, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-317. Cf. St. Athanasius, *c. Gent.*, III. lxxvii-lxx.

² The ætiological argument bears on this: *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. v. esp. § 2.

³ *Op. cit.*, ch. v. §§ 4, 11.

force;¹ and some have regarded physical effects as so many manifestations of immediate causation by the immanent God.² But the value of the phrase is not destroyed by such views. In any case it conveniently symbolizes the fact that in the mystery of causation certain phenomena appear to constitute invariable antecedents of the effects which follow;³ and this is all that is necessary to maintain when we describe the divine method in the physical order as one of secondary causation.⁴

¹ Cf. § 6 (a), below; and W. C. D. Whetham, *Recent Devel. of Phys. Science*, ch. vii.

² Occasionalism, held by Malebranche and Geulinx, treated finite things as affording only the occasions of divine operations: *Cath. Encyc.*, s. vv. "Malebranche" and "Occasionalism"; Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, s. v. "Occasionalism." Bishop Berkeley's idealism appears to be somewhat in line with this — treating nature not as substantial, but as the operation on our senses of God Himself. See his *Princ. of Human Knowledge*, §§ 146 *et seq.* Occasionalism tends to pantheism; but, as Berkeley maintained, the substantial nature of what we perceive in sensible experience can be denied without invalidating either the trustworthiness of our senses or the laws under which scientists generalize the contents of experience. These laws will, of course, be regarded as symbolic descriptions of divine operations.

³ W. C. D. Whetham, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–30.

⁴ Either one of three theories might be held, so far as the validity of physical science is concerned: (a) Occasionalism, as above defined; (b) Mechanism, or the sufficiency of matter and force to explain all events; (c) *Concursus*, as described in ch. ii. § 11, above. Mechanism is seen from the Christian standpoint to be based upon inadequate data. *Concursus* affords the best symbolism of the mysteries involved.

R. Vaughan, in *Church Quarterly Review*, April 1910, p. 125, points out that, whereas man commits his work to nature to carry

With regard to creaturely wills, our language must be somewhat different. The reality of our own wills, and the fact that within their natural limits they are truly capable of causing events — of determining what shall happen — cannot be denied without rejecting the most direct form of knowledge which we possess — that of internal consciousness.¹ We have elsewhere acknowledged our incapacity to explain how a creaturely will can determine effects in a world controlled by the eternal, and therefore absolute, will of God.² But the reality of creaturely wills, and of their causal activity, is as indisputable as is the eternal and universal ordering of all events by the will of God. Yet they are secondary rather than primary causes, for their very existence, and the conditions and limitations under which they operate, are due to divine causation and providence.

§ 5. God wills to enlist free agents, agents capable of misusing their freedom, in the furtherance of His purpose. To that end He has given them a limited sovereignty over nature, with capacity to discover its laws and to employ its elements and forces. The progress of physical science and invention is continually enlarging men's control over nature, and this appears to be in line with the divine plan.³ In brief, on — merely devising mechanisms which enlist its powers — God cannot do this because nature itself is His work.

¹ On the volitional nature of causation, see *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. v. § 4, and the references given on p. 139.

² In ch. i. §§ 1, 7.

³ Gen. i. 28. See A. J. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, ch. iii. § 9.

nature is designed to afford not only the external conditions of man's probation, but also instruments of his service under God.

But men are given power not only to manipulate and utilize the resources of the visible order, but also to energize in the spiritual realm; and are permitted to a degree to prevail with God Himself by means of petitionary prayer.¹ This does not mean that men can change the will of God. Not even God can do that; for an eternal will is not subject to either change or defeat. It means that God has willed to employ the moral power of creaturely wills for carrying out His plan and for advancing His eternal purpose. Petitionary prayer is a divinely appointed method by which men can lend their moral energies and wills to their Maker and take their permitted and intended part in the spiritual control of events.²

The power of prayer is necessarily finite, and is dependent upon conditions which are essential to its successful exercise. While it can be used, as has just been said, to prevail *with* God, it can never prevail *against* Him. It is as necessary to learn the

¹ On prayer, see St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, II. II. lxxxv; H. P. Liddon, *Some Elem. of Religion*, pp. 184-190; C. Gore, in *Oxford House Papers*, 2d Series, vi; *Cath. Encyc.*, q. v.; Wilfrid Ward, *W. G. Ward and the Catholic Revival*, pp. 285-295; Arthur Hoyle, in *Expository Times*, Aug. 1911, pp. 489-492.

² The duty of prayer is a branch of our dependence upon God, and is an instinctive act of religion. It is usually simply taken for granted in Scripture — e.g. in St. Matt. vi. 5-13. But cf. Prov. xv. 8; Ephes. vi. 18; Phil. iv. 6; Col. iv. 2.

secret of prayer in order to use it with success as it is to master the secrets of nature in order to manipulate its forces. In short, the road to power in prayer is through spiritual understanding of the divine purpose, and through moral conformity of our wills to that purpose. To put this in another way, personal power in the spiritual sphere is the fruit of personal growth in the spirit. It is the prayer of a righteous man that availeth much, for the secret of God, and of spiritual power, is with His saints.¹

To be effective it is practically necessary that human prayer should have definitive form and be directed to specific ends. We need to formulate our desires and to place them in God's hands for Him to use them in His own way; and it is His will that we should do this. We may, indeed, make mistakes and employ prayers which cannot be answered in their own terms; but the most mistaken terms, when used by those who aim to promote the will of God, have meanings in the sphere of spirit which permit their moral power to be used by God as a devout man of prayer would have it employed.² Rightly offered, prayers are genuine factors in determining and promoting the course of providential

¹ Psa. xxxvii. 4-5; cxlv. 18-19; Prov. x. 24; xv. 8, 29; St. Mark xi. 25; St. John ix. 31; St. James iv. 3; v. 16; 1 St. John iii. 22; v. 14.

² St. Paul's prayer to have his thorn in the flesh removed (2 Cor. xii. 7-11) was answered by his receiving grace to rejoice in afflictions. Cf. Rom. viii. 26; 1 Cor. xiv. 15; St. Jude 20. The Lord's Prayer has divine sanction: St. Matt. vi. 9-13; St. Luke, xi. 2-4.

events. To pray for rain may be to use terms which need to be translated into spiritual equivalents before the prayer can become effectual; but even such a prayer, when properly offered, is an exercise of spiritual power which God can use and answer in a manner which will ultimately satisfy the creaturely spirit that formulated it.¹

Prayer has other forms than the petitionary, although it is this form which falls under the subject of God's providential government. In its largest sense, prayer includes every form of personal communion with God, and has for its central basis and source of power the surrender of our wills — of ourselves — to God in Eucharistic oblation through Christ. It branches out into penitential exercises, adoration, praise, thanksgiving, intercession, and filial converse with our heavenly Father. It supplies the essential atmosphere of the spiritual life and is a means of assimilation to God and the primary instrument of spiritual functioning.²

II. *Evolution*

§ 6. The opinion that the present condition of things in this world is the result of development from chaos to order, from the homogeneous and simple

¹ Zech. x. 1. On the objective value of prayer: Gen. xxxii. 27; Jerem. xxxiii. 3; St. Matt. vii. 7-11; xviii. 19-20; xxi. 22; St. Mark xi. 5-13, 24; ix. 29; xi. 5-13, 24; St. Luke xi. 5-13; St. John xv. 7; xvi. 23; St. James v. 16; 1 St. John v. 15.

² Cf. A. C. A. Hall, *Christ. Doctr. of Prayer*; A. J. Worlledge, *Prayer*.

to the heterogeneous and complex, and from the lower and less useful to the higher and more capable, has been established as a working hypothesis by modern physical science. But evolutionary ideas are ancient, and the term "evolution" has been applied to the inorganic as well as to the organic — to the whole process through which primitive substance has been developed into the universe in which we live.¹ This process may be regarded as having four stages: the evolution of matter, of the astronomical universe, of the earth, and of organic species.

(a) Recent investigations into the constitution of matter are modifying previous opinions on the subject, and no new theory has as yet obtained general approval.² But if the general doctrine that evolution has proceeded from the simple and homogeneous to the complex and heterogeneous is applicable to the history of matter, existing scientific knowledge and opinion appear to require that we should regard material substance as evolved from ether, and as assuming the successive forms of cor-

¹ On the history of the subject, see *Encyc. Brit.*, 11th ed., s. v. "Evolution" (by P. C. Mitchell), pp. 22-32; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Evolution," I; Chas. Darwin, *Origin of Species*, 6th ed., pp. xiii-xxvi; H. F. Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin*; the writer's *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 45-55.

² Only a rough and ready summary of existing opinion among scientists is attempted in this section. On the constitution and evolution of matter, see W. C. D. Whetham, *op. cit.*, ch. vii; and "The Evolution of Matter," in *Darwin and Modern Science*, Ess. xxix; R. K. Duncan, *The New Knowledge*. For scholastic ideas, see *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Matter."

puscles or electrons, atoms, molecules, and the so-called solid bodies of common observation. Neither the last mentioned nor the atoms and molecules contained in them are really solid, but consist of a vast number of minute particles which, in obedience to mechanical laws, are in constant motion.

Ether is a mysterious substance which is supposed to fill all space. It is practically continuous, and yet sufficiently tenuous to offer practically no obstacle to the movements of matter. Its combination of opposite properties raises baffling problems, but scientists feel compelled to hypothecate its existence in order to account for the transmission of light and heat from one body of matter to another. Such transmission appears to require a continuous medium. Nature is said to abhor a vacuum.¹

Corpuscles, or electrons, are thought to be the primary elements and units from which all the more developed forms of matter are built up. Their precise nature is undetermined, but they are closely related to electrical energy and to the ocean of ether in which they are supposed to move, and perhaps constitute modifications or strains of ether. They seem to possess approximately equal mass and uniform properties.

Atoms, as their name indicates, have until quite

¹ On ether, see Sir O. Lodge, *The Ether of Space*; Simon Newcomb in Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, q. v.; E. T. Whittaker, *Hist. of the Theories of Ether and Electricity*; W. C. D. Whetham, *Recent Devel. of Phys. Science*, pp. 267-272; *Encyc. Brit.* (11th ed.), s. v. "Æther."

recently been regarded as the indivisible units of matter. Yet the fact that some seventy different kinds have been discovered, and the further fact that they bear the appearance of manufactured articles, have led many to continue their search for a more primitive common element. Recent electrical and chemical investigations have suggested the conclusion that the corpuscles constitute the long-sought-for common elements. An atom of hydrogen — the lightest known — is said to contain some eight hundred of them, and the diversity of the so-called primary elements is explained by the number and mechanical arrangement of the corpuscles which their atoms contain. These atoms constitute minute planetary systems, so to speak, their centres being charged with negative and their corpuscles with positive electricity.

Molecules are the smallest particles of matter that can maintain a separate existence, and their multitudinous variety is due to diverse chemical combinations of atoms. The forms of matter which we commonly observe, whether gaseous, liquid, or solid, have molecules for their immediate constituents, these being mechanically combined, without chemical change, in obedience to the laws of molecular attraction.

As thus described the evolution of matter is purely physical, and natural science does not consider the question as to whether ether — a purely hypothetical substance, the properties of which, as has been

said above, raise baffling questions — ought not to be regarded as a symbol for spiritual operations by which alone the ultimate mysteries of nature can be explained.¹

(b) We now come to the evolution of the astronomical universe.² According to the nebular hypothesis of Kant, Herschel, and Laplace, matter originally existed in a very hot and gaseous state. Obeying the law of gravitation, it contracted and acquired unequal density, with a rotary motion in one plane. Continued contraction increased the rapidity of this motion, until the centrifugal force thus created caused a flattening out of the nebular substance and a breaking off of an outer ring of matter. This ring continued to revolve, and breaking at some point, contracted into a globe, which solidified as it cooled off. Thus a planet was formed. In a similar manner other rings were broken off and developed into other planets. Laplace applied the theory to explain our solar system, but it has been applied to describe the development of the whole stellar universe.

It would seem that the evolution of the diverse elements of matter was conditioned and facilitated by the cooling off of the heavenly bodies, as they were evolved from primitive nebulae. Intense heat,

¹ B. Stewart and P. G. Tait, in *Unseen Universe*, ch. iv, give an interesting speculation. Cf. ch. v. § 2, below.

² On astronomical evolution, see F. R. Moulton, *Introd. to Astron.*, ch. xv; A. Berry, *Short Hist. of Astronomy*.

such as originally prevailed, would prevent those associations of corpuscles which produce chemical atoms, and the simpler and lighter atoms would naturally emerge first, the more complex and heavy ones requiring for their formation a lower temperature. It is a fact that only the lighter elements are detected by the spectroscope in the hottest stellar bodies, whereas the chemical constitution of the cooler ones is more complex.

(c) The evolution of the solar system brought to birth the globe on which we live.¹ Geologists tell us that as the earth cooled off it contracted, and that this caused a crumpling of the solid crust which was first formed, and the development of mountains and valleys, seas and dry land. The light and heat of the sun also performed their part; and in conformity with laws which are still observed to operate, the complex physical conditions which made possible the appearance and development of organic life were slowly developed.

§ 7. The theories which we have combined together in describing the process of inorganic evolution have unequal scientific value, and although the belief in evolution as a correct description of what theologians call mediate creation does not seem likely

¹ Sir Chas. Lyell, *Prins. of Geology*, 1830, broke the ground for the existing views of the earth's development. Cf. R. H. Lock, *Recent Progress in the Study of Variation*, etc., pp. 24-28; Edw. Clodd, *Primer of Evolution*, ch. iv; E. de Pressensé, *Study of Origins*, pp. 137-141.

to be shaken, some of these theories may undergo modification as a result of further investigation.

(d) But the theory of organic evolution which now holds the field appears to be sufficiently established in its main particulars to be regarded as having a certain scientific finality.¹ The honour of securing its general acceptance chiefly belongs to the late Charles Darwin, and his *Origin of Species*, published in 1859, has produced epoch-making results in natural science, in philosophy, and in speculative theology. The truth of this assertion is not altered by the fact that certain details of pure Darwinism have been rejected by many scientists.

The doctrine of organic evolution which prevails in the scientific world is somewhat as follows: All existing forms of living organisms are derived by unbroken descent from a few primitive types — some believe from one type—and the present multiplicity and diversity of species are due to progressive modifications of earlier species, brought about by natural forces and laws which still operate. Coming to the

¹The writer has treated the subject of organic evolution more fully in *Evolution and the Fall*, Lects. i-iii. See also Chas. Darwin, *Origin of Species*; A. R. Wallace, *Darwinism*; G. J. Romanes, *Darwin and After Darwin*; V. L. Kellogg, *Darwinism To-day*; R. H. Lock, *op. cit.*; *Darwin and Modern Science*; E. Wassman, *Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution*; *Encyc. Brit.*, 11th Ed., q. v. The speculative significance of evolutionary theories is dealt with in V. F. Storr, *Development and Divine Purpose*; A. Moore, *Essays Scientific and Philos.*; *Science and the Faith*; F. B. Jevons, *Evolution*; J. Fiske, *Through Nature to God*. These lists can of course be greatly extended.

particulars which are generally accepted, *variation* is a universal phenomenon in the organic realm. No two organisms are exactly alike, and while offspring as a rule closely resemble their parents, they also vary from them to an appreciable extent, and some of these variations, when protected from the consequences of inbreeding, are perpetuated by inheritance in subsequent offspring. But such perpetuation depends upon *segregation*, or isolation from the parent species; and this segregation may be either geographical or sexual, the latter being caused by variation in the organs of reproduction and in mating habits. These factors never cease to operate, and new varieties and species are continually being produced. The rate at which individual organisms are multiplied is very rapid, so rapid that, if it were not checked, the food supply would soon become inadequate. There is, however, a ceaseless *struggle for existence*, in which the forms of organic life that are least capable of adjusting themselves to the conditions of existence are crowded out and perish. The result is a *survival of the fittest* — of such forms as are most capable of maintaining the struggle. The process by which the weaker forms are thus weeded out, and the more capable are given the field, is called *natural selection*; and unassisted nature is said to accomplish in many ages what it is enabled by artificial selection to achieve in a brief period of time.

The evidences by which the theory above described

is supported are almost wholly indirect and circumstantial.¹ But they are drawn from many and diverse sources, and when considered together appear to be very convincing. Only the briefest possible summary of them can here be given.

(1) The omnipresent fact of variation, and the fact that many variations are inherited by offspring and are thus perpetuated, certainly makes the fixity of species an open question, and suggests the possibility of descent of existing species from earlier ones.

(2) The fact that all species can be classified in a limited number of groups, and the further fact that in each group striking resemblances of structure can be found, and similar laws of food assimilation, of propagation, and even of disease, point to kinship between the species of each group and to the likelihood of their origin from a common source through variation from a primitive type.

(3) The gradation of organisms in each group raises the question as to the time-order of their appearance; and this question is most reasonably answered by regarding the simpler forms as most ancient and as the progenitors of the more complex ones.

(4) There is an embryological similarity of growth in the species of each group, especially in its earlier stages. And, in the several species, individuals

¹ On these evidences, which are given in almost all works on evolution, see, in particular, Chas. Darwin, *op. cit.*, ch. xv; A. Weismann, *Evol. Theory*, Lects. ii-iii; the writer's *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 75-88.

largely recapitulate in their embryological growth the hypothesized development of species up to the point of their differentiation from other species of the same group. The uniformity of nature makes it likely that the development of individuals is determined by, and indicative of, the development of the species to which they belong.

(5) Rudimentary and useless organs, which bear the appearance of decadent survivals, are found in higher species, and corresponding organs are found in lower species of the same group and there possess useful functions.

(6) The time-order of the remains of organic species which paleontologists discover in the geological strata of the earth's surface agrees with and confirms the order of origin of species which the evolutionary theory hypothesizes.

(7) The geographical distribution of species appears to exhibit the part which isolation is thought to have performed in the development of species, and to agree with the order of development required by the evolutionary theory.

(8) The laws of organic growth which are utilized by artificial selection in producing new varieties are indisputably laws of nature, and it appears reasonable to suppose that the results of artificial selection differ from those which unassisted nature produces only in the amount of time required for their production.

(9) The fact has been established by recent careful observation that in certain instances new species

have been given birth by sudden variation, these species being capable of maintaining themselves without being assimilated to their parent forms by inbreeding.

This last fact calls for further comment, because its consideration has led many scientists to reject one element of Darwin's view. Variations are of two kinds: (a) the continuous, minute and fluctuating variations which are constantly occurring; (b) discontinuous, large, and determinative variations which are found in "sports" and in the sudden production of new species above mentioned. Darwin supposed that new species were formed by an accumulation of continuous and minute variations. The objection was raised that such variations necessarily fluctuate. Being insufficient to cause sexual segregation, they must soon be nullified by inbreeding with the parent species, unless geographical isolation occurs — a comparatively rare event. Moreover, until these variations have been developed to a degree by accumulation, they can have no utility in the struggle for existence, and therefore afford no basis of natural selection.

It has been maintained by many scientists that, under the normal conditions of natural development, only such variations can have value for the production of permanent varieties and new species as are sufficiently large and useful to be advantageous in the struggle for existence, and sufficiently sudden in appearance to prevent their being lost by inbreeding

before they are sufficiently developed to become factors in natural selection. The mutations theory is based upon such considerations, and is supported by the observed production of new species in certain instances by sudden mutation — one act of propagation being sufficient to give birth to a new species. According to this theory a species is supposed at rare intervals to pass through a period of instability, in which it gives birth to new species. Between times the variations are minute and fluctuating and, for the reasons above explained, have no permanent effect.

§ 8. This divergence of opinion does not at all disturb the general acceptance of the theory of natural selection, for it in no wise reduces the amount, pertinence, and cumulative value of the evidence by which that theory is supported. The theory of natural evolution of species by means of variation and survival of the fittest through natural selection to-day holds the field in the scientific world. It has shown itself to be a good working hypothesis, capable of being harmonized with the widest possible range of observable organic phenomena. It has no rival in this regard; and, at least until further investigation justifies its modification, it ought to be accepted by theologians as affording the best available description of the method of mediate creation in its biological aspects. This is its significance for theology, and the fact that it has such meaning constitutes the justifying reason for including an

exposition of it in a treatise of Dogmatic Theology.

Two limitations should be observed, however, in giving the evolutionary theory a place in theology. In the first place, the physical sciences are descriptive only, and are concerned wholly with the processes of nature which can be investigated by natural means. "Natural laws," whether biological or other, are merely "convenient shorthand statements of the organized information that at present is at our disposal" — information, that is, concerning the sequences of phenomena in the realm of nature. No possible results of such sciences can either have anything to do with the problem of ultimate origins or militate against Christian doctrine concerning the mystery of primitive creation.

The second limitation is that no physical theory can either have what is called the certainty of faith or be given the theological status of saving doctrine. Sciences are progressive, and their hypotheses, one and all, have to be accepted with the proviso or condition that further progress of investigation will not necessitate their modification. No doctrine, whether physical or theological, can have the finality of an article of faith — of catholic dogma — unless it is an indubitable content of supernatural revelation.

We need to remember this in order to avoid the mistake of using inferences from scientific hypotheses as reasons for modifying revealed doctrine — the catholic faith. Genuine physical science cannot

come into conflict with genuine catholic doctrine, because its sphere is distinct from that of such doctrine. The contradictions which have been supposed to exist between them arise either from confusing scientific results with the philosophical assumptions and inferences of certain scientists, or from treating certain cosmological speculations and passing opinions of theological schools as if possessed of dogmatic rank and value. A germane example of the latter error is the modern habit — now happily disappearing — of treating the divine inspiration of the Book of Genesis as having within its purpose and result the production of a scientifically exact description of the development of the universe.¹ A pertinent example of the former mistake is the naturalistic assumption made by many scientists that no other factor can have helped to determine man's primitive state than that of organic evolution — a mistake with which we shall have to reckon in a later chapter.²

III. *The Existing Order*

§ 9. Physical and theological sciences are at one in regarding the existing order of things as the result of progressive development³ — of a development

¹ *Authority, Eccles. and Biblical*, ch. vii. §§ 5-6.

² Ch. viii. § 4.

³ We use the terms "evolution" and "development" somewhat interchangeably. Scientific writers often distinguish, applying "evolution" to the growth of species and "development" to the growth of individuals.

which is still going on,—but they deal with different aspects of the drama.

The physical sciences deal with its phenomenal aspects, and with such phenomena as are capable of being generalized and described in terms of natural law. Accordingly they view the existing order as the result of the development of matter—this development being due to the operation of resident forces and proceeding according to methods which are characterized by continuity and uniformity.

Theological science cannot reject the true results of physical investigation, but can and must interpret physical developments as constituting parts of a larger drama, the ultimate explanation of which is spiritual and divine. The validity of this point of view is supported by the fact that physical scientists are confronted by phenomena which they have not been able fully to describe in terms of physical law. Life, consciousness, and moral agency have appeared in the universe, and the appearance of each constitutes a superphysical event which cannot be explained by any of the laws with which purely physical science can deal. Theology therefore regards them as evidences that the visible order is part of a larger order, the full meaning of which is to be found in factors and purposes which require other and higher terms to describe than those which are available to physical science. This larger conception does not invalidate the principles of continuity and uniformity; but it does profoundly affect our view of the

likelihood or unlikelihood of the events upon the reality of which the truth of Christian doctrine depends.

§ 10. The principle of continuity does not permit anything to happen "which is not rationally connected in causation with what has previously happened and with what will occur in the future."¹ An alleged event which is wholly unrelated, and has no intelligible place in historical and causal sequences, is incredible to intelligent men — not less so to theologians than to physical scientists. It is so because the unrelated is irrational and only the rational is credible. Continuity is an essential element in the world-drama because that drama is a product of the divine will, and the will of God is necessarily determined by perfect wisdom. There can be no real exceptions. Even the most capricious and unreasonable actions of men and devils are inevitable possibilities in a wise plan for the development of finite persons — a plan which necessarily includes the creation of free agents capable of arbitrary actions. These actions do not and cannot interrupt

¹ On this principle, see *Introd. to Dogm. Theol.*, ch. ii. § 5; *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 99-100, 162-170; Stewart and Tait, *Unseen Universe*, ch. ii; A. M. Fairbairn, *Philos. of the Christ. Religion*, Bk. I. ch. i; C. Gore, *Incarnation*, Lec. ii; J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, pp. 121 *et seq.*; Hastings, *Encyc. of Religion*, s. v. "Continuity." Cf. St. Athanasius, *c. Gent.*, §§ 35-44; St. Thomas, *c. Gent.* III. xcvi. The thought of uniformity gained emphasis among modern scientists before that of continuity. The ancient Greek viewed the world as a static order — a *κόσμος*. But the Hebrew regarded it as a movement or drama — an *alóv*.

the general laws of causation, which obey the principle of continuity even when foolishly manipulated by creatures.

But the connecting links which afford evidence that all events are rational and in harmony with the principle of continuity are not invariably apparent to us. In order that they may become apparent, we have to understand the plan which determines the sequences and connections of events; and this plan is much larger in its meaning, and in the range of factors which are employed for its fulfilment, than can be discovered and described by physical science.

To mention two critical examples, the mysteries of creation and of Christ's resurrection cannot be given intelligible places in a drama which is assumed to be wholly physical. But the Christian view of history, based upon a larger knowledge of the divine plan than purely physical investigation affords, finds rational places and meanings for these events. In the light of this larger view, the principle of continuity, so far from nullifying the credibility of creation and resurrection from the dead, depends upon their occurrence for its own significance in the whole world-drama. Without such events the shifting of scenery which is necessary for that drama would be impossible.¹

¹ Cf. *Introd. to Dogm. Theol.*, ch. ii. §§ 5-6. The Incarnation constituted a supernatural involution — the imparting of a divine ego to Christ's Manhood; by reason of which that Manhood becomes the source of quickening and enlightening grace to the members of Christ and the potential principle of our spiritual development.

§ 11. Uniformity is another permanent element in the course of events — one closely connected with continuity. By the uniformity of nature is meant the law that the same unhindered causes and conditions invariably produce the same effects.¹ If this law were not taken for granted, natural science would be reduced to absurdity, for all its generalizations are concerned with uniformities — that is, with describing what invariably happens when given causes and conditions hold the field.

But the law of uniformity is not less fundamental for theology than it is for natural science; although the subject-matter of theology shifts the emphasis from uniformity to the divine purpose and to the meaning of things in their moral, spiritual, and progressive aspects.² Without uniformity in causation the conditions would be wanting which make this world a suitable place for human probation and for the development of character. If there were no determinate physical and moral consequences of human conduct — and they could not be determinate if causation were not uniform in operation — there could be no such thing as a rationally ordered life. And the possibility of such a life is an indispensable condition of moral responsibility and spiritual devel-

¹ On uniformity, see *op. cit.*, ch. iii. §§ 4, 13; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. cv. 6; J. B. Mozley, *Miracles*, Lects. ii–iii; F. W. Temple, *Relation between Religion and Science*, Lec. i; R. C. Trench, *The Miracles of Our Lord*, Prelim. Ess., ii; Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, s. 8. "Uniformity," (3), (4).

² A. Moore, *Science and the Faith*, pp. 8 et seq.

opment. Moreover the law of uniformity, like that of continuity, is an inevitable consequence of the perfect wisdom of God. If it were invalid we should be compelled to ascribe to the Author and Governor of the world a capriciousness of method in His operations that would reveal a vacillating mind and a chaotic purpose. And this is illustrated by the fact that excellence in any art depends upon observance of well-tried rules by those who practise it. God must be a God of order, if He is really God — the sum and source of wisdom.

But uniformity in causation, while it secures stability and imparts moral value to this world's arrangements, does not exclude the possibility of progress and of innovating events in history. New causes may be brought into operation, and these causes will alter the effects previously observed, without in the least disturbing the law that the same unhindered causes produce the same effects. If there is to be progress at all, and not an endless cycle, having no intelligible purpose, the scenery must be shifted and events must occur which the causes previously operating cannot alone explain. The uniformity of nature and the coming in of supernatural causation, when new steps are required for the advancement of the larger plan of God, constitute harmonious factors in the general march of events.¹

¹ Cf. *Introd. to Dogm. Theol.*, ch. ii. A bibliography is there given on p. 33.

§ 12. It has been pointed out that the facts upon which the truth of Christianity depends, and which alone have to be maintained by catholic theology, do not come within the range of facts with which natural sciences are concerned. These sciences are concerned with natural phenomena, phenomena which are capable of being generalized and described in terms of natural law. And natural laws are merely summary descriptions of the way things are observed to happen under purely natural conditions. The word "law" has in other uses the implication of requirement, and natural laws are often regarded as if they described what must happen, whereas they describe only what is observed to happen. Physical science is indeed compelled, as we have seen, to assume that the observed sequences of phenomena will continue, if no new causes come into operation; and also that no such causes will in fact operate when their operation would violate the continuity which is rightly believed to govern the world-drama as a whole.¹ But, as we have also seen, these assumptions are as vital for theological as they are for natural science. There can be no contradiction between a sound theology and any genuinely scientific results.

But the habit of specializing often narrows men's minds and leads them to formulate philosophical theories which require a more comprehensive general-

¹H. C. Cotterill, *Does Science Aid Faith*, pp. 117-123. On the meaning of natural law, see Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, s. v. "Law" (by the Editor).

ization for their vindication than is justified by the limited range of facts with which the framers of such theories are concerned. Naturalism is a philosophy of this kind, and its doctrine that nothing super-physical can be regarded as knowable, or treated as a reality for which allowance must be made in a comprehensive view of things, cannot be verified or established by the facts with which the physical sciences are concerned. In brief, it is an extra-scientific hypothesis; and the issue which must be joined with it by theology is in no sense an issue between theology and physical science.¹

Naturalism makes the assumption that the field of investigation open to physical sciences comprehends the sum of factors that determine the course of events, whether past or future. Such an assumption plainly begs the question as to the coming in of supernatural factors. Naturalism also declares that only such realities can be known as are capable of being described in mechanical terms. This likewise begs the question at issue. What can be known must be determined by the results of trying to know. Every form of *a priori* agnosticism contradicts itself by dogmatizing concerning things of which it professes ignorance. That the super-mechanical cannot be known can only be proved by extending our knowl-

¹ On naturalism, see *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 21 *et seq.*; Jas. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*; A. J. Balfour, *Foundations of Belief*; R. Otto, *Naturalism and Religion*; J. A. Thomson, in *Hibbert Journal*, Oct. 1911, article on "Is there One Science of Nature?"

edge to the super-mechanical. In other words, the experience which alone can justify such agnosticism reduces it to absurdity.¹

The most direct and certain experience which we can have is of the subjective data of consciousness — the phenomena of reason, emotion, and volition, or the phenomena of personality. These phenomena lie outside the circle of the mechanical or physical forces that act and react in the human organism, which is complete without taking them into account. They are unmistakably superphysical, and they cannot be properly described in mechanical terms.² In knowing our own personality we enter an open door to the superphysical world and establish the possibility of a knowledge which has other methods of acquisition and other terms of description than can be employed and tested by mechanical methods and measures. The possible extent of this knowledge cannot be determined beforehand on *a priori* grounds, but is to be ascertained gradually by the measure of our success in investigating the superphysical realm.

The results of such investigation teach us that the spiritual, as well as the physical, is to be reckoned with in an adequate conception of history; and that

¹ On the self-contradiction involved in agnostic dogmatism, see *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. ii. § 9.

² *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 103-106; O. Lodge, *Life and Matter*, ch. ix; J. Orr, *Christ. View of God*, pp. 146-147; S. Harris, *Phil. Basis of Theism*, pp. 439-442; R. Otto, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-196, 232-234.

in its essential particulars the Christian view of God's plan in the creation and development of the universe is valid. Moreover, its validity rests upon grounds which are independent of any possible results of physical investigation.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

I. *Its Forms*

§ 1. According to the postulates of natural science the universe constitutes an order in which uniformity of causation and continuity of development are fundamental. The Christian view accepts these postulates, but treats the visible order as brought into existence by God, and as constituting part of a larger drama and plan of which He is the Author, omnipresent Operator, and almighty Sovereign. Both of these views leave unexplained the phenomena of evil, and neither physical nor theological scientists have been able to find a rational place for such phenomena in the continuity of things. Evil, in so far as it is evil, is the irrational, the unrelated, a breach of continuity, a thing which ought not to be. But it is a manifest reality; and one who would retain his belief in the rational and moral continuity of the world-drama, and in the goodness and power of God, is practically compelled to formulate for himself a view of evil which will rationally justify his position.¹

¹ On the problem of evil, see *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. v. § 5; A. M. Fairbairn, *Philos. of the Christ. Religion*, Bk. I. chh. iii-iv; J. Martineau, *Religion*, Bk. I. chh. iii-iv; A. C. Fraser, *Philos.*

An adequate explanation of evil may indeed be impossible for us; and such explanation is unnecessary, provided we can discover sound reasons for believing that its insolubility is due to the limitations of our knowledge and mental capacity, rather than to an essential contradiction between the phenomena of evil and the truth of the Christian doctrine of creation. But for a vindication of the reasonableness of Christian doctrine it is necessary to explain how the fact of evil can be faced without surrendering that doctrine. The position taken in this chapter is that no adequate theoretical solution of the problem of evil is available; but that good reasons can be given for retaining the Christian view of God and His universe, and that the problem is being practically solved by the general march of events under divine government.

The problem is essentially a moral one, but emerges in the physical as well as in the moral order. In its physical aspects it obtrudes itself upon the attention of natural scientists as well as of theologians, although to undertake its theoretical solution requires lines of inquiry which lie beyond the scope of

of Theism, Pt. III; T. B. Strong, *Manual of Theol.*, pp. 222-238; and *Christ. Ethics*, Lec. v; H. P. Liddon, *Some Elem. of Religion*, Lec. iv; Bishop Butler, *Anal. of Religion*, Pt. I. ch. vii; Ernest Naville, *The Problem of Evil*; T. R. Birks, *The Difficulties of Belief*; B. Boedder, *Natural Theol.*, pp. 393-411; *Cath. Encyc.*, q. v.; O. Pfeleiderer, *Philos. of Religion*, Vol. IV. pp. 1-45; J. R. Illingworth, *Reason and Revelation*, ch. xii; R. Flint, *Theism*, Lec. viii; Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, s. v. "Origin of Evil" and "Theodicy."

science properly so-called, whether physical or theological. The problem is philosophical, and a theodicy can have only speculative value.

§ 2. Physical evils,¹ as they are called, include the seeming imperfections of nature, the apparent waste of resources and of life which attend its arrangements and development, the pains and sorrows which it inflicts, and the unequal and seemingly unjust distribution of its benefits to those who deserve to enjoy them. If we do not enlarge our description of them, this is not because we fail to realize their prominence and distressing nature, but because no one is ignorant of them and our space is too limited for unnecessary elaboration. We content ourselves, therefore, with acknowledging the vast range and significant prominence of the phenomena in question.²

In judging the perfection of the universe we need to remember that it does not constitute its own end, but ministers to a larger scheme and purpose. Its excellence lies in its suitability for the part which it plays in the whole scheme; and its appearance of imperfection may be due in great measure to our

¹ Physical evil is considered by the authors above referred to; but see A. M. Fairbairn, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-146; F. A. Dixey, in *Oxford Ho. Papers*, 2d Series, pp. 99-119; Le Conte, in *The Conception of God* (ed. by G. H. Howison), pp. 72-74; R. Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 245-252; J. Martineau, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. pp. 56-99; J. O. Dykes, *Divine Worker*, ch. x; J. R. Illingworth, in *Lux Mundi*, 3d paper.

² J. S. Mill, *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 186, says that to attempt a reconciliation of such a world with infinite benevolence and justice "exhibits to excess the revolting spectacle of a Jesuitical defence of moral enormities."

regarding it as if it were its own end. This world was made for man and provides the conditions of his moral probation and spiritual development. An ideally perfect world would not, apparently, be suitable for such an end. For man's sake, therefore, "the creation was subjected to vanity, not of its own will," as if it were its own end, "but by reason of Him who subjected it." This subjection is temporary, and when man enters into his perfected state, there will be a renovated heaven and earth, a transfigured world suited to his perfection. It was subjected to vanity "in hope" that "it shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God."¹ Both its present vanity and its future emancipation are for the sake of the future perfected man, "and we know that to them that love God all things work together for good."² These considerations remind us that this world is not a finished product, and how many of its apparent imperfections are due to this fact we are not competent to determine.

The question may rightly be asked whether a finite world could be made which is self-sufficient, or perfect in itself. A created world is necessarily externally limited and dependent upon God. Perhaps its imperfections, as we view them, are parts of the perfection of that which finds its sufficiency not in itself, but in God. In any case, without greater knowledge of the divine scheme than we possess, we

¹ Rom. viii. 20, 21. ² Rom. viii. 28.

are incompetent to judge of many of its details. The value of each created thing depends upon its relation to something else and to the whole scheme in which it is an element, not necessarily at all upon its perfection considered by itself.¹

Great cataclysms — volcanic upheavals, earthquakes, hurricanes, pestilences, and the like — seem to be inevitable attendants upon a finite system of development in which many forces and factors interact. What appears like waste in nature — in particular the production and almost immediate perishing of vast multitudes of living organisms — is part of the cost of organic evolution, of the production and sustenance of higher species. We are in no position to say that the cost is extravagant, or that it could have been reduced. The value of the higher species cannot be measured by any multiple of the lower; and the value of the human species is such that, if it were necessary, the destruction of all preceding forms of organic life would not be too great a price to pay for its production. The value of inferior species lies in the part which they play in ministering to the development of the higher. They are not their own ends, and values must be estimated teleologically. It may be that a law of conservation

¹ Evils have been divided into metaphysical, physical, and moral. Metaphysical evil is "the absence of a certain perfection in a being, the nature of which is incompatible with such a perfection." It is evil in only a metaphorical sense. See B. Boedder, *Natural Theol.*, pp. 394-395; T. R. Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, ch. ii.

prevents the destruction of life as well as of energy, so that while organisms perish, life simply finds higher embodiment.

Pain also is part of the cost of organic development, for without it there would be no struggle for existence and no survival of the fittest. And pain not only teaches each species to seek for food, but serves as a warning, in lack of which various accidents would end fatally before their victims could be put on guard against them. The sufferings of lower animals are probably much overestimated. The absence of a reflective and anticipative imagination must materially reduce their duration and effect; and we have reason to believe that enjoyment of life predominates among the inferior species. Protracted dread of death is wanting, and apart from this, death loses much of its terror.

Human suffering is partly connected with human sin, and to that extent is to be regarded as part of the problem of moral evil — not as an additional problem.¹ Postponing that aspect for the present, we note that the value of pain for human beings is not less obvious in certain connections than are the problems which it raises in other relations. Its effect in protecting us from fatal dangers, of which it constitutes the chief symptom and warning, is not open to dispute. It affords a needed spur to exertion, and thus brings the faculties into full exercise and promotes human development and civiliza-

¹ J. R. Illingworth, *Reason and Revel.*, pp. 221, 222.

tion. It constitutes a useful discipline for the human spirit, chastening its unregulated impulses, refining its desires, and promoting the acquisition of virtues which are apt to be neglected under the conditions of prosperous comfort. Moreover, the disciplinary value of mental sufferings, of bereavements, of disappointments, and of other sorrows, is not less great than that of physical pain.

No doubt pain and sorrow are unequally distributed among men, and the principles of equity often appear to be violated by the miseries of the innocent and righteous and by the comparative immunity of the wicked.¹ But it is open to question whether this world could from the nature of things have been so designed as to distribute suffering according to deservings without disturbing the stability of its laws and the probationary functions of pain. Moreover, the doctrine of a future life teaches us that the sufferings of the righteous are not final, but are passing birth-pangs of unspeakable and unending joy.

The conclusion to which we are led is that, although the universe exhibits many baffling phenomena, what is called physical evil need not be regarded as necessarily inconsistent with either the power, the wisdom, or the goodness of the Creator and Governor of this world. We have confessed that certain alleged improvements in the present dispensation of things may lie beyond the possibilities of divine achievement, if the end for which this world was

¹ Cf. Psa. lxxiii. 2-22; Job xxi. 7-13; Heb. xii. 2-11.

created is to be fulfilled. But this does not imply that divine power is finite — externally limited. Power is a determinate attribute, and its application to what is intrinsically impossible is meaningless. All that supreme and righteous power can do, God can do. The limitation lies in the intrinsic nature of power — not in its external restriction or falling short of its possibilities. Whatever is really valuable is apt to be very costly. The production of a kingdom of rational and perfect persons, and their being brought to the enjoyment of an everlasting divine communion and fellowship, appears to be worth all the cost by which we observe these ends in fact to be achieved. When nature has endured her pains and sorrows, the agonies of this dispensation will no longer be remembered because of the joy that the perfected man is born into the world.¹ This world is certainly not such a world as either a malicious or an impotent God would produce.

§ 3. The problem of physical evil bears no comparison in difficulty and terror with that of moral evil.² The idea of evil belongs in fact to the moral realm; and, strictly speaking, what is called physical evil is not evil at all, except as it can be shown to be an aspect and effect of moral causation. Evil is that which ought not to be, and “ought” is essentially a moral term. It implies volition, and only that can be regarded as evil which in its original caus-

¹ St. John xvi. 21-22. Cf. Rom. viii. 18.

² For references, see p. 113, note 1, above.

ation might have been otherwise had its author willed. Once brought into effect, certain evils may indeed produce further evils which have ceased to be preventable — what is called original sin affords an example; — but when traced back to their roots all evils, properly so-called, are the results of voluntary causes. They were not originally necessary. Only of what was originally unnecessary can we say that it ought not to be.

The problem with which we are concerned is to explain the existence of moral perversity, the fact of wickedness, in a world voluntarily created and governed by one who is not only perfectly righteous, but also omniscient, all-wise, and almighty. Knowing that, if He made such a world as this and did not interfere with creaturely freedom, sin would result, and possessing, it is said, the power to make a world in which sin could have no place, how can His creation of this world be acknowledged without His responsibility for sin being implied? Many have urged that the doctrine of creation imposes upon its maintainers the dilemma of either repudiating the almighty wisdom of God or attributing moral imperfection to Him.

II. *Attempted Solutions*

§ 4. Various solutions of the problem have been attempted.¹ Two of them, the dualistic and the

¹ For general surveys of such attempts, see A. M. Fairbairn, *op. cit.*, Bk. I. ch. iii; O. Pfeiderer, *Philos. of Relig.*, Vol. IV. pp. 1-22; A. B. Sharpe, in *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Evil."

pantheistic, obviously involve a rejection of Christian theism and of the Christian doctrine of creation. For that reason alone they cannot be seriously entertained. Yet a few remarks concerning them will not be out of place.

Dualism asserts the existence of two eternal principles mutually contending for the mastery — one good, the other evil. The mixture of good and evil in this world is explained as the result of this conflict.¹ Parseeism declared that the world was created by two rival powers, Ormuzd and Ahriman, and the evils of this world were attributed to the work of Ahriman. Many of the ancients regarded matter as the seat and source of evil and as co-eternal with God — Hylism. This idea is found in ancient Gnostic systems and in Manichæism. Both Gnosticism and Manichæism proved troublesome to the Church, and the conflict caused Christian writers to contend for the essential goodness of created things.² In opposition to Manichæism, St. Augus-

¹ On dualism, cf. *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. ix. § 4, where references are given. See esp. Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, s. vv. "Dualism" and "Manichæism"; H. P. Liddon, *Some Elements*, pp. 142-148; Chas. Hardwick, *Christ and Other Masters*, Pt. IV. chh. iii, iv; *Cath. Encyc.*, q. v.

² On the gnostic view of evil, and the method of its rebuttal by ante-Nicene fathers, see A. Neander, *Hist. of Christ. Dogmas*, Vol. I. pp. 127-129; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Early Hist. of Christ. Doctr.*, pp. 73 et seq.; R. Seeberg, *Hist. of Doctr.*, §§ 10, 11; *Cath. Encyc.*, *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, and *Dic. of Christ. Biog.*, s. vv. "Gnosticism." Cf. *The Trinity*, pp. 55-57. Origen, *de Princip.*, III. v. 4 (cf. II. ix), explained evil as arising from the creature's will in a previous

tine denied that evil can be regarded as a positive entity. He declared it to be a negation of good.¹ It exists only as a defect in something which is in itself good. Absolute evil would be non-entity. Evil has no efficient cause, but only a deficient one. Wickedness proceeds from will, not from nature *in se*, and is due to misuse of what by created nature is good.

Dualism can only hold its own as a formal theory among those who disregard the rational instinct which drives thoughtful men to seek for some unifying principle in the universe. But the refusal of evil to be rationalized induces a widespread tendency to find a scapegoat for it, and the intractability of

state of existence, thus explaining man's native tendency to evil. St. Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, XI. 23, refutes this. St. Irenæus was less speculative; *adv. Haer.*, II. xxviii; IV. xxxvii-xxxix. Cf. Clement Alex., *Strom.*, IV. 13, 26; Tertullian, *adv. Marc.*, I. 14; *de Anima*, 40.

On Manichæism, see J. F. Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-95; W. Bright, *Lessons from the Lives of Three Great Fathers*, pp. 140-148; *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, s. v. "Mani, Manichæans"; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Manichæism" and "Evil," II; *Dic. of Christ. Biog.*, s. v. "Manichæans"; A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogm.*, Vol. III. pp. 316-336.

¹ The negative view of evil had already appeared in Clement Alex., *Strom.* iv. 13; vi. 17, and in St. Athanasius, *c. Gent.*, iv-vii. St. Augustine's view of evil is given in *de Vera Relig.*, ix; *de Civ. Dei*, xii. 4-7; *Enchirid.*, ix-xvi; and elsewhere. See "Introduct. Essay on the Manichæan Heresy," by A. H. Newman, in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. IV. pp. 5-31; Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctr.*, § 130; W. Bright, *Lessons from the Lives of Three Great Fathers*, pp. 271-275; John Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, Lects. viii, ix. St. Thomas follows St. Augustine, but with needed elaborations; *Summa Theol.*, I. xiv. 10; xlviii-xlix.

matter is made a specious reason for disparaging that form of substance. It is assumed to be anti-spiritual, and the difficulty which many find in believing in the resurrection of the body, *resurrectio carnis*, is largely due to an incipient Manichæism.¹

§ 5. Pantheism has had and now possesses wider support and influence than dualism, but like that theory is too radically inconsistent with any genuine form of Christian theism to be seriously entertained. Its treatment of the problem of evil is in effect a denial of its reality. All phenomena, when pantheistically viewed, must be regarded as manifestations of universal and divine substance. They proceed from the working of necessary laws, and therefore can have, properly speaking, no moral meaning. The validity of moral distinctions and of the notion of moral evil obviously depends upon the element of contingency in volition and upon responsibility to a supreme Person. A system which reduces evil to illusion cannot be said to help us to a solution of the problem of evil, and cannot be reconciled with the data of conscious experience.²

§ 6. Optimism and pessimism represent opposite views of evil which largely owe the influence which

¹ We have to reckon with this in our seventh volume, in connection with the resurrection of Christ. The very purpose for which matter is made is that it may be used by spirit. See J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, ch. i.

² See *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. ix. § 5, where references are given. Cf. A. M. Fairbairn, *Philos. of the Christ. Religion*, pp. 110-111.

they have exercised to temperamental causes. The optimist perceives and emphasizes the good, while the pessimist is chiefly impressed by the evil. Both are essentially one-sided, one minimizing and the other exaggerating and caricaturing the phenomena of evil.

Theistic optimists rightly assume that whatever God has created must in its essence be wholly good.¹ Their tendency, however, is to disregard the actual conditions and to interpret evil as more or less unreal and non-significant.² In reducing evil to negation and to a needed foil of good, St. Augustine took an optimist position, although retaining a sense of sin which redeems his view from essential error. He insisted that the problem of sin must be viewed in the light of redeeming grace; and this constitutes his most valuable contribution to the subject. In the eighteenth century Leibnitz maintained the proposition, "This is the best of all possible worlds." Although a better one is imaginable, almightiness is inapplicable to the impossible, and the imperfec-

¹ Certain scriptural passages which are said to make God the author of evil are simply emphatic assertions that nothing can either be done by, or happen to, creatures except by divine *concursum* (ch. ii. § 11, above): 2 Kings xxi. 12; Isa. xlv. 7; Jerem. xix. 3, 15; Amos iii. 6.

² On optimism, see A. M. Fairbairn, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-111; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. *vv.* "Optimism" and "Leibnitz, System of"; B. Boedder, *Natural Theol.*, pp. 123-126, 467-471. Leibnitz's *Essais de Theodicte*, 1710, is the classic exposition of the optimistic view. A large bibliography is given in Baldwin's *Dic. of Philos.*, Vol. III. Pt. II. pp. 903-907 (cf. s. *v.* "Optimism and Pessimism").

tions of this world pertain necessarily to its finitude. Even moral evil is the road through which men travel to the good. This optimism prevailed widely for a time and was accompanied by a much reduced sense of sin. The poet Pope gave popular expression to this point of view when he described "partial evil" as an element of "universal good" and said, "Whatever is, is right."¹ In thus explaining evil by a metaphysical limitation in the possibilities of finite being and development, optimism evades the problem and fails to face the reality and meaning of sin.

§ 7. Pessimism treats evil as the dominant quality of being and life, and seeks not so much to explain its origin as to abolish existence in which it inheres.² In ancient times it emerged in East Indian Buddhism, and has been formulated in modern days by Schopenhauer. Gautama traced evil to desire, which can never be satisfied under the conditions of existence. Existence then involves sorrow, which can be remedied only by the suppression of desire and extinction of separate existence in Nirvana.³ Such a view of life deprives it of meaning, and therefore constitutes

¹ *Essay on Man*.

² On pessimism, see A. M. Fairbairn, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-131; *Cath. Encyc.*, q. v.; *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, q. v.; James Sully, *Pessimism*; C. Williams, *Modern Pessimism*. A. Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Idea*, and K. R. E. von Hartmann's *Philos. of the Unconscious*, are classic defences of pessimism.

³ On Buddhism, see T. W. Rhys Davids, in *Encyc. Brit.* (11th Ed.), q. v.; R. S. Coplestone, *Buddhism Past and Present*. Cf. Sir Monier Williams, *Brahmanism and Hinduism* (4th Ed.); and the various manuals of comparative religion.

not a rational explanation of its shadows, but a one-sided assertion of its failures. The same can be said of Schopenhauer's reference of evil to the will to be, and of his contention that the existence in which the will seeks self-realization is irremediably miserable and ought to be ended.¹

Moreover, the nature of evil is misunderstood. Neither desire nor the will to live is evil in itself; and the sorrows of existence are not due to the mere fact of existence. They are partly needed factors in human development and partly results of human misdirection of desire and will. Gautama was moved with pity and Schopenhauer was cynical; but both failed to see that selfishness and absorption in purely earthly aims constitute the real difficulty. Christians avoid this error and, instead of advocating the suppression of desire and will, seek to emancipate them by a more comprehensive view of human destiny and by conformity of human aspirations to the beneficent will by which the antecedent conditions of human blessedness are determined and provided. Liberty and happiness are possible when and in so far as we learn by self-discipline to seek the supernatural end for which we were made. When we do this, suffering loses its baneful

¹ A. T. Ormond says that the thought of to-day on the problem of evil is divided "between pessimism and the Kanto-Lotzian tendency to seek refuge in the demands of the moral judgment": Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, s. v. "Theodicy." See H. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Vol. II. pp. 714 *et seq.*

meaning and is perceived to be an inevitable and very small price of everlasting blessedness.

§ 8. The problem of evil, theoretically considered, lies beyond the scope of natural science; but scientific results, in particular those of evolutionary science, afford data which have important bearing upon the problem. These data will be regarded differently according to the scientist's standpoint — whether Christian or naturalistic — and naturalism may be either atheistic, pantheistic, or theistic. Atheism bows the fact of sin out of existence, and our discussion is based upon its acknowledgment. Pantheism, as we have seen, in effect does the same, and has been sufficiently considered. Naturalistic theists agree with Christians in acknowledging the fact of sin, and do not deny its moral significance; but they underestimate its range and guilt, and the solution of the problem which they offer is inadequate. It does not fully meet the requirement that God shall not be made to appear responsible for the actuality of sin and guilt. We refer to the so-called evolutionary theory of sin.¹

¹The evolutionary theory is adopted with varying degrees of consistency by F. R. Tennant (*The Origin and Propag. of Sin*, esp. pp. 121-141, and *The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin*); Canon J. M. Wilson (*Guardian*, Oct. 7, 1896); O. Pfeiderer (*Philos. of Relig.*, Vol. IV. pp. 33 *et seq.*); W. E. Orchard (*Modern Theories of Sin*); and others. Cf. ch. viii. § 3, below. The writer has dealt with this theory in *Evolution and the Fall*, Lects. v-vi. Cf. Jas. Orr, *God's Image in Man and Sin as a Problem of To-day*, chh. v *et seq.*

This theory eliminates from consideration all supernatural factors in the problem and treats sin as an inevitable concomitant and by-product of natural evolution. The propensities in man which produce sin are naturally inherited from brute ancestors, and their unrestrained activity had no immoral significance until a sense of duty to regulate them by moral principles was developed in him. But evolution is everywhere gradual, and the moral faculties are not exempt from this law of development. In primitive man, and in earlier stages of the growth of human individuals, they are imperfectly developed and comparatively feeble. Until man's moral development is completed the lower animal propensities cannot be brought into entire subjection, and violations of moral principle, or sins, are practically unavoidable. But sin brings an experience which serves as a factor in moral development. History shows that mankind can and does profit by his failures, and that his experience with sin constitutes a factor in his upward moral development — the goal of which appears to be the evolution of a manhood in which the moral faculties will have perfect control of animal propensities. In brief, sin is sin only as a passing anachronism — inevitable and necessary for the evolution of the perfect man. Such is the naturalistic evolutionary theory.

This theory is highly plausible, if its naturalistic point of view is accepted. It is based upon the assumption that the natural factors of the evolution

of man comprehend all the factors with which we have to reckon in explaining the origin and meaning of sin. If man's primitive state and subsequent history have been wholly determined by physical causes, and if a purely natural state constitutes the sum of divine arrangements for human probation, such an assumption seems highly credible; but the elimination of superphysical causes which it implies has no scientific validity. Physical science, it is true, cannot concern itself with other than physical factors; but this very limitation debars it from dogmatizing as to the existence or non-existence of superphysical ones. The theory of moral evil under consideration is therefore philosophical and speculative; and its truth depends upon the validity of the denial of superphysical factors upon which it is based. In other words, the issue between this theory and the catholic view of sin is part of a wider issue between the Christian and the naturalistic view of history at large. The Christian view allows for, and the naturalistic view denies, the supernatural; and the naturalistic denial is not a scientific conclusion but a dogmatic assertion, based upon philosophical premises which natural science can never establish.

But the naturalistic theory in question is not only unscientific. It is also unsatisfactory as a theodicy, because it has the effect either of reducing the significance of man's sense of guilt or of making God responsible for sin — a morally imperfect God. The first result is most common. If sin is practically

unavoidable and constitutes an inevitable by-product of human progress in its early stages — a condition of such progress, — it can hardly be regarded as having at such stages the culpability which Scripture and Christian theology ascribe to it. Failures which are invariable conditions of progress towards success, missings of the mark which must attend practice in hitting it, futilities of a moral development not yet sufficiently advanced to attain security, surely such actions are to be condoned as the aberrations of children who are not yet sufficiently possessed of knowledge and moral power to be charged with guilt. If natural evolution alone is to be reckoned with in describing man's primitive state, we do not see how such reasoning can be refuted. If, however, as catholic doctrine teaches and science cannot disprove, the undeveloped moral resources of primitive man were fortified by sufficient supernatural enlightenment and grace to enable him to avoid moral transgression, his sin must be regarded as truly culpable.

Those who accept the naturalistic view of the origin of sin, and yet agree with Christian theology in acknowledging its culpability, cannot refute the charge that they in effect make God responsible for sin — for its actuality as well as for its possibility. To describe man's primitive state as the result of natural evolution, and as the initiation of a higher development, does not exempt a theist from regarding it as due to divine purpose and arrangement. If that

state involves impracticability on men's part to avoid sinning, then the actuality of sin is caused by Him who created the conditions which make it inevitable. We cannot escape this conclusion, unless we either deny the perfection of divine foresight and power — an impossible alternative for Christian theists — or accept the catholic doctrine of man's primitive state. According to this doctrine primitive man was by grace made capable of avoiding sin, and the responsibility for actual sin pertains wholly to the creature. This argument is entirely unaffected by considerations which lessen the enormity of primitive man's guilt.¹ If he incurred the slightest degree of guilt, and did so unavoidably, the responsibility for sin lies with the Author of the conditions which made it inevitable. Even the slightest real sin is something which ought not to be and raises the whole problem of moral evil.

III. *The Christian View*

§ 9. It seems clear that no one of the systems which we have been considering is to be regarded as affording a satisfactory solution of the problem of evil. That problem is essentially a moral one. What is called metaphysical evil — or the necessary limita-

¹ Cf. F. R. Tennant, *Origin and Propag. of Sin*, Pref. of 2d Ed. pp. xix-xxii. We do not suppose that our primitive parents could realize all the baneful consequences of their sin, and do not estimate its guilt on that basis. It is enough to maintain that they were really, and to some degree consciously, culpable.

tion of finite things, of which Leibnitz spoke — is not evil at all; for evil is what ought not to be, and we may not think that finite things ought not to be limited. The so-called physical evils, so far as they are really evil and not necessary factors of progress, are consequences and manifestations of moral evil, and it is moral evil that matters in facing the problems of life. How can we explain the existence of sin in a world created and governed by one who is not only perfectly righteous, but almighty and omniscient? God created the potentialities of sin, knowing that they would become actualities, and energizes the creaturely operations by means of which they become actualities. Without His immediate and uninterrupted action as immanent cause and factor in all our life and action — in brief, without His assistance — we could not sin. His assisting us in actions which for us are sinful constitutes the problem.

Can it be solved? We say both yes and no. It can be, and is, solved by divine intelligence, to which all mysteries are clear; and the solution must be consistent with both the resourcefulness and the righteousness of God. We are sure of this, because we know that God is Himself the reason for all things, and in Him no contradiction is possible. To creatures evil appears either as something to be explained theoretically or as something to be vanquished practically. By reason of the redemption which divine love has afforded we are enabled, by divine grace, gradually to overcome evil; and an ultimate victory

of good over evil, in all its ramifications, seems to be involved in the general trend of things.¹ In brief, the problem of evil can be practically solved by divine grace, and sufficient grace is afforded to all who strive thus to solve it. The reality of this solution is not reduced by the fact that time and life-long struggle is needed for its achievement.

But when evil is faced as something to be explained, it constitutes — that is, for human minds — an insoluble problem.² As will be shown, we know enough to be justified in believing that the existence of moral evil does not overthrow the doctrine that the Creator and supreme Governor of the world is at once almighty, all wise, and perfectly righteous in all His ways. In other words, we are in a position to perceive that our inability theoretically to solve the problem is due to our mental limitations, and therefore affords no adequate reason for our doubting either the resourcefulness or the power of God. And the relief which such a conclusion affords to spiritual minds becomes an ever-increasing joy when the practical solution of evil which redeeming grace makes possible is contemplated and undertaken. The problem of evil and the mystery of redemption

¹ See *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. vii. § 3; R. Flint, *Theism*, pp. 229-232; J. Martineau, *Religion*, Bk. I. ch. v.

² A. M. Fairbairn, *Philos. of the Christ. Religion*, p. 132, says, "The belief in God is an excellent thing when we face evil as something to be vanquished; but when we face evil as something to be explained, the belief is itself surrounded with serious difficulties." Cf. J. R. Illingworth, *Reason and Revelation*, pp. 234-237.

go together, and neither of them is rightly contemplated except in connection with the other.

§ 10. The necessity of considering evil and redemption together is part of a wider principle which we have more than once previously emphasized — the principle that, owing to the finite limitations of our knowledge and mental capacity, appearances of opposition constantly emerge when we contemplate fundamental facts and truths.¹ It is our ignorance of the connecting links which causes these antinomies, and we are not justified in asserting real contradiction, as between truth and counter-truth, when we have sufficient reason for accepting each. To maintain this is not to take refuge from contradiction in an appeal to mystery.² Rather it is to give reason for regarding the contradiction as only apparent — caused by our ignorance. Genuine truths cannot be mutually contradictory, and when dealing with imperfectly understood departments of truth we may not urge an appearance of opposition as nullifying what seem to be sufficient reasons for accepting the apparently opposed propositions as severally true.

On the one hand, we have abundant reasons for believing that the Creator and supreme Governor of this world is almighty and perfectly righteous,

¹ Cf. ch. i. § 2, above.

² F. R. Tennant, *Origin of Sin*, pp. 18–20, has, we think, unintentionally done injustice to the late J. B. Mozley's argument on this line.

and that He could not have made the world in ignorance of any of the consequences. On the other hand, universal experience justifies the conviction that sin is a widespread fact and that it is truly evil — a fact which ought not to be. To regard this antithesis as constituting a real contradiction involves the necessity of repudiating one or the other of the truths involved. But to repudiate either is to commit ourselves to a sceptical attitude towards evidence which is logically self-destructive. The more reasonable way is to allow for our ignorance and to account for the appearance of contradiction by the gaps in our knowledge of the mystery.¹

§ 11. We ought not, however, to exaggerate our ignorance or to suppose that no human knowledge exists which can avail to relieve the appearance of sheer opposition between the sovereign goodness of God and the prevalence of sin in His universe. If we cannot formulate an adequate theodicy, lines of true thought are available which help us in maintaining that God is not responsible for sin and that its actuality does not militate against His goodness.

(a) Scientific induction tends more and more to confirm the generalization that everything has utility, and the evolutionary hypothesis teaches us that utility is a condition of existence. The law of survival

¹ The most that can be granted is that we are unable to *formulate* certain truths together without *verbal* contradiction, because of the limitations of human terms. Our language is symbolical, and thoughtful theologians remember this without sacrificing either of the truths which they find themselves unable to define in harmonious terms.

of the fittest is generally accepted, and the fact that the use and value of many things is as yet unknown is not regarded as inconsistent with this law. At all events, the theory that matter — that any substantial thing — is intrinsically evil is supported by no real evidence. The evil of things lies in their misuse. We are justified, therefore, in believing that the proper nature of every creature of God is good.¹

(b) What are called physical evils, so far as they are not due to sin, can be seen to serve beneficent purposes. The pains and sorrows of the righteous minister to their perfecting; and penal suffering is not wholly penal, but appears to be both useful and necessary for remedying sin and for transforming character.

(c) The possibility of moral evil, or human capacity to sin, appears to be a necessary condition of our probation and of the development of human persons and of a kingdom of saints.² Such development is the revealed purpose for which man is placed in this world; and the priceless value of the divine purpose suggests that its fulfilment may be very costly and justifies the cost.³

¹ St. Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, XXII. 1, points out that, as a perversion of the nature of things, sin is by its very sinfulness evidence of their natural goodness.

² God willed to develop moral products, not mere machines. See E. H. Jewett, *Diabolology*, pp. 59-64; J. R. Illingworth, *Reason and Revel.*, p. 224; Tertullian. *adv. Marcion*, II. 5.

³ Included in the cost is an everlasting punishment. The subject belongs to our last volume. But (a) Everlasting continuance — a

(d) If it is urged that almighty power ought to be equal to the achievement of developing perfect human persons without leaving open the possibility of sin, we seem to be justified in doubting whether such an achievement can be included among the things to which power is applicable — that is, whether it is in any case a possibility. To be unable to achieve the impossible does not involve a defect of power, for to have power to accomplish the impossible is a meaningless idea. Power means ability to do what can be done.¹

(e) Only a naturalistic point of view — and natu-

temporal duration — does not make evil more contrary to divine goodness than its momentary occurrence. If we could explain the latter we could no doubt explain the former; (b) Man's obstinate wilfulness causes future punishment, which God cannot nullify without subverting the moral order; (c) We may not argue as if the penal aspect of hell were its only aspect. Scripture describes hell relatively, and as it will appear to those who taste of heavenly joys. With all its misery, hell may reveal divine mercies to its inhabitants, and the good there retained may make life worth living (St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. xxi. 4 ad 1); (d) No sinner — not even Satan himself — can avoid participating in the fulfilment of the divine plan; and our knowledge of God is sufficient to assure us that this plan is righteous and beneficent, and that it must make all creaturely existence worth while. Cf. B. Boedder, *Natural Theol.*, pp. 405-410; E. B. Pusey, *What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment*, pp. 1-28; T. R. Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, chh. xii-xiv. The subject cannot be considered rightly until popular caricatures of the doctrine of Scripture are entirely dismissed from consideration.

¹ Cf. E. H. Jewett, *Diabolology*, pp. 61-62; Le Conte, in *The Conception of God*, p. 72; A. M. Fairbairn, *Philos. of the Christ. Religion*, pp. 153-163.

ralism is not science — requires us to suppose that the existing inevitableness of sin is due to the constitution of things as it was originally established by God. A larger and Christian view of history justifies the belief that, in its ultimate origin, man's incapacity wholly to avoid sin is due to a primitive moral fall which could have been avoided. The catholic doctrine of a primitive state of grace, and of its forfeiture by unnecessary sin, enables us to place the responsibility for the actuality of human sin wholly upon man's shoulders. This is confirmed by the universal assumption that, in its final analysis, sin is an act of free will — of the human will. We instinctively blame the human sinner for his evil actions; and men do not blame God for them except when they lose their way in attempting to grapple with abstract questions that are too deep for human answering.

(f) We may not conclude that, because God permits evil and overrules it for the fulfilment of His purpose, therefore He does evil that good may come, or employs evil means for the sake of good ends. Such language implies that means and ends can be separated in divine operations, as if He did one thing at a given moment in order to achieve another thing at a later period. All time is equally immediate to the eternity of God; and His operations, however successive in historical manifestation they may be, are in themselves ever complete. The end is present in the beginning with Him, and the temporal

sequences and relations which we contemplate are relations of finite history rather than of divine action *in se*.¹

(g) Although our knowledge of the purpose of God — by which the moral significance of history must be determined — is inadequate, we know it sufficiently to be justified in believing that it is righteous and infinitely glorious. Moreover, the trend of history, as we see it, indicates that a “Power not ourselves” which “makes for righteousness” is determining ultimate issues. Scripture teaches us to interpret this fact as evidence that “to them that love God all things work together for good.”² This is the eternal purpose of God and the meaning of history, in the light of which we can patiently acquiesce in our incapacity to solve the problem. Because of this purpose we reckon “that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed to usward”; and we wait “for the revealing of the sons of God.”³

¹ Cf. ch. i. §§ 3, 4, above. See also F. B. Jevons, *Evolution*, pp. 226–229.

² Rom. viii. 28. ³ Rom. viii. 18–19.

CHAPTER V

ANGELS

I. *Their Reality*

§ 1. The modern mind, even when professedly Christian, is apt to dismiss the subject of angels from serious consideration, as having only a poetical and symbolical value.¹ Belief in angels is explained as a mythical personification of the powers of nature — a survival of pagan conceptions, purged by biblical writers of their grosser and polytheistic ele-

¹ On angels, see the articles *q. v.* in *Cath. Encyc.*; *Schaff-Hersog Encyc.*; and Blunt, *Dic. of Theol.* Patristic views are surveyed in *Dic. of Christ. Biog.*, *q. v.*, and emerge in St. Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, IX-X; Pseudo-Dionysius Areop., *de Coelesti Hierarchia*; St. John Dam., *Orth. Fid.*, II. iii, iv. They are exhaustively presented by Petavius, *de Angelis*. Scholastic treatments occur in Peter Lombard, *Libri quat. Sententiarum*, II. ii-xii; and St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. l-ixiv, cvi-cxiv. Roman Catholic writers: J. Perrone, *Praelec. Theol.*, Vol. III. pp. 2-65; Ad. Tanqueray, *de Deo Creante*, cap. ii; Wilhelm and Scannell, *Cath. Theol.*, §§ 118-121; Chr. Pesch, *de Deo Creante*, Tr. I. Sec. iv. Anglican: Bp. Andrewes, *Sermons on the Nativity*, i, xii; Rich. Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, I. iv; Bp. Bull, *Works* (Burton's ed.), Vol. I. Serms. xi, xii; Jos. Mede, *Discourses*, x; E. B. Pusey, *Lecs. on Daniel*, chh. viii, ix; J. H. Newman, in *Plain Sermons*, Vol. II; Chr. Wordsworth, *Com'ty on St. Luke*, Pref.; P. G. Medd, *One Mediator*, §§ 44-52, and notes i-v; T. R. Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, chh. v, vii; W. Sanday, in *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*; Alfred Edersheim, *Life and Times of Jesus*, Vol. II. App. 13.

ments.¹ In particular, the indications in Scripture of belief in the personality, kingdom, and power of Satan are said to exhibit traces of the animistic polytheism of earlier ages, and, in later documents of the Old Testament, the influence of Medo-Persian ideas.²

This attitude is an inevitable outcome of naturalism, which refuses to leave any place for the operation of superphysical agencies in the universe; and the modern mind is largely determined by naturalistic forms of thought, even when unready to give formal adherence to them. Professing Christians are not exempt from the influence of the mental atmosphere in which they live, and the belief in angels is peculiarly liable to suffer under modern conditions. This is so for two reasons. In the first place, angelology does not seem in popular estimation to occupy a central place in Christian doctrine, and the loss of belief in angels is not thought, therefore, to carry with it any serious modification of Christian doctrine. In the second place, modern science has

¹ Belthasar Bekker of Holland (1634-1698) introduced the idea of accommodation on Christ's part to prevailing notions; and he was followed in Germany by J. S. Semler (*de Dæmoniacis*, 1760). In England similar ground was taken by the Rev. Hugh Farmer (dissenter): *An Inquiry into the Nature and Design of Christ's Temptation* (1761) and *An Essay on the Dæmoniacs of the New Testament* (1775). See K. R. Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctr.*, § 297; E. H. Jewett, *Diabolology*, pp. ix, x.

² So F. Ueberweg, *Hist. of Philos.*, Vol. I. pp. 418, 421-422. See, *per contra*, C. Hardwick, *Christ and Other Masters*, pp. 558-563; E. H. Jewett, *op. cit.*, Lec. iv.

seemed to many, by its theory of ether and by its pathological generalizations, to afford physical explanations of the phenomena which constitute the alleged spheres of angelic and demoniacal activity.

§ 2. It is a serious error to think that the doctrine of angels is not vital to Christian belief. A rejection of it involves the doctrine of our Lord's Person in grave difficulties, and that doctrine is the primary article of the Christian faith. If Christ was not fully divine while on earth, His claims, as recorded in the Gospels, must be rejected. If He was really divine, He could neither have been mistaken as to the existence of angels and the reality of demoniacal possession, nor, by way of accommodation, have employed language calculated to crystallize, and give permanent place in Christian belief to, false doctrine.¹ The doctrine of angels is either true or false. If it is false, it is a kind of belief which inevitably engenders superstition, by causing men to place dependence upon superhuman beings which have no place in divine government. If, however, the doctrine is true, and God has indeed created invisible spirits who are appointed to minister to the heirs of salvation,² the knowledge of angelic ministrations must afford comfort and courage in our efforts to escape from sin. The belief in angels has

¹ See R. C. Trench, *Miracles of Our Lord*, § 5; E. H. Jewett, *op. cit.*, Lec. v.

² Heb. i. 14.

in fact been of the greatest practical help to multitudes of Christians in every age.

It is unnecessary to repeat the reasons for repudiating the naturalistic philosophy.¹ But it is only from the naturalistic point of view that we are justified in supposing that modern physical science leaves no place for rational belief in the existence and ministrations of angels. Physical science is concerned only with the physical factors of the world-drama and can neither affirm nor deny the existence of other and higher factors. Philosophically viewed, physical factors do not afford a complete explanation of things. They are obviously insufficient to account for many phenomena. Ether is after all but a name — a symbol — for an unseen universe to which are referred the unknown factors that lie behind natural phenomena. What it really is, no one has been able to determine with scientific certainty.² When described in physical terms it appears to combine attributes which are mutually incompatible — a continuous or solid medium, which is none the less so tenuous and elastic as to afford practically no resistance to the movements of heavenly bodies. We profess no greater natural knowledge of this mystery than scientific investigation affords; but it does not appear either irrational or contrary to genu-

¹ See ch. iii. § 12, above.

² For references on ether, see p. 92, note, above. A suggestive speculation is to be found in Stewart and Tait, *Unseen Universe*, ch. vii (cf. ch. iv).

ine scientific knowledge to suppose that the realities which are symbolically generalized under the name ether include angelic operations. Such a supposition at least relieves us from the difficulty above mentioned which attends a purely physical conception of unseen substance.¹

Pathological interpretations of the disorders which in the New Testament are referred to demoniacal agency are no doubt to be accepted so far as they go. We are neither competent nor desirous to reject them. We accept them without question. But a pathological description of mental and physical disorders does not exclude spiritual factors from their causation. It is a matter of daily experience that both mental and physical diseases are sometimes caused by human wills, acting through intemperance, auto-suggestion, and other forms of abuse. The fact that this is so neither discredits physical descriptions of disease nor is nullified by the truth of such descriptions. If the human will can induce physical disorders by mischievous usage of the material organism, a place surely remains for the belief that unseen spirits, if they exist, can, under the limits imposed upon them by their Creator, do likewise. In brief, to be able to give a physical description of the symptoms and developments of epilepsy,

¹ That natural operations should be in part carried on by created spirits is not inconsistent with the dominance of law and order which we discover in these operations. *Ex hypothesi*, angels fulfil the will of God, which, in any case, is the ultimate explanation of the whole natural order.

insanity, and other physiological disorders, does not, except upon the highly disputable basis of naturalism, enable us either to affirm or to deny the part of creaturely wills, in particular demoniacal wills, in inducing some of these disorders. If any knowledge of this matter can be had, it must come from other sources than that of physical science; and, if Christian doctrine in general is true, other sources are available. To give a concluding thought, if, as the New Testament bears witness, evil angels can and do cause disorders in the human organism, such disorders must, from the nature of things, be just such as our organism is liable to incur—such as can be scientifically diagnosed and pathologically described.¹

§ 3. We have taken the position that the existence and functions of angels cannot either be proved or disproved by evidence drawn from physical investigation. But a wider view of the drama, of which physical phenomena constitute a partial manifestation, enables us to perceive that an unseen universe exists in which there is abundant room and a credible place for angelic beings and their ministrations. A belief in angels is therefore not intrinsically unreasonable, and when supported by spiritual and supernatural evidence, it becomes credible and unassailable.

¹ Bishop Bloomfield, on St. Matt. iv. 24, says that "we may ask, if an evil spirit were permitted to disturb men's vital functions, have we any conception how this could be done without occasioning some or other of the symptoms which accompany natural disease?"

It would be erroneous, however, to suppose that the scriptural doctrine of angels derives no support from common experience. Promptings to good and temptations to evil are frequently experienced which have marks of other than physical or auto-suggestive origin. Their suddenness and articulateness give them a supernormal appearance and suggest external and personal sources.¹ These experiences are too purely personal and mental to be available as evidence in argument with others, but they are often exceedingly convincing to those to whom they come. Physicians who minister to the insane are often impressed with the baffling nature of the disorders which they investigate, and at times seem to detect signs of the working of other than physiological causes. Many of them are led by these indications to believe in the agency of evil spirits — in demoniacal possession. But the phenomena in question are too occult to be depended upon as evidences properly so called. The fact that religious insanity is peculiarly malignant and baffling appears to impart credibility, however, to the belief in demoniacal agency.² The phenomena of spiritualism, an important residuum of which remains after the mountain of fraud connected therewith has been removed, lend themselves to a similar explanation. Demons, if they exist, may be believed to have access to the supernormal information which mediumistic spirits

¹ See R. Dale, *Lec. on the Ephesians*, pp. 422 *et seq.*

² See W. A. Matson, *The Adversary*, ch. xvi.

exhibit, and this view of such spirits would explain the disorderly and irresponsible mode of conversation which they usually display.¹

Various theological writers have appealed to natural analogy in support of the probability that such beings as angels exist. In nature we discover a vast hierarchy of living beings, reaching from the lowest and simplest forms of organic life up to man. The late Canon Liddon asks: "Is he to suppose that the hierarchy of beings which rises by such gradual steps . . . does in very truth rise no higher; that it stops abruptly at the link which he himself forms, between an animal organism and a personal spirit? Is it not more reasonable to suppose that the upward series continues, and that above man there are beings stretching, in rank beyond rank of ascending excellence, upward toward the throne of the Uncreated and the Eternal? and supposing such beings to exist, as revelation says they do exist, is it not at least conceivable that they do in sundry ways limit our independence, just as we, on our part, interfere with creatures below us?"² Such an appeal to analogy does not, of course, afford real evidence. But

¹ *Op. cit.*, ch. xvii; E. M. Duff and Thos. G. Allen, *Psychic Research and Gospel Miracles*, App. B. II; W. McDonald, *Spiritualism Identical with Ancient Sorcery*; *Church Quarterly Rev.*, April 1877, pp. 212-217; J. Nevius, *Demon Possession and Allied Themes*; Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, s. v. "Demonology," "Magic," "Psychical Research," "Spiritism," and "Witchcraft"; Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. v. "Sorcery." Cf. pp. 166-168, below.

² *Univ. Sermons*, 2d Series, p. 152.

it helps many to see the credibility of biblical teaching.

It has been objected that the doctrine of angels is of non-biblical origin, being a survival of ethnic beliefs growing out of a primitive animism. Ancient peoples were apt to regard natural phenomena as caused by unseen spirits; and the belief in angels, it is said, grew out of this belief.¹ Having outgrown such naïve conceptions, we ought to abandon the angelology into which they have developed. Our reply is simple. The caricatures of truth which prevail among untaught races may not be regarded as militating against the elements of truth which they contain. We need not regard the religious notions of heathen races as wholly false. But the basis of our own belief in angels, whatever may have been its antecedents, is the clear teaching of Holy Scripture in general and of Jesus Christ. To repudiate this teaching is to undermine Christian doctrine at large.

§ 4. Biblical teaching concerning angels is very abundant, although limited in range and usually indirect.² That is, the attributes of angels are not often the immediate subject of definition; but we are usually left to infer their nature and functions

¹ E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. II. pp. 123-143.

² On biblical teaching, see Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. v. "Angel" (by A. B. Davidson); *Dic. of Christ*, s. v. "Angels" (by J. T. Marshall); A. B. Davidson, *Theol. of the Old Test.*, pp. 289-306; E. B. Pusey, *Lecs. on Daniel*, Lecs. viii, ix; L. P. (editor), *A Book of Angels*, ch. ii (by T. T. Carter); J. E. Hull, *The Holy Angels*.

from the narratives in which their part in sacred history is described. Their existence and active participation in human affairs is either asserted or implied in every part of Scripture. They most commonly appear as messengers from God to men;¹ and they are distinguished from God Himself as creatures,² and from men as neither having flesh and blood³ nor being given in marriage.⁴ Their acting and speaking as messengers reveals their personal nature, as does also their exhibition of knowledge, wisdom,⁵ freedom, and moral character.⁶

They appear at every critical stage of sacred history, and the revelation of their nature and functions is progressive, running parallel with the gradual self-manifestation of God, with the succession of divine dispensations, and with the development of the Church of God.⁷ Moreover, their own fortunes, whether good or evil, and their ultimate destiny seem to be connected with those of men, whom they

¹ To Abraham, Gen. xviii. 2; xxii. 11-18; to Jacob, Gen. xxviii. 12; to Balaam, Numb. xxii. 31; to Daniel, Dan. vi. 22, etc.; in connection with the Incarnation, St. Matt. i. 20; ii. 13, 19; St. Luke i. 11-20, 26-38; ii. 9-14; the resurrection, St. Matt. xxviii. 2-5; St. Mark xvi. 5-7; St. Luke ii. 23; St. John xx. 12; the ascension, Acts v. 10, 11; to the apostles, Acts v. 19; viii. 26; xii. 17-23; Revel. i. 1; v. 2, etc.

² Psa. cxlviii. 2-5; Col. i. 16.

³ Ephes. vi. 12.

⁴ St. Matt. xxii. 30.

⁵ 2 Sam. xiv. 20.

⁶ St. Matt. vi. 13 (R. V.); St. Mark vi. 38; St. John viii. 44; 2 St. Pet. ii. 4.

⁷ E. V. Gerhart, *Institutes of the Christ. Religion*, §§ 166-167, 175.

were appointed to serve, and with the Church. Thus, when the foundations of the earth were laid, we are told, "all the sons of God shouted for joy."¹ On the other hand, it was the devil, described as a serpent, who tempted man to his first sin, and thus brought evil into the world.² When our first parents were banished from Eden because of their sin, the way of approach to the tree of life was guarded by the Cherubim.³ The patriarch Abraham was visited by three angels at the oaks of Mamre,⁴ one of whom spoke with divine authority, as somehow identified with God — a theophany;⁵ and other appearances to the patriarchs are described in Genesis.⁶ The call of Moses came through "the angel of the Lord," who "appeared unto him in a flame of fire out of the midst of the bush,"⁷ and the angel of God guarded the host of Israel at the crossing of the Red Sea and on its undertaking the conquest of the land of Canaan.⁸

¹ Job xxxviii. 4-7.

² Gen. iii, interpreted in the light of Revel. xii. 9; xx. 2; 2 Cor. xi. 3.

³ Gen. iii. 24. ⁴ Gen. xviii.

⁵ The ancient fathers usually interpreted the Old Testament theophanies as revelations of the Son. Examples are given by Ewd. Burton, *Testimonies . . . to the Divinity of Christ*, pp. 37-40. On theophanies, see P. G. Medd, *One Mediator*, §§ 83-111; H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of Our Lord*, pp. 52-60.

⁶ Gen. xix; xxii. 11; xxviii. 12; xxxii. 24-30.

⁷ Exod. iii. 2.

⁸ Exod. xiv. 19; Josh. v. 13-15. Other angelic appearances are given in Judges ii. 1-5; vi. 11-24; xiii. 2-21; 2 Sam. xxiv. 16; 1 Kings xix. 5-7; 2 Kings i. 3; Dan. viii. 15-17; ix. 21; x. 5, etc.

Whatever may be the respective dates of the Psalms, the belief in angels which they express is in line with that discoverable in the most ancient Old Testament documents, and cannot have been borrowed from Gentile sources during the Babylonian captivity. "The angel of the Lord encampeth round about them that fear Him, and delivereth them."¹ "He shall give His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways. They shall bear thee up in their hands, lest thou dash thy feet against a stone."² Later Jewish speculation elaborated this belief;³ but the Christian doctrine of angels was completed by experience of their ministrations in the pentecostal age and by the direct and indirect teaching of Christ and His apostles. That teaching will be sufficiently exhibited when we treat systematically of angelic functions and attributes. It is enough at this point to emphasize the impossibility of shutting out the doctrine of angels from our Lord's teaching, without destructive mutilation of the Gospel narratives.

As might be expected on the supposition that the Christian doctrine of angels is true, the crisis of the Incarnation was accompanied by various angelic appearances. An angel who called himself Gabriel

¹ Psa. xxxiv. 7. ² Psa. xci. 11-12.

³ On later Jewish speculations, see Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, Extra Vol. pp. 285-290; Speaker's *Commentary*, Apocrypha, Vol. I. pp. 171 *et seq.*; A. Edersheim, *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, App. xiii; *Jewish Encyc.*, s. v. "Angels," pp. 583-597; *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, s. v. "Angels," II.

appeared to Zacharias to announce the birth of our Lord's forerunner,¹ and six months later he announced to the Blessed Virgin the privilege which she was to enjoy of bringing forth the Son of God.² The nativity, when it occurred, was announced by an angel to some shepherds who were watching their flocks in the neighborhood.³ Christ was assailed with temptations by the devil, the chief of evil angels, after His forty days' fast in the wilderness,⁴ and was ministered to by holy angels.⁵ An angel also strengthened Him during His agony in Gethsemane.⁶ His resurrection was announced by angels to the women at the sepulchre on the first Easter morn;⁷ and His coming again in the clouds of heaven was promised to the disciples after the ascension by two men in white apparel.⁸

Christ was plainly conscious of having angelic hosts at His service,⁹ and taught that little children are attended by angels, who behold the face of the Father in heaven.¹⁰ He indicated that they neither marry nor are given in marriage,¹¹ and described them as caring for the righteous departed¹² and as attending and serving in the final judgment.¹³ As we have

¹ St. Luke i. 11-20. ² St. Luke i. 26-38. ³ St. Luke ii. 8-14.

⁴ St. Matt. iv. 1-11; St. Mark i. 13; St. Luke iv. 1-13.

⁵ St. Mark i. 13. ⁶ St. Luke xxii. 43.

⁷ St. Matt. xxviii. 2-7; St. Mark xvi. 5-7; St. Luke xxiv. 4-7; St. John xx. 12-13.

⁸ Acts i. 10-11. ⁹ St. Matt. xxvi. 53. ¹⁰ St. Matt. xviii. 10.

¹¹ St. Matt. xxii. 30. ¹² St. Luke xvi. 22.

¹³ St. Matt. xiii. 39, 41, 49; xxiv. 31; xxv. 31; St. John i. 51, etc.

already stated,¹ such teaching from such a Person cannot be explained as an accommodation on His part to current notions; and He cannot consistently be regarded as mistaken by those who acknowledge Him to be what He claimed to be, the Light of the world. The subject is too closely connected with the mysteries of the kingdom which He came to declare, to be included among the things which He condescended as Man not to know; and such nescience as He willed to experience in His human mind cannot have involved blundering on His part in spiritual things.

These remarks apply to His experiences with, and teaching concerning, evil angels or devils. It was obviously His mission to deliver men from him who has power over soul and body in hell;² and, as an earnest of what He was to accomplish, He went about casting out devils from those who were possessed,³ also imparting power to His disciples to do likewise.⁴ When accused of casting out devils through Beelzebub, the prince of devils, He denounced the accusation as equivalent to blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, and declared His power over devils to be evidence that the Kingdom of God had come.⁵

¹ See § 2, *init.*, above.

² St. Matt. x. 28; St. Luke xii. 4-5; Col. i. 13; 1 St. John iii. 8.

³ St. Matt. iv. 24; viii. 28-32; ix. 32, 33; xii. 22; xv. 22-28; xvii. 14-18; and parallels in the other Gospels.

⁴ St. Matt. x. 8; St. Luke x. 17-20.

⁵ St. Matt. xii. 24 *et seq.*; St. Mark iii. 22; St. Luke xi. 15. On this subject, see R. C. Trench, *Miracles of Our Lord*, § 5, *init.* It is obvious that our Lord's attitude in the passages here cited goes beyond mere accommodation.

II. *Christian Doctrine*

§ 5. It has always been generally believed by Christians that multitudes of angels exist; that they are created and personal spirits, possessed of high intellectual power and capable of considerable although limited influence upon nature and upon man; that they belong to various orders, to which diverse functions are distributed; that, originally created good, many of them have fallen away, and under Satan's leadership oppose themselves to divine purposes and to man's moral and spiritual welfare; and that the holy angels not only minister to God in heavenly places, but also to the souls of men, defending them against the assaults of Satan and his hosts.

As might be expected, however, speculative opinions have been added to the common doctrine, which stand on a different footing, some of them meeting with widespread favour and others failing to gain general acceptance.¹ Thus the ancient Greek theologians in general and St. Jerome held that angels were first made and were employed in subsequent creations. The Latins and St. Basil, on the other hand, made their creation to coincide with that of this world.² Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and

¹ On the history of Christian doctrine and speculation, see K. R. Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctr.*, §§ 49-52, 131-133, 172, 265, 297; *Dic. of Christ. Biog.*, s. v. "Angels," by E. H. Plumptre; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Angel."

² *Nicene and Post-Nic. Fathers*, 2d Series, Vol. II. p. 210, note 4.

Tatian supposed that they possessed subtle bodies; but this opinion has been generally rejected.¹ As against gnostic views, the ancients denied that angels were emanations or æons; and the view of Philo, that they were powers of God, was also rejected.² Several attempts were made to describe the angelic orders,³ and the ninefold classification of the Pseudo-Dionysius⁴ obtained general acceptance in scholastic theology.⁵

It has been held that the fall of evil angels was due to their envy of the exalted destiny prepared for mankind.⁶ Tatian regarded his temptation of Eve as the immediate cause of Satan's fall.⁷ Various early writers identified the sons of God who had intercourse with the daughters of men with angels, and treated this as a second fall.⁸ Origen expressed hope of Satan's final salvation, and several later writers took a similar view;⁹ but the opinion has been gen-

¹ Justin, *Dial.*, 57; Tertullian, *de Carne Christi*, vi; Tatian, *Orat.*, 15; St. Basil, *de Spir. Sanc.*, 16; Fulgentius, *de Trin.*, 8.

² Justin, *Dial.*, 128; Tertullian, *adv. Prax.*, 3.

³ St. Basil, *de Spir. Sanc.*, 16; St. Gregory Naz., *Orat.*, xxviii. 31; St. Augustine, *Enchirid.*, 58. Cf. J. B. Lightfoot, on *Coloss.*, i. 16; T. K. Abbott, on *Ephes.*, i. 21.

⁴ *Coelesti Hierarchia*. He was followed by St. Gregory Magn., *Homil. in Ezek.*, xxxiv. 7.

⁵ St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. cviii.

⁶ Petavius, *de Angelis*, III. ii.

⁷ *Orat.*, 11. *Per contra*, St. Irenæus, *adv. Haer.*, IV. 40.

⁸ Cf. K. R. Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctr.*, § 52 (3).

⁹ Origen, *de Princip.*, III. vi. 5. Cf. Didymus, *Enarr.*, *Epp. Cathol.*, on 1 St. Pet. iii. 22; St. Gregory Nyssen, *Orat. Catech.*, 26.

erally rejected. St. Gregory Nazianzen held that it is still possible for good angels to fall;¹ but St. Augustine and later writers held the contrary view.² Demoniacal possession was generally acknowledged by the ancient fathers as a continued experience, and the possessed were dealt with by an order of exorcists.³ The history of modern witchcraft exhibits continued belief in the part which devils take in human affairs;⁴ but the influence of modern rationalism and naturalism has banished such belief from many classes of people, and has tended to weaken the hold of multitudes upon the general doctrine of angels.⁵

§ 6. It is time to survey biblical and Christian doctrine in detail. This must be done briefly. There is indeed but little occasion for discussion of its nature.

There can be no reasonable question as to the fact that angels are creatures who owe their nature and endowments, as well as their vocations, to God.⁶ That they were among the first of creatures is

¹ *Orat.* xxxviii. 31. Cf. St. Basil, *de Spir. Sanc.*, 16; St. Cyril Jerus., *Catech.*, ii. 10; Lactantius, *Instit.*, vii. 20.

² *De Vera Relig.*, i. 13; *Enchirid.*, 28; *de Civ. Dei*, xi. 13. Cf. Hagenbach, *op. cit.*, § 131.

³ Hagenbach, *op. cit.*, §§ 51, 133. On exorcism, see Smith and Cheetham, *Dic. of Christ. Antiq.*, s. vv. "Exorcism" and "Exorcists"; *Cath. Encyc.*, q. vv.; Jos. Bingham, *Antiq. of the Christ. Church*, Bk. III. ch. iv; *Dic. of Christ. Biog.*, s. v. "Demonology."

⁴ W. A. Matson, *The Adversary*, chh. xiv, xv.

⁵ Cf. §§ 1, 2, above.

⁶ Col. i. 16; Heb. i. 7; Rev. xxii. 8, 9. Cf. Neh. ix. 6; Psa. xxxiii. 6; civ. 4.

implied in the description in Job of the sons of God as shouting for joy when the foundations of the world were laid.¹ At all events their origin cannot be dated later than that of man.²

The angels are personal, for they are free and rational agents to whom personal functions and names are ascribed. That they possess free will is shown by their having undergone a probation, for the results of which those who sinned were held accountable.³ They are also described in many places as performing actions which can be done only by free and rational agents.⁴ Their knowledge transcends the knowledge which men have in this life,⁵ and they enjoy the beatific vision.⁶ But God alone can discern men's thoughts,⁷ and angels have to learn the mysteries of grace through the Church.⁸ Moreover, they are ignorant of the day of judgment.⁹

But immortality is mentioned by Christ as an attribute wherein those who attain to the heavenly world shall be equal to the angels.¹⁰ Their long-continued experience must afford them a wealth of knowledge of nature and of our constitution, both

¹ Job xxxviii. 4-7. ² Gen. ii. 1; Exod. xx. 11.

³ Jude 6; Revel. xii. 7-9.

⁴ Especially their acting as messengers, examples of which have been given in § 4, above.

⁵ This is implied in the order in which angels are mentioned in St. Matt. xxiv. 36; St. Mark xiii. 32. Cf. 2 Sam. xiv. 20. It appears in their function of teaching men: Dan. viii. 15-19; St. Luke i. 26-37.

⁶ St. Matt. xviii. 10. ⁷ 1 Kings viii. 39; Jerem. xvii. 9, 10.

⁸ Ephes. iii. 8-10; 1 St. Pet. i. 12. ⁹ St. Matt. xxiv. 36; St. Mark xiii. 32. ¹⁰ St. Luke xx. 36.

bodily and mental, which, although finite, transcends that of human science. Their acquired resourcefulness and their ability to understand us and to manipulate the laws of nature with reference to our good and, in the case of devils, to our ill, must be very great. Whether this method of argument is valid or not, their power is treated in Scripture as superhuman¹ and as including a certain degree of control over the material universe,² over our bodies,³ and over death.⁴

They have no flesh and blood,⁵ so that the bodies in which they appear would seem to be either docetic or temporarily assumed.⁶ But they are local in presence⁷ and motion,⁸ moving with great swiftness.⁹

The number of angels is very large;¹⁰ but they do not marry¹¹ and do not constitute a race having

¹ 2 St. Pet. ii. 11; Psa. viii. 5; ciii. 20.

² Acts xii. 7-10; Revel. vii. 1-3; viii. 5-12; xvi. 1-14. Cf. O. D. Watkins, *Divine Providence*, vii; J. E. Hull, *The Holy Angels*, chh. i, x; J. H. Newman, *Paroch. Sermons*, Vol. II. Sermon. xxix.

³ Dan. x. 18; St. Matt. iv. 11; St. Luke i. 20-22; xxii. 43.

⁴ 2 Sam. xxiv. 16; Acts xii. 23.

⁵ Ephes. vi. 12; Heb. i. 7, 14. Cf. Psa. civ. 4.

⁶ Cf. Tobit xii. 19. See St. Thomas, I. l. 1; li. 1-3; Bishop Bull, *Works*, Vol. I. pp. 276, 277; Schouppe, *Elem. Theol. Dogm.*, Tr. VII. §§ 42-47, 61, 69; Petavius, *de Angelis*, I. ii-iv.

⁷ Numb. xxii. 22-26; 2 Sam. xxiv. 16; Zech. iii. 5.

⁸ Gen. xix. 1; Judg. ii. 1; Isa. xxxvii. 36; St. Matt. iv. 11; St. Luke i. 28; St. John i. 51, etc.

⁹ Dan. ix. 21.

¹⁰ Psa. lxxviii. 17; St. Matt. xxvi. 53; St. Luke ii. 13; Heb. xii. 22. See St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. l. 3; Suarez, *Theol. Summa*, T. II. lib. I. ch. xi; Schouppe, *op. cit.*, Tr. VII. § 59.

¹¹ St. Matt. xxii. 30.

organic interconnection. This is supposed to explain the fact that a portion of the angels fell without involving the rest in their sin and ruin.¹ It is also thought to afford the reason why the Son did not assume the nature of angels in order to save those who were fallen.²

§ 7. The general function of angels is to be ministering spirits,³ their service having relation to God, to creation at large, and to mankind. They appear to be organized in hosts or armies,⁴ and are divided into orders to which different names are given.⁵ The classification crystallized by the Pseudo-Dionysius⁶ has no inspired authority, but has been widely accepted as a convenient summary of angelic orders. He classifies them in three hierarchies, each containing three orders: (a) The first, consisting of thrones,⁷ Cherubim,⁸ and Seraphim,⁹ is revealed as engaged in immediate attendance upon God.¹⁰ (b) The second hierarchy consists of dominations,¹¹ virtues,¹² and powers,¹³ who are more or less associated with

¹ St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. l. 4; Bishop Andrewes, *Serms. on the Nativ.*, I; A. J. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, ch. iii. § 6.

² Heb. ii. 16, 11. See Bishop Andrewes, as cited; Schoupe, *op. cit.*, VII. § 79. Cf., however, B. F. Westcott, *in loc.*

³ Heb. i. 14.

⁴ Revel. xix. 14. Cf. St. Matt. xxii. 7; and the divine title "Lord of hosts."

⁵ Ephes. i. 21; iii. 10; vi. 12; Col. i. 16; ii. 10.

⁶ See p. 156, nn. 3-5, above. ⁷ Col. i. 16.

⁸ Gen. iii. 24; Exod. xxv. 20; xxxvii. 6-9; Psa. lxxx. 1; xcix. 1.

⁹ Isa. vi. 1-3. ¹⁰ Cf., however, St. Matt. xviii. 10.

¹¹ Ephes. i. 21. ¹² Psa. ciii. 20. ¹³ Ephes. i. 21; iii. 10; Col. ii. 10.

works of power in nature¹ and warfare. (c) The third, which includes principalities,² archangels,³ and angels, contains God's messengers to men.⁴ All these orders are named in the Preface of the Ter-sanctus in the Liturgies of St. Basil and St. James.⁵

Holy Scripture seems to imply the existence of seven archangels.⁶ Of these St. Michael and St. Gabriel⁷ are named in the proto-canonical Scriptures, and St. Raphael and St. Uriel⁸ in the deuterocanonical. Three others are added by Jewish tradition; *viz.* St. Chamuel, St. Jophiel, and St. Zadkiel.⁹

The work of angels which is most clearly and frequently described in Scripture is their "service for the sake of them that shall inherit salvation."¹⁰ In this service they defend us against the temptations of devils.¹¹ Angels are described as in some sense

¹ Cf. *Psa. civ. 4; Acts xii. 7-10; Revel. vii. 1; xvi.* See St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. cx; cxiv. 4; III (Suppl.), xci. *vel* xciii; J. H. Newman, *Paroch. Serms.*, xxix; O. D. Watkins, *Divine Providence*, ch. vii.

² *Ephes. i. 21; iii. 10; Col. ii. 10.*

³ *Dan. x. 20, 21; xii. 1; 1 Thess. iv. 16.*

⁴ *Heb. i. 14.* The use of the general term "angel" to refer to a particular order is doubtful.

⁵ On the whole subject, see St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. cviii; Chr. Pesch, *de Deo Creante*, prop. xxxix; J. E. Hull, *The Holy Angels*, ch. ii; *Dic. of Christ. Biog.*, s. v. "Angels"; J. B. Lightfoot, *Coloss.*, i. 16; T. K. Abbott, *Ephes.*, i. 21 (note).

⁶ *Zech. iii. 9; Revel. i. 4; iii. 1; iv. 5; v. 6.* Cf. *Tobit xii. 15.*

⁷ St. Michael, in *Dan. x. 13; xii. 1; St. Jude 9; Revel. xii. 7.* St. Gabriel, in *Dan. viii. 16; ix. 21; St. Luke i. 19, 26.*

⁸ St. Raphael, in *Tobit iii. 17; xii. 15.* St. Uriel, in *2 Esdras iv. 1.*

⁹ For references on the later Jewish Angelology, see p. 152, note 3.

¹⁰ *Heb. i. 14.*

¹¹ *Revel. xii. 7-10.* Cf. *St. Jude 9; Tobit iii. 17; viii. 3.*

belonging to individual men, especially to children,¹ and upon this fact is based the belief that a guardian angel is assigned to each heir of salvation.²

Among the details of angelic service mentioned in Scripture are the following: to convey messages to men;³ to give them understanding;⁴ to succour them;⁵ to pray with and for the Church;⁶ to carry the prayers of men to heaven;⁷ to bear the souls of the faithful to their rest;⁸ and to care for their bodies.⁹ They are also described as witnessing our actions and our judgment;¹⁰ as rejoicing over our repentance;¹¹ as setting us an example;¹² as demanding and executing judgment upon the enemies of God;¹³ as coming with Christ to the final judgment; and as assisting therein and executing His decisions.¹⁴

¹ Acts xii. 15; St. Matt. xviii. 10. Cf. Psa. xci. 11.

² On guardian angels, see Bishop Geo. Moberly, in *A Book of Angels* (ed. by L. P.), ch. xi; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. cxiii; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Guardian Angel"; Petavius, *de Angelis*, II. vii.

³ St. Luke i. 19, 26; ii. 10; Acts x. 22; and many others.

⁴ Dan. ix. 21, 22.

⁵ 1 Kings xix. 5-8; Dan. x. 18, 19; St. Matt. iv. 11; St. Luke xxii. 43. Cf. Collect for St. Michael's.

⁶ Zech. i. 12.

⁷ Revel. viii. 3, 4. Cf. Tobit xii. 15.

⁸ St. Luke xvi. 22. ⁹ St. Jude 9.

¹⁰ Eccles. v. 6; St. Matt. xxv. 31; 1 Cor. iv. 9; 1 Tim. iii. 16; v. 21; Revel. iii. 5. Cf. 2 Esdras xvi. 66.

¹¹ St. Luke xv. 7, 10. ¹² St. Matt. vi. 10.

¹³ Gen. xix. 11; Exod. xii. 23; Judg. v. 23; 2 Kings xix. 35; Dan. iv. 13-17; Acts xii. 23.

¹⁴ St. Matt. xiii. 39, 49; xvi. 27; xxiv. 31; xxv. 31; St. Mark viii. 38; xiii. 27; St. Luke xii. 8; 1 Thess. iv. 16; 2 Thess. i. 7.

III. *Evil Angels*

§ 8. God is revealed to us as essentially righteous, and He cannot be truly regarded as the Author of evil.¹ The nature of everything that God has made was therefore originally good.² In particular, all the angels must have been created good, and the evil which appears in Satan and his angels proceeds from their own misuse of the freedom with which they are endowed.³

The creation of free agents necessarily involves the possibility of this misuse, and therefore places such creatures on probation. The angels, therefore, must have undergone a primitive probation; and the very existence of devils, as well as the testimony of Scripture, indicates that some of them fell into sin.⁴ Their sin was not necessary. It is true that no creature is self-sufficient, and apart from

¹ Cf. ch. iv, above.

² Gen. i. 21. Cf. St. James i. 17.

³ The subject of evil angels receives attention in the treatises named at the commencement of this chapter. But see, in particular, E. H. Jewett, *Diabology*; W. A. Matson, *The Adversary*; W. H. Hutchings, *Mystery of Temptation*, Lec. iii; St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. xliii-xliv, cix, cxiii-cxiv; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Beelzebub"; "Demon"; "Demoniac"; "Demonology"; and "Devil"; *Dic. of Christ. Biog.*, s. v. "Demonology"; Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. v. "Satan"; *Dic. of Christ*, s. v. "Demon" and "Satan"; *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, s. v. "Demon," "Demoniac," and "Devil." Patristic references can be found in K. R. Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctr.*, §§ 51-52, 133, 172, 265, 297; Petavius, *de Angelis*, lib. III; and in the articles cited in *Dic. of Christ. Biog.* and *Cath. Encyc.*

⁴ St. John viii. 44; 2 St. Pet. ii. 4; St. Jude 6; Revel. xii. 7-8.

divine grace no finite will can be expected to persevere in uninterrupted sinlessness. But our knowledge of the ways of God forbids us to suppose that, prior to any fault of theirs, He would place His creatures in a state in which sin would sooner or later become unavoidable. We are led therefore to believe that sufficient supernatural assistance was available to the angels in their primitive state to enable them altogether to avoid sinning.¹

The time of the angelic fall was prior to that of man, for it was by means of demoniacal temptation that man was led into sin; but how long before this we have no means of knowing. Whatever form the first sin of angels assumed, its root was pride, which is indeed the original germ of all sin.² Any opinion we can form as to the occasion of this sin can only be conjectural, but some theologians have supposed that it was a revelation to the angels of the future dispensation of the Incarnation and the consequent exaltation of human nature to a superangelic state. It is conjectured that Satan and his angels recoiled from ministering to such a dispensation and from worshipping the Incarnate.³

¹ Cf. a similar argument with reference to man's primitive state, ch. iv. § 8, above; ch. viii. § 8, below; and the writer's *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 170-175, 219-222. See St. Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, XII. 9; St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. lxii. 3.

² Isa. xiv. 12-15. Cf. 1 Tim. iii. 6.

³ This speculation is most congenial to Scotist theologians, who treat the Incarnation as part of the plan of creation, irrespective of sin. Heb. i. 6; Psa. xcvi. 7; and Revel. xii. 1-9 are thought to sup-

Satan and his angels have incurred an irreversible doom, and eternal fire has been prepared for them.¹ On the other hand, there is no indication that good angels continue to be liable to sin; they appear rather to be established in holiness. Why there can be no salvation for devils we are not told. But Satan's sin was the first sin in the whole drama of evil and could not, as in man's case, have been caused by external persuasion. It must have had its origin wholly within Satan's will, and therefore must have involved unique malevolence and a peculiarly self-subversive effect. Their purely spiritual essence may also tend immediately to fix the wills of angels in the direction of their original choice between right and wrong. The whole subject belongs to speculation.²

§ 9. Pending their being finally "cast into the lake of fire and brimstone" to be "tormented day and night forever and ever,"³ the devil and his angels are present in this world, and Satan is permitted to exercise a limited power and dominion, not only over evil angels,⁴ but over unstable souls of men, as

port the view. See Suarez, *de Angelis*, VII. xiii; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Devil," p. 765, 2d col.; W. H. Hutchings, *Holy Ghost*, pp. 53-55.

¹ St. Matt. xxv. 41.

² See T. R. Birks, *Difficulties of Belief*, pp. 82-86; Chr. Pesch, *de Deo Creante*, § 401.

³ Revel. xx. 10.

⁴ St. Matt. ix. 34; xii. 24-27; St. Mark iii. 22-27; St. Luke xi. 15-22.

prince and god of this world.¹ Man's sin has given devils power over him.² This power was gained by wicked craftiness and cannot become a right to which Satan is entitled. But the responsibility of man for engaging in his service cannot be evaded, and constitutes the obvious reason why God permits Satan to rule over him. This is the *quasi* "right" which certain ancient writers supposed God to concede to Satan.³ If it may thus be regarded, it is, in any case, nullified, so far as faithful Christians are concerned, by their redemption by the blood of Christ.⁴ By reason of this redemption Christians can put the devil to flight by resistance,⁵ although they still have reason, because of the seductiveness of sin and the incitements of their own lusts, to fear Satan, lest he should regain power to destroy both soul and body in hell.⁶

It is clear from the teaching of Christ, who could not have been ignorant in a matter so vitally related

¹ St. John xii. 31; xiv. 30; xvi. 11; Ephes. vi. 12; 2 Cor. iv. 4; Ephes. ii. 2.

² 2 Cor. iv. 3, 4; Ephes. ii. 2; vi. 11-12; 1 St. Pet. v. 8; Revel. xiii; xx. 3, 7, 8.

³ On the patristic theory, that Christ paid the ransom to Satan, see H. N. Oxenham, *Cath. Doctr. of the Atonement*, chh. ii-iii; Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctr.*, §§ 68, 134; W. Bright, *St. Leo on the Incarn.*, note 65; Darwell Stone, *Outlines of Christ. Dogma*, pp. 96-97. We take up the subject in Vol. VII.

⁴ Acts xx. 28; 1 St. Pet. i. 18-20; Revel. xii. 10, 11; v. 9; vii. 13-15. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. cxiv; H. P. Liddon, *Passiontide Serms.*, pp. 84-99.

⁵ St. James iv. 7.

⁶ *Ibid.* i. 13-15; St. Matt. x. 28; St. Luke xii. 5.

to the mysteries of His Kingdom, that devils can possess the bodies of men and disturb the human organism.¹ The observable results of such possession will of course be determined by the nature and operative laws of the human body, and will therefore be indistinguishable by physical investigation from the diseases to which the body is liable when disordered by the natural causes which medical and pathological science describes. Devils cannot alter the working of natural laws, but can only manipulate them for mischievous ends; and their power even to do this is necessarily finite and subject to divine overruling.

This constitutes at once the range and limit of their power to work miracles — a power which is acknowledged in Scripture.² The hopelessly vain quality and degrading tendency of the communications from the departed which are alleged to be made

¹ Cf. § 2, above. On demoniacal possession and casting out of devils in the Bible, see Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. *vv.* "Demon, Devil" and "Exorcism, Exorcist," by O. C. Whitehouse; *Dic. of Christ*, s. *v.* "Demon, Demoniacs," by W. O. E. Oesterley; W. M. Alexander, *Demoniac Possession in the New Testament*; R. C. Trench, *Miracles of Our Lord*, § 5. In ethnic religions, J. L. Nevius, *Demon Possession*; A. Lang, *Making of Religion*, ch. vii; E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, chh. xiv, xv. In the ancient Church, cf. references given in p. 155, note 1. In the middle ages, Philip Schaff, *Hist. of the Christ. Church*, Vol. I. pp. 878 *et seq.* Miscellaneous treatments, *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, s. *v.* "Demoniac," by Johannes Weiss; W. A. Matson, *The Adversary*, chh. viii. *et seq.*; Hastings, *Encyc. of Religion*, s. *vv.* "Demons and Spirits" and "Divination."

² St. Matt. xxiv. 24; Acts viii. 9-11; 2 Thess. ii. 9; Revel. xiii. 13-14; xvi. 14; xix. 20.

through spiritualistic mediums suggests the hypothesis that, so far as they are not instances of human fraud, they come from devils. This would, at all events, explain the supernormal information which the mediumistic spirits display and the sternness with which having to do with witches and those possessing familiar spirits is condemned in Scripture.¹ The method by which spiritual things are judged is necessarily spiritual, and the power of discerning spirits is a gift of the Holy Spirit.² St. John tells us that we must prove the spirits, and that they can be tested by their willingness to confess the Incarnation.³ This test is but a specific application of the larger principle by which all creatures are to be estimated: "By their fruits ye shall know them."⁴

§ 10. The whole problem of evil is raised by the existence of evil angels, and the fall of Satan was the first bringing into actuality of that possibility of evil which appears to be a necessary result of the creation of free and responsible agents. This problem has already been discussed at large in the previous chapter. But a few additional remarks may suitably be added at this point.

Scripture plainly forbids us to hope that the devils will ever be saved. Therefore, whatever reasons may have led men to hope for the ultimate

¹ For references, see p. 148, note 1, above. Cf. Gal. v. 20; 1 Tim. iv. 1.

² 1 Cor. xii. 10. ³ St. John iv. 1-3. ⁴ St. Matt. vii. 16.

salvation of all men, such salvation will not bring to an end the mystery of evil. The fallen state of devils is everlasting.¹ But "everlasting" is a temporal duration — through all time — and we are in no position to maintain that temporal evil has subversive effect, in the eternal sphere, upon eternal good. We cannot define the connection between the temporal and the eternal, except to say that they are different, and that the predicates of the one may not be transferred without modification to the other. The problem of evil lies in its beginning rather than in its temporal continuance. The evil in fallen angels is moral and volitional, and it defeats no purpose except of those who are responsible either for choosing it or for yielding to it. To put this sharply, the effects of creaturely sin exhaust their evil on sinful creatures and cannot disturb the plan of God or defeat His will in its objective effect.

The eternal plan of God cannot be either defeated or altered by satanic malice, for temporal events expend their force upon temporal effects. To use an imperfect illustration, just as the pebble on the highway is absorbed in the pneumatic tire of a passing machine and neither interrupts nor changes its course, so all creaturely contingencies are absorbed in eternity and cannot prevent the march of events towards their appointed goal. The truth is that, in seeking to thwart the divine will, devils are unable to escape the law that, whatever the creature may

¹ St. Matt. xxv. 41; St. Jude 6; Revel. xx. 10.

intend by his actions, he must invariably minister in these actions to the purpose of God, which is altogether righteous and holy. The intended evil remains only as creaturely guilt and creaturely defeat, and the action is overruled to become a factor in divine goodness, so that all things work together for good to them that love God.¹ In spite of themselves, devils become the agents of God for holy ends.² Hell itself will no doubt afford conditions under which the fallen will possess such good as they can receive, and unavoidably achieve results by their actions which will minister to the divine will. Such a belief seems to be warranted by our knowledge of the goodness of God, and of His infinite power and resourcefulness, as well as by the analogies of our experience of His dealings in history.

§ 11. It remains to give reasons for emphasizing the value of the doctrine of angels—a subject usually ignored in theological treatises.

(a) The various aspects of this doctrine occupy, as we have seen, a somewhat prominent place in Scripture and in the teaching, direct or implied, of our Lord. This affords strong presumption that the doctrine of angels is of considerable importance to us. A law of parsimony governs divine revelation, and it is not the method of God to vouchsafe more knowledge concerning the unseen than is needful

¹ Rom. viii. 28.

² Cf. 1 Sam. xvi. 14-15; Job. ii. 7, 10.

and practically useful. The fact, therefore, that in Scripture we are given much and varied information concerning angels and their ministrations should put us on guard against hastily treating the subject as one which we can dismiss without disadvantage. The Church has accordingly been guided by the Spirit continually to remind us of the angels in her Liturgy and in her calendar.¹

(b) If, as Christians are bound to believe, the doctrine of angels is true, our knowledge of it modifies in a somewhat radical way the view of human life, and of its spiritual dangers and protectives, which must otherwise prevail; and this modification is in the direction of a larger and more resourceful intelligence. If we are indeed engaged in conflict with unseen and personal assailants, and are able in this conflict to rely upon the assistance of personal guardians and defenders, our conflict cannot be waged otherwise than at a disadvantage so long as we remain ignorant of the existence and activity of these beings.

(c) The doctrine of angels also enlarges our view of the divine plan and of man's place therein. Knowledge of the fact that multitudes of intelligent and powerful beings are sent to serve in our behalf, witnessing with absorbing interest our every action, must immensely enhance our realization of the importance of human souls and of the critical significance in the

¹ Cf. the Tersanctus and the observance of the festival of St. Michael and All Angels.

world-drama of our lightest conduct. It must also deepen our sense of the love of God for us, and of the resourcefulness of divine providence in our behalf.

(*d*) Coming to particulars, when we learn of the irremediable ruin which sin has brought upon fallen angels, we gain a more vivid perception of the consequences of sin on our own part, and are fortified against the deceptive notion that we shall be saved in the end, in spite of failure to repent during the time given us for repentance. We are also helped to realize that salvation is, in any case, a difficult achievement, costing the death of Christ and depending upon our careful use of divine assistance.

(*e*) The doctrine of evil angels, and of their ceaseless efforts to ensnare us in sin, also throws needed light upon the sources of temptation, which is shown to be far more subtle and powerful than can be explained by our natural instincts when left to themselves. Temptation is seen to represent a highly intelligent and personal manipulation, achieved by beings who have both the knowledge and the power to act upon our organism in manners that intensify our carnal propensities.¹ They cannot indeed subvert the laws of nature which control our bodies; but they understand those laws and both can and do use them to our damage. Knowledge of this, and of the fact that by prayer we can enlist

¹ If St. James in one place, i. 14, traces temptation to man's own lust, he elsewhere exhorts his readers to resist the devil, iv. 7.

the assistance of equally powerful holy angels, as well as of divine grace, cannot safely be treated as unimportant.

(f) In view of the snares which beset our path, and of the personal nature of the foes who assail us, the doctrine of good angels, and of their readiness to succour us, becomes of critical value. It assures us that we have countless fellow-creatures and friends who have won out in the battle against sin, and who come to our rescue with that sympathy and intelligence which successful warfare against temptation affords. Moreover, by their creaturely rectitude and virtue they afford us examples of what we are capable of becoming by divine grace and by their assistance. We shall never become angels, but it is God's will that we should acquire their virtues.

We ought not to conclude without a proviso. Although we are made lower than the angels, our destiny is higher than theirs, and we may never conceive of them as above the creaturely rank. If we may honour them and invoke their assistance, we may never give them divine worship, nor may we appeal to them as having divine power and prerogative. We must ever regard them as fellow-creatures and jealously guard the truths of divine solity and of the sole mediatorship of Christ. And if we may not unduly exalt even holy angels, much less may we honour devils. Indeed, we may have no traffic whatever with them. The use of charms, of

enchantments, of sorcery, of magic, of witchcraft, and of persons having familiar spirits appear to be forms of such traffic; and every form and degree of devil worship constitutes the deepest abyss of idolatry.

CHAPTER VI

MAN

I. *His Origin*

§ 1. Christian doctrine teaches that man's origin is due to the creative will of God, who made him, physically speaking, out of the dust of the ground and breathed into him the breath of life so that he became a living soul.¹ Modern science declares that, on his physical side at least, man has been made by organic evolution from lower forms of life, his distinctive characters being produced by variation in previously existing species and by natural selection.²

Whatever may have been thought immediately

¹ On the doctrine of man at large, see St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. lxxv-cii, cviii. 8, cxvii; I. II. i-v; II. II. clxiii-clxv; J. A. Moehler, *Symbolism*, Bk. I. Pt. I. The several treatises on the *Articles of Religion*, Arts. ix-xi, by A. P. Forbes, Harold Browne, and E. C. S. Gibson; Darwell Stone, *Outl. of Christ. Dogma*, chh. iv-v and notes 8-10; T. B. Strong, *Manual of Theol.*, chh. v-vi; Wilhelm and Scannell, *Catholic Theol.*, Bks. III-IV; Ad. Tanquerey, *de Deo Creante*, cap. iii; Chr. Pesch, *de Deo Creante*, Secs. III-IV; the writer's *Evolution and the Fall*; Aubrey Moore, *Essays Scientific and Philosophical and Science and the Faith*, *passim*; articles in the various biblical and other encyclopædias, s. *vv.* "Adam," "Anthropology," "Augustine," "Fall," "Man," "Original Sin," "Pelagianism," "Sin," etc.; H. W. Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of the Man*; John Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctr. of Man*, new ed.; etc.

² On the evolution theory at large, see ch. iii, §§ 6 *et seq.*, above.

after the publication of Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859 A.D., these two views of man's origin are no longer considered by unprejudiced thinkers to be irreconcilable. A materialistic and naturalistic philosophy has to be added to the evolutionary theory in order to commit its supporters to the view that such mutual contradiction exists. Christian doctrine deals with an aspect of man's origin concerning which purely physical science can, from the nature of things, have nothing to say — that the *cause* of the process of man's making is the will and power of God. Both Scripture and science affirm that previously existing material elements were employed in the process. Biological science advances the theory — now accepted by all classes of thinkers — that the method of man's making on his physical and animal side was by natural descent from previously developed species, through variation and survival of the fittest. Theology adds the further doctrine that on the mental, moral, and spiritual side men possess characters which cannot be explained by organic evolution, but must have been due to higher causation — to involution or divine in-breathing. All these propositions can be combined in one self-consistent view, and are so combined by some of the leading natural scientists, as well as by Christian theologians.¹

¹ On man's evolution, see *Evolution and the Fall*, Lec. iii. Pt. III. Among those who hold that man is wholly evolved from brute ancestors are Chas. Darwin, *Descent of Man*; Thomas

The evolutionary theory cannot rightly be treated as having the finality of supernaturally revealed doctrines or articles of faith. It is taken over, not as involving or justifying any correction of revealed doctrine, but, in so far as it affords data for theology, in its scientific and progressive task of co-ordinating the spiritual and divine aspects of God's universe. In brief, it is taken over as a scientific hypothesis, and therefore as having both the value and the limitations of such an hypothesis.

§ 2. Those scientists who adopt the naturalistic philosophy hold, of course, that natural evolution, conceived of as wholly to be explained by physical factors, affords a complete account of man's origin — explaining his higher mental, moral, and spiritual characteristics as well as his lower animal and physical ones. But this view cannot be shown to have scientific basis and value.¹ Naturalism is not science, but a self-contradictory combination of agnosticism, Huxley, *Man's Place in Nature*; M. M. Metcalf, *Outline of the Theory of Organic Evolution*, pp. 163-183; G. Schwalbe, in *Darwin and Modern Science*, VII; Ernst Haeckel, *The Evolution of Man*; and Herbert Spencer, *Princ. of Biology*. Erich Wassman, S.J., *Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution*, ch. xi, gives the most complete argument against any descent of man from brute. The position here taken is supported in its main contention by A. R. Wallace, *Darwinism*, ch. xv; Henry Calderwood, *Evolution and Man's Place in Nature*; Jas. Orr, *God's Image in Man*, pp. 121-136; Aubrey Moore, *Essays Scientific and Philosophical and Science and the Faith*, *passim*; and others.

¹ If it could, this would merely prove that the involution by God of the potentialities of such evolution occurred at an earlier stage than we suppose.

ticism and philosophical dogmatism; and the view that natural and organic evolution explains all the distinctive characters of the human species does not command such a consensus of scientific opinion as requires its acceptance as a scientific result.

In a work of this kind we need only to epitomize very briefly the reasons for accepting the view of certain scientists that the human species possesses characters which physical evolution alone cannot explain.

(a) Natural evolution is brought about by the survival of those variations and characters which have utility for natural selection and survival of the fittest. But man possesses certain faculties — *e.g.* the mathematical, musical, and artistic — which appear to have no such utility. In other words, contrary to the naturalistic conception of evolution, man represents improvement beyond the necessities of survival.

(b) The variations of degrees between the characters of individuals of the human species exceed in range what is consistent with survival in a purely physical evolution, which requires that the surviving characters shall approximate a mean level, in order not to disturb organic balance. Only superphysical causes can explain the enduring unity and vitality of the human species in spite of the wide variations which exist between its individual members.¹

¹ These two arguments are given by A. R. Wallace, *Darwinism*, ch. xv. The most complete presentation of arguments is found in Henry Calderwood, *op. cit.*, esp. chh. vii–viii, xi–xii, xvi.

(c) The gap between the highest brute and the lowest human intelligence appears to be too great to be bridged by purely natural evolution. The divergence seems to be one of kind rather than of degree. The lower animals exhibit a certain perceptive and concrete reason — especially high under domestication — but apparently cannot, as man does, generalize, think abstractly, acquire opinions, employ language containing conceptual terms, and hand on the results of mental progress to posterity. Animal consciousness is not reflective self-consciousness, and both moral judgment and religious aspiration are wanting to brute intelligence.

(d) There is a striking disparity between the large mental variations above mentioned, which distinguish man from brute, and the physical variations which differentiate the brains of man and of his immediate predecessor in physical evolution. The brain did not originate with man, nor is there a difference in kind between his brain and that of his predecessors; but his use of it is, in significant respects, altogether new and unique. The evolution of his brain cannot by itself explain the emergence of his mental, moral, and spiritual capacities.

(e) No one has succeeded, or can succeed, in describing human intelligence, or any intelligence, in physical terms. Even if we concede that human intelligence is wholly developed from brute intelligence, it remains impossible to explain the origin of intelligence by purely physical evolution. Mole-

cular action in the brain is one thing and the accompanying sensation is another. The two differ in kind.

(f) According to the law of the conservation of energy now generally accepted by physical scientists, "The total energy of any body or system of bodies is a quantity which can neither be increased nor diminished by any mutual action of these bodies, though it may be transformed into any of the forms of which energy is susceptible."¹ On examining the human organism, scientists discover that it constitutes a closed circle, a self-complete system of acting and reacting energies, and this quite independently of the phenomena of life and of mental and moral functioning. These lie outside the organic system of mechanical forces and cannot, therefore, be explained by their evolution.

Whatever may have been man's origin, he is what he is — a being so different from, and so much higher than, all other animal species that, as the late John Fiske says, in order rightly to classify him, it is necessary to "dichotomize the universe, putting man on one side and all things else on the other."² Whether we date the involution of the higher capacities which emerge in man at the moment of the origin of the *genus homo*, or push it back to an earlier stage of evolution, his origin must, in ultimate analysis, be

¹ Clerk-Maxwell, *Theory of Heat*, p. 93. Cf. Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, s. *vv.* "Energy" and "Conservation of Energy."

² *Through Nature to God*, p. 82.

referred to superphysical and divine causation; and his place in nature must be regarded as unique and as requiring spiritual terms for its interpretation.

§ 3. The account of man's creation in the second chapter of Genesis, whether regarded as intended to be historical or not, is generally taken to imply a common origin for the human species, or the descent of all men from one human pair.¹ In any case, the race is treated in divine dispensations as destined to participate in common benefits, and it was promised that in Abraham all the families of the earth should be blessed.² Our Lord also seems to assume a common origin of mankind from Adam and Eve in describing the primitive institution of marriage.³ St. Paul explains the entrance of sin and death into the race by the sin of Adam; ⁴ and while he does not expressly assert that this is through a common descent of all men from Adam, he evidently takes such common ancestry for granted,⁵ and certainly implies some mode of contamination of the entire race by Adam's fall. The sum of the matter is that Holy Scripture treats the human race as one, as capable of being elevated through one seed,⁶ as intended by God to

¹ On the descent of mankind from one human pair, see St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. xc-xcii; Chas. Hardwick, *Christ and Other Masters*, ch. ii; Archd. Wilberforce, *Incarnation*, pp. 24-39; H. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Bk. VII. ch. ii; Wilhelm and Scannell, *Cath. Theol.*, § 130; Ad. Tanquerey, *de Deo Creante*, §§ 126-138.

² Gen. xii. 3, etc.

³ St. Matt. xix. 4-8.

⁴ Rom. v. 12, 19; 1 Cor. xv. 21-22.

⁵ Cf. his words in Acts xvii. 26.

⁶ Heb. ii. 11-17.

share in common blessings, and as somehow involved in the sin of one common ancestor.

The data which are available to natural scientists in their investigation of human origins are necessarily limited, and they do not afford sufficient grounds for scientific certainty as to the precise locality and circumstances of primitive mankind. But, so far as it goes, the evidence derivable from natural investigation rather confirms than weakens the belief that all human races are derived from a common human ancestry. That these races are generically the same and constitute one species is not seriously disputed, and, since the members of the most diverse races are capable of uniting in the propagation of a common posterity, they are also presumably capable of being derived from common parentage. The difficulty once felt as to the shortness of time within which, on such supposition, the wide existing divergences between races must have developed, has been dissipated by fuller investigation. As will be shown in our next section, mankind has existed for a longer period than was formerly supposed. Moreover, possibilities of sudden natural variations have been established by recent biological investigation which are more than adequate to meet the difficulty.

We need not discuss this subject at length. But, speaking summarily, the proposition that all men have a common human parentage is in various degrees confirmed by the following extra-scriptural arguments:

(a) All men constitute one species, capable of a common human posterity, and therefore capable of a common human ancestry; (b) Comparative philology brings to light many affinities between human languages, and affords a basis for belief in their representing variations from one primitive tongue; (c) Archæological research and a comparison of ancient civilizations seem to point to a common origin of civilization in Central Asia; (d) The traditions of widely sundered races have common elements, which indicate Asiatic origin; (e) Geology affords evidence that, since man's origin, important changes in the arrangement of land and water have occurred — changes which seem to remove the difficulty that for many ages certain barbarous races have been isolated from the rest of mankind by geographical barriers which appear to be insurmountable by them.¹

§ 4. Many Christian scholars have mistakenly assumed that the inspiration of Scripture includes within its purpose and result an entire freedom on the part of biblical writers from mistakes in chronological science.² On this assumption they have maintained that man's origin cannot be dated earlier than somewhere between thirty-five hundred and seven thousand years before Christ — the differ-

¹ On anthropological evidence of the unity of the race, see *Encyc. Brit.*, 11th Ed., s. v. "Anthropology," III; E. B. Tylor, *Anthropology, passim*. This unity is now generally acknowledged by scientists.

² On this subject, see *Authority, Eccles. and Biblical*, ch. vii. §§ 5-6.

ence in their figures being largely due to a use of different versions of Scripture. The date which has been most widely adopted since Archbishop Ussher's time is 4004 B.C.¹ Modern investigation has overthrown this conclusion, and a reconsideration of the limited purpose for which the Scriptures are given has satisfied theologians that the antiquity of man is not a question which Holy Scripture should be expected to determine.

Modern investigation has not determined, apparently cannot determine, the age of mankind in the exact terms of years and centuries. Archæology and paleontology alike show that man existed in prehistoric times and during ages the length of which must be expressed in the relative terms of geological change. Efforts have been made to measure these ages in years, but the wide diversity of results arrived at has shown their uncertainty. At one time scientists were claiming for man an antiquity of millions of years. The later tendency has been to employ much smaller figures. But a date for man's origin later than between 20,000 and 10,000 B.C. is considered by many modern investigators to be shut out from serious consideration by the evidences which are available.

It seems clear that many ages are required in order to account for (a) the development of existing racial differences, known to be prehistoric; (b) the

¹ His biblical chronology was developed in *Annales Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, A.D. 1650-1654.

development of languages, already in some instances attaining mature forms at the dawn of history; (c) the rise of civilizations which had become highly developed several thousands of years before Christ; (d) fossil remains of man dating as far back at least as the Pleistocene stage of the tertiary period in geological reckoning. Our conclusion is that, without feeling called upon to assume that modern science has afforded either final or determinate information as to man's antiquity, we seem to be driven to regard mankind as having existed longer than an exclusive reliance upon the chronological data supplied by Old Testament writers would lead us to believe.¹

II. *His Nature*

§ 5. The nature of a growing thing is what it becomes by reason of its native capacities, whatever may have been the nature of its origin and its genealogy. Man is what he is by reason of what his natural capacities enable him to become when fullgrown. Described in the terms of experience, he is a rational, moral, and religious animal. That is, he belongs in physical aspects to the animal kingdom, but possesses superphysical characteristics which constitute him

¹ On the antiquity of man, see *Encyc. Brit.*, 11th Ed., s. v. "Anthropology," IV; Chas. Lyell, *Antiquity of Man*; G. F. Wright, *Ice-Age of America*; E. B. Tylor, *Anthropology*, ch. i; S. R. Driver, *Genesis*, pp. xxv-xlii; *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, s. v. "Man," III; A. R. Wallace, *Darwinism*, pp. 455-459; *Church Quarterly Rev.*, April, 1894, article on "The Glacial Period and the Antiquity of Man."

a self-conscious, thinking, feeling, and willing ego, having moral responsibilities and capacities, and dependent for the satisfaction of his native instincts and aspirations upon divine communion and fellowship. By reason of his natural gifts he is the highest of the animal species, and is the natural although limited sovereign of the world of inferior creatures and forces in which he lives. All the forces and capacities of the larger visible world or macrocosm are gathered up, and in a representative manner recapitulated, in him, so as to constitute him a kind of microcosm and head of creation.¹

In biblical terms, man is made the image of God. The characteristics which entitle him to such a description are rational, moral, and spiritual, and have their centre in the superphysical part of his nature. But the description applies none the less to the whole man, and his physical organism, or body, affords conditions and relations which are required to make him the image of God that he is.² The ever-

¹ On human nature, see references given at the commencement of this chapter; in particular, St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. lxxv-cii; Wilhelm and Scannell, *op. cit.*, Bk. III. ch. v; P. G. Medd, *One Mediator*, §§ 55-57; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Man"; H. P. Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, Lec. iii; J. Laidlaw, *Bible Doctr. of Man*, chh. iii-viii; J. O. Dykes, *Divine Worker*, chh. vii-viii; A. B. Davidson, *Theol. of the O. Test.*, ch. v.

On the history of the Christian doctrine, see Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctr.*, §§ 53-58, 106, 173-174, 298; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Early Hist. of Christ. Doctr.*, ch. xvii; H. W. Robinson, *Christ. Doctr. of Man*, chh. iii-iv.

² On the image of God in man, see St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. xciii;

recurring tendency to disparage the body, as if it were somehow an evil prison from which man needs to be emancipated, and by which he is necessarily degraded from his proper level, is a species of Manichæism. It is based upon the false assumption — often unreflectively made — that matter is evil, at least unworthy of association with spirit. The truth is that matter is made for spirit and is capable, when rightly employed, of ministering to the loftiest and most sacred purposes of the human spirit. The experienced fact that matter is useful for spirit, while spirit is useless for matter — utility for matter is indeed a meaningless idea — shows that the evil attributed to matter lies wholly in the perverted and unnatural use which personal spirits make of it.¹

The characteristics which exhibit the image of God in man are chiefly the following: (a) his possession of spirit, akin to the divine essence, although finite and dependent upon his Maker; (b) his rational nature and sovereignty over the microcosm or smaller world in which his person is, in a finite sense, omnipresent — a sovereignty which is capable of limited extension over the larger world in which he moves; (c) the infinite and eternal presuppositions of his mind, which, although subject in action to the finite forms of space and time, is capable of discovering

Cornel. A Lapidé, *Comm.*, in Gen. i. 26; J. Laidlaw, *Bible Doctr. of Man*, chh. vii-viii; Darwell Stone, *Outl. of Christ. Dogma*, pp. 41-43; Wilhelm and Scannell, *op. cit.*, §§ 124-125; Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. v. "Image"; *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, s. v. "Image of God."

¹ J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, chh. i-ii, vi.

that its spatial and temporal conceptions presuppose, and are dependent for meaning upon, an infinite and eternal background or standard of reference; (d) his capacity to participate by divine grace in the moral attributes of God, and to enjoy divine communion and fellowship — an enjoyment which is necessarily based upon a certain affinity of nature and upon mutual spiritual congeniality between him and God. Man is indeed made for God, and his natural aspirations cannot obtain full satisfaction except by the enjoyment of filial relations with his heavenly Father. He is by nature God's child, and capable of being advanced by grace to a higher sonship, of which his natural sonship is the antecedent sign and conditional promise.¹

According to the creation narrative, man is made not only in the image of God, but after His likeness;² and upon these two terms, "image" and "likeness," catholic theology bases a distinction which is not less valid because not likely to have been consciously intended by the sacred writer.³ Technicalizing these terms, theology employs the phrase, "in the image of God," to signify what man is by virtue of his created

¹ Cf. *The Trinity*, pp. 263-264, 229.

² Gen. i. 26, 27.

³ See the references to catholic writers on the image of God, above; and A. P. Forbes, *Thirty-Nine Articles*, pp. 140-142, 162-167. The distinction is made by Clement Alex., *Exhort.*, 12; *Strom.*, ii. 22, etc.; Origen, *de Prin.*, III. vi. 1; St. Irenæus, *adv. Haer.*, V. vi. 1, and later fathers. Cf. H. W. Robinson, *Christ. Doctr. of Man*, pp. 164-165; Petavius, *de Sex Primorum Mundi Dierum Opificio*, lib. II. capp. ii-iv.

nature, and the phrase, "after the likeness of God," to describe the spiritual character which he is intended to acquire by discipline and grace. This character is partly natural, in so far as it is acquired by the proper use and development of man's natural faculties, and partly supernatural, as including virtues and perfections which can only be attained through dependence upon God and upon supernatural assistance.

Making this distinction between the image and likeness of God in man, catholic theology affirms that, whereas man cannot, so long as he is human, cease to possess the divine image, his possession of, and development after, the divine likeness is contingent upon grace and upon the co-operation of his will therewith. One who is in a state of grace is said to possess the divine likeness, because he is in a state in which its development is possible. But the loss of grace carries with it the loss of the divine likeness, which can be recovered only by a restoration to a state of grace. From this point of view it is said that in his primitive state, being possessed of grace, man was also possessed of the divine likeness; but that when he fell, having forfeited grace, he lost the divine likeness, although the image of God, defaced by sin though it was, remained in him. To this latter fact is due the possibility of his becoming a subject of salvation and of recovery of grace and of the divine likeness through Christ.

What man was created to become is revealed in Jesus Christ, who is the image of God not only by

reason of His divine Sonship and co-essentiality with the Father, but also through the Incarnation, by virtue of the ideal perfection of our nature as assumed by Him. It is in the light of our knowledge of Him that we are able to understand in a measure the true nature of man and the eternal purpose of his creation. We can, partially at least, enter into the significance of the saying, "What is man, that Thou art mindful of him? And the son of man, that Thou visitest him? For Thou hast made him but little lower than Elohim, And coverest him with glory and honour." ¹

§ 6. The activities and functions of human nature fall into three groups: (a) The bodily⁹ or physical functions have to do with sensation and motion, and with assimilation, growth of the physical organism and its reproduction. They are partly instinctive and partly under the conscious direction of the will. Their investigation pertains to physiological science.

(b) The psychical functions, mental, emotional, and volitional, are evidently superphysical, although conditioned in the living man by physical antecedents and concomitants, and producing certain physical effects. We cannot here discuss the interesting subject of the relations between mind and body, but assume, as well established, that the two are distinct. The mind is dependent in action upon the

¹ Psa. viii. 4. Cf. Heb. ii. 7 (where "Elohim" becomes "angels").

body, and in turn exercises a limited control over the body; but psychical activities cannot be described in physical terms and cannot rightly be regarded as bodily functions.¹ It is in his psychical functions and in their control by purpose, based upon self-conscious reflection, that the gap in evolution between man and brute first emerges.

(c) The spiritual functions are essentially psychical, but are constituted by a specialization of the mental, emotional, and volitional functions in moral and religious directions. They include such activities as moral judgment and choice, spiritual reason and insight, and religious aspiration. It is in the exercise of spiritual functions that the dependence of man for his full development upon supernatural relations and assistances appears. And these functions, conditioned as they are by a peculiarly complex combination of both physical and superphysical concomitants, are more easily deranged than the lower human faculties. This explains the fact that in many men, otherwise highly capable, they are so imperfectly developed as to escape recognition altogether, and are often refused a place in human functioning.²

All these functions are interrelated and mutually connected in human nature. The living man cannot

¹ On the impossibility of describing psychical phenomena in physical or mechanical terms, see ch. iii. § 12, above, and the references there given.

² See *Introd. to Dogm. Theol.*, ch. iv. §§ 6-7; ch. v. §§ 12-13, 16; Wm. Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, pp. 109-114.

exercise his psychical and spiritual faculties independently of bodily conditions. The functions of his physical organism depend for continuance upon the union between body and soul, and in important respects for direction and healthful result upon mental, emotional, and volitional conditions. Finally, there can be no disharmony in action between the psychical and spiritual faculties without a disturbance of both. The man is one both in organic constitution and in every form and direction of functioning.

Man cannot change his nature and cannot become either exclusively physical, exclusively psychical, or exclusively spiritual. When he attempts to become one or other of these, he simply disarranges his functions and, without ceasing to be what he is, falls short of his natural capacity.¹ And the harmony and higher value of his faculties depends upon their being determined in the direction of their action by spiritual reason and purpose. This requires his use of divine grace,² for man is by nature insufficient to

¹ On the interrelation of psychical faculties in the operation of each, and in religion, see *Introd. to Dogm. Theol.*, ch. ix. §§ 4-5; R. C. Moberly, *Reason and Religion*, pp. 91-93; J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, pp. 59-73; *Personality*, pp. 29-40, 233-236; *Reason and Revel.*, pp. 44-54. Just as the headlight is at once a source of warmth and light and is given determinate radiation, so personal activity is at once emotional, intellectual, and self-determined in direction.

² *Introd. to Dogm. Theol.*, ch. iv. § 2; ch. v. §§ 12, 13. That faith is not a separate faculty, but is an exercise of the natural psychical faculties in a special direction and under spiritual conditions, see W. R. Inge, *Personal Idealism*, pp. 3-6; S. Harris, *Self-Revel. of God*, pp. 89-95. Some relevant texts on various aspects of spiritual knowl-

himself, being created for God and for supernatural relations and developments.¹

Man is personal. We are using the word "personal" in its theological sense. He is personal because he is a rational and free agent, a subject capable of self-conscious determination of his action. But this is not all. His personality is not to be found in the faculties which he possesses, but in the fact that these faculties are to be referred to an indivisible subject, self, or ego, in which they are centred. In theological terminology personality is selfhood, and the human person is the self who possesses the rational faculties of human nature. His possession of these faculties shows him to be a self — a person; but it is this self, rather than his faculties, that is meant when his person is mentioned.² It is a law of human nature that each individual man

edge: Psa. xxv. 14; xxxiv. 8; xcvi. 11; Prov. iv. 18; Jerem. xxiv. 7; St. Matt. v. 8; vi. 22; St. Luke xxiv. 25; St. John vii. 17; x. 3; xiv. 21; Rom. xii. 2; 1 Cor. i. 21; ii. 14-15; 2 Cor. iii. 15-16; Ephes. i. 18; Phil. i. 9; 1 St. John iv. 7-8; Revel. ii. 20.

¹ On biblical psychology, see Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. v. "Psychology"; John Laidlaw, *Bible Doctr. of Man*, chh. iii-vi; J. B. Heard, *The Tripartite Nature of Man*; *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, s. v. "Soul and Spirit" (with bibliography). For theological and semi-theological treatments, see St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. lxxvii *et seq.*; M. Maher, *Psychology*; J. H. Newman, *Grammar of Assent*; J. R. Illingworth, *Reason and Revelation*; R. C. Moberly, *Reason and Religion*; G. T. Ladd, *Philos. of Knowledge*.

² Cf. *The Trinity*, ch. vi. §§ 2-6, 10-11, 12 (vii-viii); J. R. Illingworth, *Personality*, Lects. i-ii; H. C. Powell, *Prin. of the Incarn.*, pp. 157-170; pertinent articles in Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*; W. Sanday, *Christologies, Ancient and Modern*, esp. vi.

possesses but one self — one subject or ego to whom all his personal actions are to be referred. In the previous volume we have shown that this is not a metaphysical necessity of being, and that we may not infer from the oneness of human personality that the same law must be exemplified in God.¹ But the oneness of every man's personality unifies his moral nature and life, and unescapably fastens his responsibility upon himself.

§ 7. The three groups of human functions which have been above described are commonly referred severally to three departments of human nature — the body, *σῶμα*; the soul, *ψυχή*; and the spirit, *πνεῦμα*. But such use of language does not of itself necessarily signify that three substantial parts are contained in man's constitution. Trichotomists maintain this view; but dichotomists regard the soul and spirit as substantially one, differing only in the functions which these names serve to emphasize.

Scripture does not directly determine this question, but describes man's constitution in different ways: as consisting of body and soul;² of body and spirit;³ and of body, soul, and spirit.⁴ The terms "soul" and "spirit" are also used by turns in a mutually equivalent sense, each signifying the whole

¹ *The Trinity*, ch. v. § 10; ch. vi. § 11.

² St. Matt. x. 28. We are giving only the more obvious distinctions.

³ 1 Cor. v. 3.

⁴ 1 Thess. v. 23. Cf., however, note 2, next page.

incorporeal part of man's nature;¹ and sometimes the two are mutually distinguished.² In no case is either the distinction or the equivalence of soul and spirit plainly declared to be one of substance.³

The question is not vital, and neither dichotomy nor trichotomy has been treated by the Church as an article of faith. Among the ancients trichotomy was maintained chiefly in the East⁴ and dichotomy in the West.⁵ Trichotomy lost some ground among orthodox theologians because of its being employed in heretical interests by Apollinaris⁶ and Pelagius.⁷

¹ *The soul*: Psa. xlii. 6; St. Matt. xx. 28; St. John xii. 27; Revel. vi. 9. *The spirit*: Gen. xli. 8; St. Matt. xxvii. 50; St. John xiii. 21; Heb. xii. 23.

² Heb. iv. 12. Implied in 1 Cor. xv. 44 (Greek). According to J. Laidlaw, *Bible Doctr. of Man*, ch. v, in the Old Testament, soul refers to man as possessing life, while spirit denotes the man as endowed with life from above. In St. Paul, soul or soulish comes to represent man in his carnal state and aspect, while spirit denotes the man in his regenerate state. He concludes that the distinction in Scripture between soul and spirit is not even one of departments of functioning, but of states and aspects of a unity.

³ The argument that Scripture teaches trichotomy is fully given by J. B. Heard, *Tripartite Nature of Man*. That it teaches dichotomy is maintained by J. Laidlaw, *op. cit.*, chh. iii-v, who gives valuable references to other writers. Dichotomy certainly seems most in harmony with scriptural language.

⁴ Platonists held to trichotomy, and Platonism had influence with the fathers. See J. Laidlaw, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-108. For patristic references see Hagenbach, *op. cit.*, § 54 (2)-(3), and C. J. Ellicott, *Destiny of the Creature*, Sermon V, notes.

⁵ Tertullian, *de Anima*, 10; St. Augustine, *de Anima*, iv. 32.

⁶ He held that the eternal Logos displaced the rational soul, *νοῦς*, equivalent to the *πνεῦμα*, in Christ's human nature.

⁷ In the interests of the self-sufficiency of the human will.

Scholastic and later writers have usually followed in the wake of St. Augustine and St. Anselm in adopting dichotomy.¹ Among Anglican writers Bull, Hammond, Jackson, and a few others have accepted trichotomy, but modern psychology has tended to establish dichotomy.²

The soul was regarded by Tertullian as corporeal on the assumption that all creaturely existence is necessarily so,³ and as an incident of his traducianist belief that souls are transmitted through physical generation.⁴ But he acknowledged the soul's incorruptibility.⁵ Catholic theology maintains its incorporeal nature, its simplicity of substance, its incorruptibility, and its immortality. Materialists, of course, reject such doctrine. Ernst Haeckel asserts that the soul is a purely physical phenomenon, and that psychology is a branch of physiology, requiring no "different methods of research for that science than for any of the others," adding that the spirit world and the doctrine of immortality are products of imagination.⁶

Such a view is scientifically untenable, for, as we have seen, it is impossible to describe psychical

¹ For example, St. Thomas, in *Omnia D. Pauli Epis.*, on Heb. iv. 12.

² On the whole subject, Chr. Pesch, *de Deo Creante*, §§ 113-118; T. B. Strong, *Manual of Theol.*, pp. 240-245; H. P. Liddon, *Some Elements*, pp. 89-91; J. O. Dykes, *Divine Worker*, pp. 150-157; Jas. Orr, *God's Image*, pp. 46-53.

³ *De Anima*, 11.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I-10, 14.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁶ *Riddle of the Universe*, ch. vi.

phenomena in the physical terms of matter and motion; and the completeness of the circle of energies discoverable in the human organism, when considered apart from psychical activity, requires us to refer this activity to a source distinct from the body — an incorporeal subject, but one which is obviously united hypostatically with our organism and conditioned in activity during this life by physical concomitants.¹

§ 8. The manner of the soul's origin has engaged much theological speculation. Origen suggested the pre-existence of the soul, in order to account for its innate sinful tendencies. The human soul, according to his view, sinned in a previous state, and in consequence was given a mortal body.² This opinion was unable to gain a footing in catholic theology, and was condemned by the Council of Constantinople, held in 540 A.D.

The ancient fathers in general took either the traducianist or the creationist view. The former opinion, that the soul is derived by generation from human parents, was defended by Tertullian as required to explain the transmission of sinful tendencies.³ It

¹ On the spiritual nature of the soul and its distinctness from the body, see St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. lxxv; B. Boedder, *Natural Theol.*, pp. 35-47; M. Maher, *Psychology*, pp. 361-393, 443-467; R. F. Clarke, *Logic*, pp. 105-120, 140-157; H. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Bk. II. ch. i; J. Fiske, *Cosmic Philos.*, Pt. III. ch. iv; Jas. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Lechs. xi-xiii; H. Calderwood, *Evolution*, chh. x-xi.

² *De Princip.*, I. vii. 4.

³ *De Anima*, 25, 27, 36.

prevailed in the West, being treated as *de fide* by St. Leo I,¹ and being accepted by St. Gregory Nyssen in the East. St. Augustine was conscious of its difficulties, and refrained from relying upon it in his defence of the doctrine of original sin as against Pelagianism.²

The creationist view, that each soul is a fresh creation by God, infused into the humanly derived body, prevailed among the Easterns — no doubt because of their more optimistic view of human nature — and was accepted by St. Hilary and St. Jerome in the West.³ In the middle ages it secured general acceptance in the West, largely because of the materialism thought to be involved in traducianism.⁴ The objection that creationism is inconsistent with the transmission of sinful tendencies and spiritual traits from parent to child is met by remembering the mutual interaction of body and soul. Even though created pure from sin, the soul begins its existence in a body which has been made spiritually unwieldy by transmitted defects and inevitably experiences hindrance *ab initio*. Thus the

¹ *Epis.*, 15.

² In *de Anima et ejus Origine* he criticises a certain Vincentius for dogmatism in the creationist direction, confessing his ignorance on the whole subject. Cf. *Epis.*, clxvi.

³ St. Jerome, *ad Pammachium*, 22; St. Hilary, *Tract. in Psa.* xci. § 3. On patristic views in general, see J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Early Hist. of Christ. Doctr.*, pp. 302-305; Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctr.*, §§ 55, 106.

⁴ St. Thomas maintained creationism in *Summa Theol.*, I. xc. Cf. B. Boedder, *Natural Theol.*, pp. 131-132.

physical likeness between parent and child induces a corresponding spiritual likeness.

Physical science cannot determine the question; but a naturalistic standpoint is fatal to creationism, while emphasis upon the superphysical nature of psychical functioning makes for its acceptance.¹

III. *His Destiny*

§ 9. For reasons, and under limitations, elsewhere explained,² we have in this work assumed the scientific validity of the theory of organic evolution and of man's descent on the physical side of his nature from brute ancestors. Dogmatic Theology undertakes more than simply to exhibit articles of faith. Assuming as it does that these articles constitute revealed data which have primary and permanent validity, theology has a scientific aim, and therefore reckons with all particulars of human knowledge and credible opinion which are related to its subject-matter. In adopting such procedure, theology incurs the necessity of occasionally modifying some of its propositions in the light of wider natural knowledge and more credible opinion. In brief, while the catholic dogmas which it accepts and

¹ On the whole subject, see H. P. Liddon, *Some Elements*, pp. 93-104; A. Moore, *Essays Scientific and Phil.*, pp. 75-82; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Creationism"; J. O. Dykes, *Divine Worker*, pp. 157-165; O. D. Watkins, *Divine Providence*, pp. 73-80 (traducianist); Chr. Pesch, *de Deo Creante*, §§ 141-152.

² See § 1, above.

expounds are in their substance unalterable, catholic theology, *qua* science, is progressive.¹

The evolutionary view of the organic world, when reasonably considered, implies a purposeful drama and a goal of development.² This goal, so far as it can be ascertained or conjectured in the light of natural investigation, is to be regarded as in line with the development and destiny of the highest and sovereign product of evolution — man.³ From the standpoint of natural science it is a most credible conclusion that the goal of the world-development is the perfect son of man, whose destiny determines the significance of creation — of the universe. But the data which are required for clearly determining and defining the destiny of man cannot, from the nature of things, become available to natural science. Yet

¹ In other words, there is a legitimate and ever-continuing “development of doctrine.” See *Authority, Eccles. and Biblical*, ch. ix, esp. §§ 3-4, 10.

² Cf. *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. vi. §§ 4, 10, and the references there given; and the writer's *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 112-116. H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, *passim*, powerfully criticises teleology as thus described. He maintains that nature diverges rather than converges, obeying a creative push of life rather than moving to one controlling goal. His thought contains important truth, and seems to call for improved terms in teleological description — a task for future thinkers. But divergent though evolution is, it also reveals increasing unity. Its manifold products combine in a cosmos, the purpose of which appears to lie in man's future destiny.

³ Cf. J. Fiske, *Destiny of Man*; A. Moore, *Science and the Faith*, pp. 200 *et seq.*; Jas. Orr, *Christ. View of God*, Lecs. iv, ix, and pp. 428-429; A. B. Bruce, *Providential Order*, Lecs. ii, viii; A. J. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, ch. iii. §§ 7-9.

natural investigation does bring data to light which justify the belief that man is made for a higher destiny than the conditions of the present physical order either enable or permit to be attained. The natural religious instincts and aspirations of man indicate that he is by nature made to find his highest and therefore ultimate life in a correspondence with an unseen world, and through development of an existing but inadequate capacity to adjust himself to a higher environment than his earthly conditions afford. The environment which his higher instincts demand, and the incipient capacity for adjustment thereto which has made its appearance in him, are alike superphysical and spiritual.

It is unreasonable to regard these natural capacities and aspirations as illusory. If they are so, the process of evolution has become most aimless and least useful at its highest stage — at the stage at which reason teaches us to look for the clearest marks of the intelligent and resourceful purpose by which the world-drama as a whole appears to be governed.¹ Evolutionary thought, therefore, when reasonably guided, must conclude that man is created for a destiny above and beyond the natural order — a destiny which cannot be attained except by the coming in of new and superphysical factors, by man's being enabled to pass successfully through death, and by his surviving the cataclysm which at length will inevitably destroy his earthly environment.

¹ See J. Fiske, *Through Nature to God*, pp. 174 *et seq.*

§ 10. Other considerations derived from experience and reason point the same way. They are so often presented and so familiar that we need only to summarize them.¹

(a) The *consensus* argument is that belief in human continuance, at least in a disembodied state, after death has been sufficiently widespread in every age and clime to justify the contention that it is instinctive and natural to man, and therefore made so by his Creator. This *consensus* would seem, at least, to throw the burden of proof upon the shoulders of those who repudiate the belief.

(b) The evolutionary considerations above presented appear to enhance the credibility of this belief. They constitute a modern form of the familiar argument that man's religious aspirations, which appear to be a part of his natural and inevitable functioning, point to possibilities of satisfaction which depend upon higher and more lasting conditions than this life affords.

(c) As the late John Fiske says, "The natural history of the mass of activities that are perpetually

¹ On human immortality, see W. R. Alger, *Critical Hist. of the Doctr. of a Future Life*; S. D. F. Salmond, *The Christ. Doctr. of Immortality*; J. Fiske, *Life Everlasting*; G. T. Fechner, *The Little Book of the Life After Death*; J. H. Hyslop, *Science and the Future Life* (psychical research basis); W. H. Myers, *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death* (same basis). This list could be very much expanded. An exhaustive bibliography (previous to 1860) is given by Alger, *op. cit.*, and one including recent works in *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, s. v. "Immortality."

being concentrated within our bodies . . . shows us a closed circle which is entirely physical. . . . As for our conscious life, that forms no part of the closed circle, but stands entirely outside of it.”¹ He proceeds to argue that this fact nullifies the certainty of the assumption that the dissolution of our bodies carries with it the destruction of that in us which is conscious. Immortality is not thus proved to be a fact, but belief in it is shown to be left unaffected by physical investigation. To borrow a point from the late Professor James, if it be insisted upon that thought is experienced as a brain function, this function may be interpreted as releasing or transmissive.² That is, the brain’s physiological states may be regarded as releasing or transmitting thought, its source being distinct and higher.

(d) Certain investigators into psychical — spiritualistic — phenomena are convinced that they have sufficient evidence of the reality of some of the alleged mediumistic communications from departed human spirits. They consider, therefore, that they have discovered unanswerable proof of human continuance after death. We give this argument for completeness’ sake, but feel grave doubts as to its demonstrative value. As elsewhere shown, another, although extra-scientific, explanation of the phenomena in question is tenable,³ and scientists are far

¹ *Life Everlasting*, pp. 78-79. ² *Human Immortality*, pp. 11-30.

³ Pp. 166-168, above. This argument for life after death is given by Hyslop and Myers, *opp. cit.* *Per contra*, A. E. Tanner, *Studies in*

from agreement in this view of them. The argument is not needed, and dealing with mediums is attended by grave moral dangers.

(e) All our knowledge assures us that the soul is incomposite. It cannot, therefore, be dissolved, and can be destroyed only by an annihilation of substance — a supposition which the scientific mind, at least, cannot easily entertain. The Christian cannot consistently deny that the Creator of a substance can cause its being to be temporary. But the very nature of spirit appears to be that it should live, and no reason appears for supposing that it will ever cease to exhibit that nature.

(f) A man's moral judgments, whether concerned with his own actions or with those of other men, necessarily presuppose an ideal which it is the common duty of men to actualize, but which cannot be fully actualized unless higher and more enduring opportunities are to be available than this brief life affords. Human nature bears many marks of being an unfinished product. Its capacities do not in this life attain to that fulness and harmonious sufficiency to which they must attain unless its development is to end in futility — a supposition which is incredible in view of the sovereign place which has apparently been assigned to man in the general system of things.

(g) The righteousness of divine government and,

Spiritualism. Full bibliographies are given in *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, s. v. "Psychical Research" and "Spiritualism."

as dependent for credibility thereupon, the strength of theistic belief must suffer discredit if it can be shown that this life is man's only life. The scales of justice as represented by the consequences of human conduct obviously fail in this life to reach their balance. Evil men often prosper in spite of their wickedness, and the righteous often have to bear the sufferings which the wicked deserve. Unless this anomaly can be regarded as non-final and as incidental to growth into a higher and more enduring life — that is, unless there is to be a future life and another world wherein righteousness will be properly favoured — the general scheme of things seems to be hopelessly unjust.

(h) The Christian belief that love is the true basis and unifying principle of righteousness and of divine action intensifies the horror with which this life must be regarded if it be our only life; and this emphasis upon love is justified by our deepest natural instincts. Man is so constituted that he must love, and gain adequate response to his love, in order to attain to self-realization; and his being made for love seems to imply a plan on the part of the Creator in which love shall finally triumph. If God is love, as such a plan teaches us to believe, it involves a denial of His power and resourcefulness to maintain that no larger and happier conditions are in store for men than are afforded by this life.

The sum of the matter is that we cannot reject the belief that God wills to carry His faithful chil-

dren through the gates of death into an unending life of blessedness without being driven into hopeless pessimism, and into a denial either of the power or of the righteousness of God.

§ 11. That God will bless those who submit to the conditions which righteousness imposes with everlasting life and joy is made certain to Christians by the indications in Scripture concerning His eternal purpose in creation and concerning the destiny which He is preparing for His chosen. This life is there shown to be a stage, necessary but temporary, in the evolution of a kingdom of persons wherein dwelleth righteousness, and in which to know and enjoy God in an everlasting communion of perfected children of God will constitute our life.¹ This present life, again, is for education and probation — education whereby we are gradually assimilated in mind and disposition to the likeness after which we were created,² and probation whereby our willingness to fulfil the conditions of this education is tested and, when we fulfil certain necessary conditions, established.³ Without such education and probation, and without the assistances which supplement the insufficiency of our

¹ Cf. Isa. lxii. 22; St. Matt. viii. 11; xxv. 34; St. John x. 10 (with xvii. 2-3); Rom. v. 17; Ephes. i. 3-14; Col. i. 9-23; 1 Thess. ii. 12; Heb. vi. 17-20; xii. 23; xiii. 14; 2 St. Pet. iii. 13; Revel. xxi. 1, 3; etc.

² Cf. Rom. xii. 2; 2 Cor. iii. 18; 2 St. Pet. ii. 4; 1 St. John iii. 2-3.

³ Revel. xxi. 11. On probation and judgment thereon, see Prov. xxiv. 12; Jerem. xxxii. 19; Ezek. xviii. 4-32; Rom. ii. 5-12; 1 Cor. iii. 8, 12-15; 1 St. Pet. i. 17; Revel. ii. 23; xx. 12.

native powers, we cannot acquire the capacity to enjoy God and the fellowship of saints for which we are destined.¹

It is not good for man to be alone.² He is by nature social, and is made for personal fellowship. Love is his supreme function.³ This fellowship cannot fully satisfy us, however, except upon the basis of entire mutual congeniality; and no such congeniality can exist for beings made in the image of God until the holy character of God has been translated into human terms and made our own. It is thus translated in Jesus Christ,⁴ and that we should be conformed to His image is God's eternal purpose in creating us — that we should be holy and without blame before Him in love.⁵

We are made for God,⁶ and our chief end is "to glorify God and enjoy Him forever."⁷ But we are made to enjoy Him in a communion of persons of our own race.⁸ These two aspects of our social destiny are vitally connected; and a leading part of our education in this world is to learn how to practise

¹ Phil. ii. 12-13.

² Gen. ii. 18; Eccles. iv. 9-12.

³ St. Mark xii. 30-31. Cf. Prov. xv. 17; Rom. xiii. 8, 10; 1 Cor. xiii; Ephes. v. 2; Col. iii. 14; Heb. x. 24; St. James ii. 8; 1 St. John iv. 7, 20, etc.

⁴ Heb. i. 3.

⁵ St. Matt. v. 48; 1 Cor. xv. 49; Ephes. i. 3-6; iv. 11-16; v. 1-2.

⁶ Gen. i. 26-27; v. 1; Prov. xvi. 4; Isa. xliii. 7.

⁷ *Westminster Catechism*.

⁸ Psa. cxxxiii; St. John xvii. 21; 1 Cor. x. 17; xii. 12-13, 2 Cor. xiii. 11; 1 St. John i. 3, 7.

the kind of brotherly love that will enable us to enter, and to bring others into, the society wherein mutual love will be exercised and enjoyed forever in union with God in Christ. We are made both for God and for man, but it is growth towards God that alone enables us to grow towards each other on lines that endure and mutually satisfy. The Church, with its sacramental institutions, is a divinely appointed organism by incorporation into which we enter the heavenly society for which we were made, and are enabled gradually to acquire the virtues and graces of Christ which alone make it possible for us to fulfil and enjoy our social destiny.¹ To sum up, human destiny consists of an everlasting and perfect social life of love, based upon filial relations to God, in and through Christ, and including a perfected brotherhood of men in a mystical communion of saints.

§ 12. All this presupposes immortality — not an immortality of which man's physical evolution has made him naturally capable, but one made possible by supernatural factors and dispensations involved in the eternal purpose of God. As has already been shown, evolutionary science exhibits man as an unfinished product, and therefore as presumably destined by his Creator for something yet to come. But it also confirms the doctrine that the future which is thus, as it were, promised to man cannot be attained by the unassisted resident capacities of

¹ 1 Cor. xii. 12-13; Ephes. ii. 19-22; iv. 3-16.

human nature. Only by a change or involution from above can this mortal put on immortality, and flesh and blood inherit the Kingdom of God.¹ The destiny of man as revealed in Scripture is not only supernatural, but affects the whole man. Flesh and blood, in spite of existing corruptibility and mortality, will be made to put on incorruption and immortality, and this corruptible will become a suitable and permanent habitation and instrument of the spirit — being no longer psychical, *σῶμα ψυχικόν*, but spiritual, *σῶμα πνευματικόν*; that is, perfectly subject to the spirit.² Pagan thinkers developed arguments for the immortality of souls,³ but a resurrection from death of the whole man usually lay quite outside of their thought. The Christian doctrine of

¹ The exegesis of 1 Cor. xv. 50, which makes "cannot inherit" equivalent to "will not inherit," not only disregards St. Paul's assertion immediately following, that "this corruptible must put on incorruption," by virtue of a change at the last day, but has a baneful effect on the doctrine of Christ's own resurrection. Only a knowledge of the limitations of matter which we do not possess would warrant the argument that matter is intrinsically unsuited for the manifestation and functioning of personal spirits. In fact, the one purpose for which matter has been made is for the use of spirit.

² 1 Cor. xv. 44. The continued translation of "natural body" and "spiritual body" in the R. V. helps to perpetuate, even among scholars, the erroneous idea that St. Paul is contrasting that which contains material substance with that which is pure spirit — not a body at all. He is not contrasting two bodies, but one body in two states.

³ Plato's *Phaedo* is the Greek classic on the subject. On "Ethnic Thoughts Concerning a Future Life," see W. R. Alger, *op. cit.*, Pt. II. Cf. J. A. Macculloch, *Compar. Theol.*, ch. xiv; S. D. F. Salmond, *op. cit.*, Bk. I.

immortality is unique in affording the promise of redemption and glory for the body as well as for the soul — for the whole man.¹

This doctrine was not clearly revealed in Old Testament days;² and in a very real sense immortality was brought to light — made a subject-matter of intelligent apprehension — by the Gospel.³ Accordingly, while evidence exists which forbids our assent to the statement often made that belief in a future life was wanting to Hebrew thought until a late period, the subject of life after death receives no direct attention in the earliest Old Testament literature. Reasons for this are not difficult to discover. Until the Incarnation and resurrection of our Lord from the dead had occurred, the data and point of view which are required for an intelligent reception and consideration of human immortality were lacking; and the inanity of pagan speculations on the subject perhaps hindered the development of a Jewish eschatology. The members of the old covenant were being prepared for the Gospel, and when they became ready to receive it, then and not

¹ R. E. Hutton, *The Soul in the Unseen World*, ch. xvii, *init.* The subject of the resurrection of our bodies is to be considered in the last volume of this series; the related subject of Christ's resurrection in the seventh volume.

² On Old Testament teaching, see S. D. F. Salmond, *op. cit.*, Bk. II; A. B. Davidson, *Old Test. Theol.*, ch. xi; and article on "Eschatology," in the Old Testament, in *Hastings Dic. of Bible*; R. H. Charles, *Crit. Hist. of the Doctr. of a Future Life*, etc.

³ 2 Tim. i. 10 (A. V.).

before, they became ready to assimilate the doctrine of immortality which the Gospel made known.

The teaching of Christ was highly eschatological;¹ and the apostolic writers, enlightened by their experience of Christ's resurrection and by the Holy Spirit, clearly proclaimed the Christian doctrine of resurrection from the dead and of the life to come. The exposition of biblical eschatology belongs to a later volume.²

As will be more fully shown in a later chapter, if man had not sinned, he would probably in time have advanced to his final state of immortality and glory, without passing through the death to which his unassisted nature makes him liable.³ Sin, however, deprived man of the grace of immortality and caused him to revert to his natural insufficiency and corruptibility. Thus sin sets back and, if unremedied, forever hinders the divinely intended development of man and his attainment to his appointed destiny. But it was the eternal purpose of God in the fulness of time to overcome this hindrance by sending His Son Jesus Christ to take our nature and in it to overcome both sin and death in our behalf. Because of what Christ has done and suffered, we

¹ This fact has been exaggerated in recent German criticism of the Gospels, e.g. in Schweitzer's *Historical Quest of Jesus*. An account of various views is given by C. W. Emmet, *The Eschatological Question in the Gospels*, and by Ernst von Dobschutz, *The Eschatology of the Gospels*.

² Vol. X.

³ Ch. viii. § 6 (c).

are enabled by incorporation into the body of Christ to become partakers of His immortality — not indeed so as altogether to escape death, but so as to pass successfully through it into the deathless life for which we were created. What is here briefly summarized will require future volumes to elaborate and explain.

CHAPTER VII

RELIGION AND MORALITY

I. *Religion*

§ 1. The doctrine of man cannot be fully exhibited without giving attention to the subjects of religion¹ and morality, for man is by nature religious and moral. He is religious because constituted for relations with his Maker, and moral because responsible as a free and rational agent for fulfilling the will of God in all departments of conduct and spiritual growth.

¹ For a survey of the development of the modern science of religion and of its literature, see L. H. Jordan, *Compar. Religion, Its Genesis and Growth* and *Compar. Religion: A Survey of Its Recent Literature* (1906-1909). On its nature and implications, see H. P. Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion* (very valuable); G. T. Ladd, *Philos. of Religion*; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Religion." In relation to comparative religion, see Chas. Hardwick, *Christ and Other Masters*; J. J. I. von Döllinger, *The Gentile and Jew in the Courts of the Temple of Christ*; A. Lang, *The Making of Religion*; F. Max Müller, *Lecs. on the Science of Religion*; S. R. Driver and W. Sanday, *Christianity and Other Religions*; Morris Jastrow, *The Study of Religion*; F. B. Jevons, *Introd. to the Hist. of Religion and Introd. to the Study of Compar. Religion*; J. A. Macculloch, *Compar. Theology*; C. P. Tiele, *The Science of Religion*; E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*; *The Hibbert Lecture Series*; *Wisdom of the East Series* (pub. by Murray); *Religions Ancient and Modern* (series pub. by Constable); *Non-Christian Religious Systems* (series pub. by S. P. C. K.), etc.

Religion, like all things subject to development, can be intelligently defined only with reference to its developed form; for all things which grow are to be interpreted by what they become when their growth is completed.¹ It is also to be remembered that real religion invariably takes a concrete form, and therefore cannot be correctly described as an abstract quality or essence. These considerations should prevent us from basing our definition of religion upon the assumption that its definitive marks are correctly exhibited in all religious systems — even in those of either immature or perverted growth. And they should guard us from identifying religion with any of its characteristics considered apart from their concrete embodiment.

Waiving for the present the question of the finality of its present form, Christianity exhibits itself to enlightened reason as the most maturely and truly developed system of religion that is known to us. What Christianity is in the concrete, therefore, affords the best standard of reference for a true definition of religion. We ought not, of course, to infer that the study of comparative religion is of no value in acquiring an intelligent conception of religion. Quite the contrary is true, and the study of partial and abnormal growths affords important assistance in an intelligent interpretation of what is more fully and more

¹ Cf. A. M. Fairbairn, *Philos. of the Christ. Religion*, pp. 214-215; J. Caird, *Fund. Ideas of Christianity*, pp. 24-30; V. F. Storr, *Development and Divine Purpose*, pp. 223-226.

truly developed. But what a growing thing is must be determined by its most mature and correctly developed form, and inferior religions cannot rightly be treated on equal terms with Christianity in investigating the nature of religion.¹ Christianity must no doubt be considered in its normal form, freed from whatever appears to be an excrescence or foreign development; but if pure Christianity does not constitute true religion, no reliable basis of a definition of religion exists.

It is in view of these considerations that we deny the adequacy of a definition of religion exclusively based upon the common elements of all religious systems, and of the definitions which identify religion with the exercise of one or other of man's higher functions. Speaking of these last-mentioned definitions, religion no doubt requires and involves a sense of dependence, the exercise of emotional aspirations; but it involves more and cannot be properly defined as consisting in emotion. Religion also involves intelligence, and correct notions concerning God and our relations to Him — sound belief — are needed in its practice; but religion is more than faith or orthodoxy, and more than sense of dependence with orthodox belief added thereto. Finally, religion necessarily engages the will and involves righteousness; but neither righteousness alone, nor a righteousness which is joined with orthodoxy and a wholesome sense of dependence upon God, adequately describes the nature

¹ Cf. A. M. Fairbairn, *op. cit.*, pp. 208 *et seq.*

of religion as concretely exhibited in its maturest and truest form — in Christianity.¹

Religion is a working system and concrete relation by which we are bound to God and attain the divine communion and fellowship for which we have been created.² Its purpose is to achieve and perpetuate a rightly ordered and authentic communion with God. It is essential for man's self-realization because he was made for such communion and cannot become what he is designed to become apart from it. Its truth stands or falls by its success in securing and developing authentic and acceptable relations between God and those who faithfully accept and employ it. Its benefits depend for their degree upon the fulness with which its professors exercise all their faculties in practically fulfilling its requirements. In brief, the truth of a religion, if our definition is correct, must be pragmatically

¹ See H. P. Liddon, *op. cit.*, Lec. i. Pt. I; A. M. Fairbairn, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-203.

² Cicero, *de Nat. Deorum*, ii. 28, says, "Qui omnia quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retractarent et tanquam relegerent, sunt dicti religiosi, ex relegendo." Lactantius, *Instit. Div.*, iv. 24, says, "Vinculo pietatis obstricti Deo, et religati sumus, unde ipsa religio nomen accepit." Dr. Liddon cites these passages, *Divinity of Our Lord*, p. 5, and adds, "Religion is the bond between God and man's whole nature; in God the heart finds its happiness, the reason its rule of truth, the will its freedom." On the etymology and definitions of religion, see Max Müller, *Origin of Religion*, pp. 10 *et seq.*; Chas. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, Vol. I. p. 21. The words used for religion in the New Testament are *θησικελα* (ceremonial observance, worship), Acts xxvi. 5; St. James i. 27; and *δειδιδαιμονίας* (fear of the gods), Acts xv. 19; xvii. 22.

determined by its success in achieving its aim and in imparting its intended benefits to those who adequately and sincerely fulfil its demands. In view of the aim of religion, no religious system can properly be described as true, whatever elements of truth it may conserve, which does not enable its disciples to find God — to secure authentic and approved personal relations with Him. It may indeed represent a genuine form of seeking after God, and for that reason may be blessed with such forms and measures of blessing as the loving Father is certain to bestow upon all who sincerely seek to please Him. But no religion can be regarded as true which is incapable of fulfilling the definitive aim of religion — to secure real and authentic relations with God.¹

§ 2. Certain marks of religion should be mentioned.

(a) True religion finds and pleases God, because it is *instituted* by Him and constitutes the appointed method and means of gaining access to Him and of securing acceptable relations with Him. In other words, the validity of its claims to be true — that is, successfully to fulfil the purpose of religion — is guaranteed by a formal and divine covenant.

(b) For several reasons true religion is necessarily *supernatural*, both in origin and function. Its claim really to find God and to please Him cannot be established except by superhuman attestation, and man's

¹ This position has been frequently stated in misleading terms and is widely misunderstood. It is more fully explained in § 4, below.

unaided natural capacity does not enable him to attain to genuine and conscious personal communion with God.¹ The function which true religion fulfils is plainly supernatural, for it brings finite creatures into open relations with Him who is both infinite and invisible, and is the means by which God advances man towards a destiny his attainment of which requires supernatural assistance. To be dependent upon God is the property of man's nature which makes him religious, and religion supplies that to which this dependence points — obviously superhuman, and also obviously necessary for man's self-realization.

(c) Religion *involves the whole man*. The whole man is made for God, and all his functions, whether mental, emotional, volitional, or physical, have pre-ordained purposes in relation to the destiny which religion enables him to enjoy. In the practice of religion man learns to know God, progressively enjoys Him, yields voluntary obedience to His will, and governs external action with direct reference to the future destiny prepared for him.²

¹ The need of supernatural revelation is treated of in almost all apologetical treatises. On the supernatural aspect of true religion, see V. H. Stanton, *Place of Authority in Religious Belief*, pp. 29-42; Theodore Christlieb, *Modern Doubt and Christ. Belief*, Lec. ii; Herman Schultz, *Outlines of Christ. Apologetics*, pp. 45-55. The distinction between the inspiration of religious thinkers and writers (which may lead to authentic communications from God, and may not) and revelation is important here. There is a sense in which, for example, Socrates was inspired; but he was not the prophet of an authentic revelation.

² J. R. Illingworth, *Reason and Revelation*, ch. x.

(d) Religion affords *the determinative centre of human life*. This is so because it constitutes the appointed connecting link between man and His Sovereign and Judge, and it is the means by which human life is ordered in relation to human destiny. Religion, therefore, affords the standpoint and interpretative principles by which our ideal of life should be developed, and furnishes both the sanction and the determinative particulars of human obligations. Apart from religion human ethic is defective in the very elements which give it coherence and sufficiency.

(e) Religion is *essentially social*, for man is a social being, and the relations between him and God, which it is the aim of religion to develop, are social. This means that true religion can never be an exclusively individual affair, but must fulfil its Godward function in a corporate manner.

(f) *Public and sacrificial worship* is the working centre of true religion. This is so because, apart from habitual and open acknowledgment by men of their relation to God, the relation with which religion is concerned, that relation must suffer neglect and become incapable of proper development. That relation is one of entire dependence upon God, and its true expression consists in self-oblation, which is the essence of true sacrificial worship. Moreover, this worship must assume public form, because the relation to which it gives dutiful expression is, as above stated, a social one, and demands corporate

acknowledgment. This element of religion has been neglected by many modern Christians, through forgetfulness of the fact that the necessity of self-oblation, and of its public performance, is not contingent upon sin, and therefore is not removed by the death of Christ. That event indeed renders Christian oblations effective, and has modified their divinely instituted form, which is now commemorative and Eucharistic.¹

§ 3. While the fundamental elements of true religion are unalterable and are invariably embodied in its revealed form, this form is not wholly independent of change. The progress of man towards his appointed destiny — that is, towards his full enjoyment of the communion with God for which he is made — has been attended by changes in his spiritual condition, and by crises in the historical development of God's purpose for him, which have required modifications in the divine precepts and institutions of religion. Such modifications cannot be made by human authority and judgment, but are accomplished by new dispensations from God — each being authenticated by supernatural revelation. The history of these dispensations is the history of the development of true religion; and while this development has been conditioned by human circumstances and factors, the determining factor at each stage has been divine action and purpose. The primary and distinctive precepts and institutions of each successive

¹ The subject will be dealt with in the eighth volume of this series.

form of true religion have been divinely appointed; and this fact imparts to them a validity¹ which would otherwise be wanting.

(a) The primitive dispensation was adapted to the childhood of the race and to the state of innocence which preceded human sin. Our direct knowledge of its institutions and precepts is derived from a narrative which is symbolical rather than historical; but the underlying teaching of that narrative, and certain general peculiarities of revealed religion, assure us that the primitive man was sufficiently enlightened and assisted by supernatural means to be capable of sinless advance towards his destiny and of attaining his final state without passing through physical death.²

(b) Sin nullified the value of this dispensation and led to a new method of divine dealing with mankind.³ This method was the election of a particular people, which should be isolated and put to school in preparation for discharging the double function of intelligently receiving a dispensation of salvation from sin, and of extending its benefits by a propaganda of persuasion to the rest of mankind. Its first and patriarchal stage reached its determinate development in the choice of Abraham, in whose seed it

¹ "Validity," as applied to religious rites, means covenant value. A valid sacrament, for example, means one which fulfils the covenant conditions to which an authentic divine promise of grace is attached. To call a sacrament invalid is to deny its fulfilment of these conditions.

² See ch. viii, below.

³ See ch. viii. §§ 9-12, and ch. ix, below.

was promised that all the families of the earth should be blessed.

(c) But a more elaborate system was required before the seed of Abraham could be prepared for its appointed function, and this was instituted in the Mosaic dispensation. Two of its leading peculiarities were those of legalism and prefigurative ritual. The law and the judgments which were visited upon those who violated it served to develop a sense of sin and to reveal the incapacity of men to become fit for their intended fellowship with God except by a dispensation of grace, which it was promised the divine Messiah would in the fulness of time establish. The Mosaic ritual, especially in its sacrificial elements, at once gave dutiful and corporate expression to the relation in which Israel stood to God, and prefigured the higher and effectual sacrifice which Christ was to achieve and perpetuate in the dispensation to come.

(d) At the appointed time the promised Christ was revealed as God-incarnate and, on the basis of His death, established the Christian dispensation, wherein true religion is given its final earthly form — a form which gives way only to the heavenly dispensation of full and everlasting enjoyment of divine fellowship. It is a catholic dispensation, in which the promise to Abraham is being fulfilled by a propaganda that knows no racial limitation. Its institutions constitute divinely appointed conditions and instruments of grace, whereby men are made

members of Christ, and in Him are enabled effectually and socially to discharge the functions of true religion, and by patient self-discipline to become fit for their appointed destiny.¹

It can be seen that the history of true religion is also the history of a process of involution from above — of the operation of supernatural factors, whereby man's future evolution, foreshadowed by his native instincts, but transcending his resident capacities, is carried on to its predetermined goal.²

§ 4. The point of view which is afforded by sacred history, or the history of the development of true religion,³ determines our convictions concerning the place and value of other religions.⁴ To call them false religions is apt to invite misunderstanding. It is likely to be interpreted as meaning that they preserve no truths, that they necessarily represent on the part of those who practise them a wilful rejection of God, and that they fulfil no providential function. If to call non-Christian religions false means all this, we may not thus describe them.

But to call them true is also misleading, since it can only mean that they successfully achieve the characteristic function of true religion, which is to

¹ On paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) see ch. x, below.

² Cf. ch. iii. § 3, above.

³ Summed up in St. John xiv. 5-6; 1 Tim. ii. 5.

⁴ On this subject, see F. B. Jevons, *Introd. to the Study of Compar. Religion*, pp. 239-265; J. H. Newman, *Arians of the Fourth Cent.*, ch. i. § iii. 5; G. P. Fisher, *Grounds of Theistic and Christ. Belief*, ch. xv.

bring man into personal and authentic relations with God. This they do not do; and the fact that they do not do it is all that we may legitimately imply in describing them as false — false when viewed as claiming to fulfil the divinely appointed functions of true religion. In so far as a religion has the establishment and preservation of acceptable relations with God for its aim — the characteristic aim of religion — it is a *genuine* religion, and represents a seeking after God which, if sincere, cannot rightly be condemned. But religions which have no such purpose cannot be correctly described even as genuine, and the only reason for speaking of them as religions is the fact that they occupy the place of religion in the lives of their disciples.¹ Happily, however, a religion which excludes God from consideration fails in the long run to maintain itself without modification, and the polytheism into which it develops, superstitious though it be, represents the undeniable demand of human instincts for genuine religion.

Have gentile religions any place and value in divine providence? We agree with certain ancient Christian writers in believing that they certainly have. Using the phrase untechnically, and without implying the idea of an authentic divine covenant, these

¹ Buddhism in its original form affords an example. Cf. Darwell Stone and D. C. Simpson, *Communion with God: The Preparation before Christ and the Realization in Him*, on the contrast between pagan seeking after God and the Christian finding Him.

religions seem obviously to embody a "divine dispensation" of paganism. That is, they embody elementary truths which the Holy Spirit has preserved among races that have lost a true knowledge of God, and constitute means providentially overruled for keeping alive the capacity to be recovered to true religion.¹ We may not rank them with Christianity as constituting means of salvation;² but to say that the elements of truth which they contain confer no benefits upon those who receive them, and that a pagan's religious devotion, however sincere, is in no sense pleasing to God, is to contradict the principles of sane judgment as guided by what we know of the divine will and character.

Religions of purely natural development are not in line as religious systems with true religion, and cannot constitute stages in its development. True religion is of supernatural ordering in all its stages.³ But, under divine overruling, gentile religions may — we believe they do — become means of preparing men for the reception of true religion. They prepare the heathen for Christianity because they preserve elements of religious truth,⁴ and keep alive religious

¹ Cf. St. Justin M., 2d *Apol.*, 8, 10, 13; Clement Alex., *Strom.* I. 1, 5, 16; VI. 5, 6, 8, 17; VII. 2. See J. H. Newman, as above cited; Chas. Bigg, *Christ. Platonists of Alexandria*, pp. 47-49; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Paganism," VI.

² Acts iv. 12.

³ Not less so because existing human rites are appropriated, these being modified and given higher meaning.

⁴ So conservative a writer as Dr. Liddon, *Essays and Addresses*, pp. 32-39, acknowledges this.

aspirations, which enable men to apprehend the truth of revealed religion when it is proclaimed to them. No doubt — but the subject lies beyond what God has revealed — they prepare those of their sincere disciples who have no opportunity to receive the Gospel in this world, for redemptive mercies in the world to come. What these mercies will be, and whether they will include all that is promised to faithful Christians, we may not venture to assert. There must be adequate reason for the commission to preach the Gospel to all men in this world.

It is certain that Christianity alone brings to its faithful disciples a definite divine promise of everlasting life with God and the means of obtaining it; and obstinate and wilful rejection of this religion is attended by everlasting consequences. It embodies every truth which has been preserved by gentile religions, and embodies them in their proper connections and proportions.¹ This fact, as well as the tenor of revelation, assures us that for this life it possesses absolute finality, and will not in any respect be stultified by the fuller dispensation of the world to come.

II. *Moral Sanctions*

§ 5. Reasons have been given for believing that the moral qualities of human nature cannot be accounted for by purely natural evolution.² But

¹ A displaced feature may destroy the value of a portrait. A good, popular statement of the view here adopted is given by Bishop Gore, *Creed of the Christian*, pp. 27-33.

² In ch. vi. § 2.

these qualities are what they are, and moral distinctions possess the meaning and validity which men in general perceive in them, whether our moral nature is derived exclusively through natural evolution or — as we believe — requires for its explanation a special and creative involution. Even if, contrary to the view here adopted, the lower forms of organic life from which the human species is said to be derived possess an imperfectly developed moral sense, the fact holds good that in their most incipient form moral capacities are superphysical and cannot have been originally acquired except by involution.

Our moral nature comes from God, and the validity of moral judgments ultimately depends upon the divine source of the moral sense. This sense, like other human faculties, can be and has been misused and rendered less trustworthy by such misuse. But a certain consensus is discoverable in the more fundamental judgments of mankind, especially among the more enlightened races, which justifies the assumption that certain judgments correctly express normal and therefore divinely intended conclusions of moral intelligence. If God has so constituted human nature that in the normal exercise of their faculties and under the most diverse circumstances men inevitably and generally arrive at certain common conclusions, these conclusions must be regarded as indisputably true. A rejection of this inference involves an implied repudiation of the infallible truthfulness of

God, which in turn involves subversion of the only sufficient basis of trust in human reason.

(a) Paramount among these commonly accepted conclusions is the doctrine that men are responsible agents, and that God is the supreme Ruler and Judge to whom all must somehow, somewhere, and at some time render account for the manner in which they exercise the rational freedom with which they have been endowed.¹

(b) A second and equally axiomatic judgment is that, under given conditions, some actions ought to be performed and some ought to be avoided. The "ought" and the "ought not"² represent a distinction which is easily recognized and which cannot wholly be evaded, but which cannot be defined because absolutely unique. It can be described only in terms derived from itself.

To describe the "ought" either as equivalent to what affords personal pleasure (hedonism), or as signifying what is useful for general happiness (utilitarianism), is fundamentally erroneous.³ This can be seen by reckoning with the question that obviously remains unanswered. Why *ought* I to seek

¹ See N. K. Davis, *Elements of Ethics*, ch. xiii.

² "Ought" is an old preterite of "to owe," but has acquired a meaning of its own.

³ Utilitarianism is historically and critically treated by H. Calderwood, *Handbook of Moral Philos.*, Pt. I. Div. II. Cf. E. Albee, *Hist. of English Utilitarianism*; J. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, Bk. II. Branch I; Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, s. *vv.* "Epicureanism" and "Eudæmonism."

the pleasurable or useful? Such a question would be meaningless if oughtness were equivalent to being pleasurable or useful. The fact is that what we ought to do is perceived in many critical instances to be contrary to what we would do, if either our own pleasure or general happiness were the determining principle of our judgment.

(c) A third axiom is that what we ought to do is invariably what God wills that we should do, which constitutes the standard of divine judgment. This does not justify the inference that righteousness is an arbitrary creation of the divine will. Rather it is based upon two assumptions: (1) that God is at once essentially righteous and all wise, so that His will is necessarily and invariably righteous; (2) that, from the fundamental nature of things, He ought to be, and is, the supreme Governor and Judge of mankind. The conclusion of the matter is that the source and determinative principle of moral sanctions and judgments is to be found in the nature, and therefore in the will, of God.¹

§ 6. The will of God is determined by His nature — by His righteousness of character — but issues in purpose; and His purpose in creating us is not less truly determinative of human righteousness than is His character. The divine character constitutes the likeness after which we are made;² and, when

¹ N. K. Davis, *Elem. of Ethics*, §§ 101-102; H. Calderwood, *Handbook*, pp. 251-253.

² See ch. vi. § 5, above.

translated into human terms, it becomes the norm of righteous character in man, and therefore the guiding principle of human conduct. On the other hand, the purpose for which God has made us, or the divinely appointed destiny of man, determines man's chief end; and its fulfilment constitutes the directive or teleological principle of human righteousness. Our righteousness is therefore determined in quality by the righteousness of God and, in controlling purpose, by the goal which God wills us to attain. These two are mutually harmonious and equally vital elements in the divine will, and cannot be isolated from each other in human ethic without robbing that ethic of completeness and finality.

This means that true religion and morality are vitally connected, and that to separate them is to narrow moral ideals and to make an adequate development of moral science impossible. The basis of this contention is neither remote nor uncertain. It has been shown in this chapter that true religion is the divinely constituted working system by which man is bound to God and is enabled both to develop and to enjoy the relations with Him which fulfil the purpose for which he was made. This being so, true religion determines righteousness on its teleological side, because the practice of it constitutes the divinely appointed method by which human righteousness is brought into line with and fulfils the purpose of God for us. That purpose, as we have seen,

is not less determinative of human obligation than are the non-teleological elements of righteousness. We are made to be righteous for a purpose, and the fulfilment of that purpose is therefore an essential and determinative element in our being righteous. To practise true religion is to fulfil that purpose, and to reject true religion is to disregard that purpose.¹ The chief, and therefore the morally determinative, end of man is to glorify God and to enjoy Him forever.

The conclusion to which we are driven by these considerations is that the habit of placing religion and morality in separate compartments of practical science is inconsistent both with human nature, which teaches the moral necessity of religion, and with the aim of moral science, which is to co-ordinate all branches of human obligation. This habit, erroneous though it be, is based upon a misinterpretation of valid distinctions — that between natural and revealed obligations and that between obligations which have exclusively earthly reference and those which have reference to man's future and supernatural destiny. But to convert this distinction into separation is to reduce morality to a purely temporal significance and to put this life out of alignment with the larger life for which it was designed of

¹ On the connection between ethic and religion, see N. K. Davis, *op. cit.*, §§ 141-142; H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 268-270; B. P. Bowne, *Prins. of Ethics*, ch. vii; H. P. Liddon, *Some Elem. of Religion*, pp. 17-18; G. T. Ladd, *Philos. of Religion*, ch. xix.

God to be preparatory. It is to convert life into a half-played drama, the plot of which is arrested before it is fully developed, and is to change the ideal of human character into an unfinished portrait. Moral life must be viewed in its ultimate meaning and purpose, or be reduced in value and practical result. A true moral science makes a righteous life equivalent to a consistent Christian life. The only possible basis for repudiating this conclusion is a denial of the truth of Christianity.

§ 7. The acknowledgment that the will of God determines human righteousness, and that the practice of true religion is involved in fulfilling that will, should lead on to a recognition of the social factor in righteousness. The necessity that religion should be social and corporate in working has been already set forth.¹ Man is made a social being, and his relation to his Maker cannot be rightly viewed and developed on purely individualistic lines. The ecclesiastical society and its corporate functions are vital to the practice of true religion.

The same reason requires that the whole range of moral obligation shall be regarded as determined in method of fulfilment by social relations — by the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. It is not good for man to be alone; and this means that to live an individualistic life is to live an unnatural life — an immoral one. To live according to nature — that is, as rightly understood in its divine pur-

¹ In § 2 (e) of this chapter.

pose — is a *sine qua non* of righteousness; and man is by nature social.¹

The spheres and forms of social obligation are necessarily determined by a recognition, in theory and practice, of the social institutions which God has sanctioned and of the functions which He has assigned to each. The chief divinely sanctioned social institutions are the family, the state, and the Church. The family is constituted by the natural relations between husband and wife, between parents and children, and between children of the same parents. It affords necessary conditions of a righteous propagation of the species, of training for citizenship and churchmanship, and also for the human brotherhood at large. The sexual love which constitutes a natural basis and impelling motive of marriage becomes, when regarded and regulated from the Christian standpoint, a type of and preparation for a higher and spiritual union to which the carnal relation must in time give place.² But the terms of its divine institution, and the teachings of experience as well, show that the marriage tie cannot righteously be annulled or displaced by another tie of the same kind until the death of one of its participants.³

¹ The social aspects of Christian ethics are gaining increased emphasis. They are dealt with in all recent moral treatises.

² Cf. Ephes. v. 22-33.

³ The difficult text, St. Matt. xix. 9, must be interpreted, in view of its context, with reference to the Jewish standpoint of the question which Christ was answering, and in the light of New Testament teaching at large. Cf. St. Matt. v. 31-32; St. Mark x. 2-12; St.

The state is not so strictly determined as to its constitution as is the family. The complexity, contingency, and mutability of the conditions which it is designed to meet make an occasional adjustment necessary, and the adjustment required may at times amount to revolution. But as the state is a social institution, the right of revolution pertains to society — not to individuals. The function for which the state is divinely sanctioned is to regulate and guard the external and temporal conditions of proper adjustment between the common welfare and personal liberty. It may discharge its functions unintelligently and even unrighteously; but the powers that be are ordained of God, and they cannot be righteously abolished except by society at large, through its establishment of a new state.

The Church has to do with the moral and religious aspects of social obligations, and with men's relations to God. These relations and obligations are not only permanent, but in vital respects are too mysterious to be left to exclusively human ordering. Accordingly, as with the family, the constitution and institutions of the Church are permanently defined and appointed in their central features by God. In one respect the ecclesiastical society is paramount — in respect to the guidance of men towards their

Luke xvi. 18; Rom. vii. 1-4; 1 Cor. vii. 10-11, 39. See O. D. Watkins, *Holy Matrimony*; S. L. Tyson, *Marriage and Divorce*; H. J. Wilkins, *History of Divorce and Remarriage*; Chas. Gore, *The Question of Divorce*.

chief end, including the regulation of their spiritual concerns. These concerns are the most vital of all. Yet, being moral, they cannot be regulated by physical force; and the Church's jurisdiction, indisputable and permanently valid though it be, is moral and persuasive — not "coercive."¹ Excommunication is the extremest form of discipline which it can rightly employ.

The postulate which is presupposed in a true conception of the social institutions above described is the brotherhood of man, as determined in significance and purpose by filial relations to God. These relations are progressive and advance from a creaturely sonship, in which all men have natural part, to the sonship of adoption and grace, which is entered upon through baptismal new-birth into the body of Christ, who is the proper and only-begotten Son of God. The common brotherhood, however, affords the starting point of man's progress towards his final destiny; the sphere within which the family, the state, and the Church extend themselves; and the natural and unescapable conditions of moral and social life and progress.²

¹ The jurisdiction which bishops in an "established" Church derive from the state is "coercive," the authority to secure legal enforcement of certain of their decisions. Their spiritual jurisdiction is not thus derived.

² The truth of what is here said concerning social obligations is independent of any conclusions concerning what is called "socialism," which in each of its forms is a debatable scheme for improving and perfecting social relations in the state.

§ 8. A true social ethic and a properly ordered human society require, on the one hand, a due recognition of the distinct and inviolable authority of the family, of the state, and of the Church, in the proper sphere of each. On the other hand, they depend upon the harmonious working together of all three on the basis of the common brotherhood of man, and in subordination to the supernatural end for which man was made. This ideal has never been adequately realized on earth; but it is not less the divine ideal for man, and therefore affords the fundamental and guiding principles of a true social ethic and of true education.

The purpose of education is to train its subject for an intelligent and successful life — intelligent and successful, that is, with reference to the spheres within which he ought to succeed and the destiny which he ought to attain. That destiny is attained primarily by religion; and the social spheres within which his successful attainment of it has to be achieved are the family, the state, and the Church — not less any one of them than the other two. Accordingly the family, the state, and the Church alike have claims in determining an educational curriculum and the methods of school discipline. The history of education is the history of failure to rise to this ideal; and to-day it is the higher and religious aspects of education that are most neglected. A secularized education, even when neither ostensibly nor designedly anti-religious, brings about an

atrophy of religious intelligence and aspiration and favours the development of an ethic which is truncated because unrelated to the larger meaning of the life of the child of God.

III. *Moral Philosophy*

§ 9. Modern writers in Dogmatic Theology have largely abandoned the practice of scholastic writers of including the subject of morality in their treatises; and this change appears to be connected with — it certainly accentuates — the tendency to isolate morality from religion. As we have been endeavoring to show, no moral science is either sound or adequate which is not built upon the postulate that the truths of revealed religion determine the range of human duties, their teleological significance, and their mutual relations. On the other hand, the vital significance of religious truths — the truths with which Dogmatic Theology is concerned — cannot be adequately exhibited by defining them wholly in the abstract. They are truths by which to live, and cannot rightly be understood apart from their meaning for life.¹

The sum of what we are saying is that the fields of Dogmatic and moral theology partially overlap, their difference lying in their specific aims. An adequate moral theology pays incidental attention to revealed doctrine, but for the purpose of expounding moral principles and obligations. Vice versa, an

¹ Cf. *Introd. to Dogm. Theol.*, ch. ix. §§ 1-3.

adequate Dogmatic Theology reckons with the moral nature, history, and obligations of men, but for the purpose of making clear the pragmatic value and vital significance of the truths with which it is especially concerned. These considerations, theologically important in themselves, explain why, in treating of man from the standpoint of Dogmatic Theology, we feel called upon to include a brief survey of the field in which moral science specializes.¹

In making this survey we adopt as postulates certain propositions of Dogmatic Theology which, as we have shown, have determinative significance for a sound moral science.

(a) Man's chief end is to attain to divine fellowship in a communion of saints, and this end deter-

¹ The standpoint is traditional, so far as fundamental principles and distinctions are involved. But an effort is made to have regard for the conditions, forms of thought, and terminology of modern days. The history of ethics can be studied in Henry Sidgwick, *Outlines of the History of Ethics*, supplemented by Thomas Slater, *Short Hist. of Moral Theol.*; Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, s. v. "Ethical Theories"; and *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Ethics," III. Among works which have determined the history of ethical thought are Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*; St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Pars II (transl. by Jos. Rickaby); Robert Sanderson, *Lecs. on Conscience and Human Law* (transl. by Chr. Wordsworth); Jeremy Taylor, *Ductor Dubitantium*; Joseph Butler, *Sermons on Human Nature*; Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Practical Reason*; Jeremy Bentham, *Prins. of Morals and Legislation*; Herbert Spencer, *Prins. of Ethics*; T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*. Of modern manuals should be mentioned Jos. Rickaby, *Moral Philosophy*; Henry Calderwood, *Handbook of Moral Philos.*; J. J. Elmendorf, *Elements of Moral Theol.*; N. K. Davis, *Elements of Ethics*; H. Martensen, *Christian Ethics*; T. B. Strong, *Christian Ethics*; J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*.

mines the range and teleological significance of human obligations.

(b) True religion constitutes the working system by which men get into genuine and acceptable relations with God and control their lives with reference to their chief end.

(c) The truths of religion, taught by the Church and established by Holy Scripture, define the relations in which men stand to God and the conditions which determine their obligations with reference both to this world and the future.

(d) This life is preparatory, educational, and probationary, and ends in judgment to come, the results of which will determine our everlasting state thereafter.

(e) The foundation of righteousness is the fundamental nature of things, as determined by the eternal character and will of God; and the will of God is the ultimate standard of moral judgment.

It will be convenient to gather our survey of morality under three heads: The Agent; The End; and The Act. We shall have to eliminate discussions and confine ourselves to concise propositions, the soundness of which the reader can test for himself by reckoning with their dogmatic standpoint and by a fuller study of moral science.¹

¹ "Moral science" is a more comprehensive term than "ethics"; *i.e.* as the latter is usually employed. It includes (a) moral philosophy, the chief subject-matter of modern ethical treatises; (b) moral theology proper, which treats in detail of Christian obligations; (c) ascetic theology, concerned with the ways and means of advance

§ 10. We first come to the moral agent — man. Men are moral agents by reason of their possession of rational freedom, their capacity to distinguish and choose between right and wrong action, and their sense of responsibility for their choice and consequent conduct.

As moral agents men possess what are called moral faculties. These are not separate from the psychological faculties in general, but are simply specific forms and applications of man's intellectual, emotional, and volitional functions. Moreover, these functions are mutually inseparable aspects of all psychological and moral activity. Neither pure reason, nor pure emotion, nor pure will has ever been experienced. A sound psychology is the determinative background of sound treatment of moral faculties.

The intellectual moral faculties are conveniently divided into theoretical and practical. The former, called by scholastic writers the *synderesis*, may be reckoned as having to do with the general appropriation and consideration of moral truths and principles. On the other hand, the practical faculty or *conscience* is concerned with applying moral principles to conduct, passing moral judgments upon given actions under given conditions. It is not infallible, and may err either through inadequate knowl-

in Christian virtue; (d) casuistry, which discusses moral cases and problems. What is here given is the briefest possible syllabus or sketch of moral philosophy as viewed from the standpoint which has been above explained.

edge or through imperfect exercise. It requires education.¹ But its judgments signify, in each case, what seems to be right and wrong, and therefore determine beyond appeal what at the moment ought to be done and what ought not to be done. This conclusion is consistent with the proviso that culpable failure to protect the conscience from error by previous inquiry and education renders a man responsible for its errors.

The emotions — such as pleasure and pain, love and hate, desire and aversion, hope and fear — constitute impelling and deterring motives of action, and therefore of choice. They are to an important degree subject to modification and culture, partly by voluntary regulation of the proportionate attention paid to each of them, and partly by control of their effect upon conduct. Such culture and control are essential factors in righteousness of life.

The will is the faculty of self-control and of determining personal action. Its exercise signifies a self-determination which cannot be directly compelled from without. In so far as it determines between

¹ The seemingly contrary view, set forth, for instance, by H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, Pt. I. Div. I. ch. iv, that the conscience being intuitive, cannot be educated, is verbally rather than essentially opposed to this. The question is one of terms. If the name "conscience" is used to signify the faculty of moral intuition (so Calderwood and the intuitional school), it cannot be educated. If, however, it signifies the faculty of practical judgment of given moral actions (the traditional use in moral theology), it can be educated. Cf. Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, s. v. "Conscience" and "Synderesis"; Hastings, *Encyc. of Religion*, s. v. "Conscience."

alternative possibilities, the will is a true cause; but as created by a higher will, its existence and freedom are effects, and its range of action is circumscribed by various finite limitations, both intrinsic and extrinsic.¹ Within these limitations the will is truly free to choose, and upon this fact depend the reality and extent of man's personal responsibility.² But choice can never be without motives or wholly independent of them,³ and these may be created and modified to some extent by the will itself, and also by extraneous causes, such as environment, bodily conditions, personal influence, heredity, divine grace, and previous character and habit. It is the responsible function of the will to adopt methods of regulating and developing motives, as well as to determine what motives shall bear fruit in action.

¹ In brief, the human will is a "secondary cause." Cf. ch. iii. § 4, above, and *Introd. to Dogm. Theol.*, note on pp. 39-41.

² The denial of free self-determination is called determinism; which takes various forms: (a) theological, of irresistible grace; (b) external or naturalistic, treating volition as included in the invariable sequences of physical causation; (c) psychological, treating volition as the non-contingent result of previous psychical conditions and motives; (d) pantheistic, reducing volition to an illusion; (e) fatalism, reducing even divine action to necessity. The history of volitional theories previous to about 1850 is given by Archibald Alexander, *Theories of the Will*. Cf. H. Calderwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-202; J. Martineau, *Religion*, Bk. III. ch. ii; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Determinism." For full bibliography, see Baldwin, *Dic. of Phil.*, Vol. III. pp. 888-897.

³ The view that it can be called "indeterminism." Pure "indeterminism" is also called "accidentalism," and maintains the "liberty of indifference." Cf. J. M. Baldwin, *Elements of Psychology*, pp. 362-367; *Dic. of Philos.*, q. v.

The harmony of man's moral nature, which means the subjection of his animal impulses to his higher motives,¹ is dependent upon divine grace; for man has not been made self-sufficient. Sin nullifies grace and upsets this harmony. By doing so it reduces moral intelligence, gives wrong direction to the emotions, degrades the motives, and weakens the will. And it is because this corruptibility of nature is engendered in all the children of Adam that a new and spiritual birth in Christ is an essential factor in the development of human righteousness.²

§ 11. The chief end of man, also called the *summum bonum*, is, as we have seen, "to glorify God and enjoy Him forever," in a society and kingdom of perfected persons — the communion of saints.³ The joy and glory of this communion, in both its Godward and manhood relations, is based upon love, and this, in turn, depends upon a mutual congeniality of character which is the result of development of its human participants in the spiritual likeness of God after which they were created. This end defines the supreme purpose of moral life, the present perfection of which consists not in immediate achievement, but in sincere and unremitting pursuit of the way of life which leads to the appointed goal.

Involved in man's ultimate end is the immediate end of acquiring spiritual perfection both for one-

¹ Called in technical terms "integrity."

² On this subject, see ch. ix. §§ 1-2, below.

³ Cf. ch. vi. § 11, above.

self and for others. As social beings, men cannot perfect themselves unless they also devote themselves to helping others towards perfection. Human destiny is also social, and depends for attainment upon a common perfection and mutual congeniality, in the achievement of which every individual has responsible part, according to his providentially assigned vocation. In brief, to save ourselves we must help to save others, and it is only by self-surrender that self-realization is achieved.¹

It can be seen that we are placed here mutually to co-operate in the cultivation of virtues, which are dispositions and habits that make for perfection. Using the common classification, the cardinal virtues of wisdom, temperance, fortitude, and justice ought to govern our lives in earthly relations, while the heavenly or theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity pertain directly to our supernatural destiny and chief end, and for that reason enlarge the significance of the cardinal virtues and perfect them.

Love is the highest and most determinative of all virtues because it is the chief requisite and joy of the perfect life hereafter.² It properly signifies desire for, and joy in, personal fellowship. It is imperfect in this world because based upon a mutual congeniality, which cannot be complete between imperfect persons. Yet its cultivation and practice is of paramount obligation and may not be post-

¹ St. Matt. x. 39; St. Luke ix. 24; Phil. ii. 2-11.

² 1 Cor. xiii.

poned. To fulfil this obligation is possible for Christians because their faith and hope enable them to discern in each neighbour a potential perfection which they can help to actualize. It is a potential and prospective congeniality that gives vitality to Christian love even in its earthly imperfection. This love normally expresses itself in doing good to others, because such is the method of its culture; but the distinctive mark of Christian love, as distinguished from all other love, is its having reference to, and gaining final fulfilment in, the communion of saints.

The ends which determine human conduct, when translated into immediate and subjective terms, become the motives, or internal considerations and feelings, by which the will is guided and influenced. The intellectual motives, or reasons for action, are regulative, while the emotional motives or impulses are either impelling or deterring. By divine grace we both can and ought habitually to direct our attention upon motives which accord with our chief end, to cultivate them, and to be ruled by them; and this requires a cultivation of desire and enlightened purpose to attain that end.

§ 12. Human acts are materially moral in so far as they pertain either immediately or remotely, positively or negatively, to the fulfilment of the divine will and to man's chief end, or *summum bonum*. They are formally moral in so far as they are performed with such antecedent freedom and opportunity of knowledge as is required to render their agent

responsible; and ignorance does not preclude responsibility unless it is invincible — that is, is not due to previous and culpable neglect of means of information. The absence of formal responsibility for wrong action does not do away with its material effect in either defeating or delaying the attainment of the *summum bonum*; for this attainment is necessarily dependent upon the possession of a spiritual character which can be developed only by material as well as formal conformity to the divine will.

The will of God which is here meant is His revealed will, commonly called the “will of signs.” It consists of (a) commands and prohibitions; (b) permissions and counsels; (c) example. Taking them in reverse order, the divine example is found primarily in the earthly life and spiritual character of Jesus Christ, God-incarnate; and a perfect human life is one which is in moral agreement with that life, and which develops in us the character of Christ — the likeness after which we were made.¹

Divine permissions and counsels pertain to actions and habits of action the moral quality of which depends upon contingent circumstances and individual vocation. They are either expedient or inexpedient in relation to the *summum bonum*. That which is morally expedient ought always to be followed. Things permitted — not expressly forbidden — are liable to become obviously inexpedient, and to that extent wrong; while things counselled are, for certain

¹ Ephes. v. 1-2. Cf. St. Matt. v. 48.

individuals, expedient and even to a degree obligatory. But circumstances may render things permitted expedient and things counselled inexpedient.¹

The commands and prohibitions of divine law, subject to rare and self-evident exceptions, determine beyond appeal what is materially obligatory and what is materially wrong. The law of God is summarized chiefly in the Decalogue, as interpreted by the law of love set forth by Christ and by the changed conditions of the Christian covenant. Rightly interpreted, the divine law requires obedience in things morally permissible to human authority, whether parental, civil, ecclesiastical, or other.

Any violation of the divine law constitutes sin,² which is necessarily displeasing to God and prejudicial to divine grace and to the attainment of the *summum bonum*. Sin varies in culpability and immediate effect, according to the degree of its deliberate wilfulness and the gravity of its matter. In its graver forms it is "mortal" — immediately fatal, until remedied, to attainment of the *summum bonum*. In lighter forms it is "venial" — not immediately fatal. But all sin has to be remedied by repentance and amendment, which are made possible by the cleansing and assisting grace of Christ. The universality of sin gives repentance and the sense

¹ 1 Cor. vi. 12; x. 23. Puritanical legalism converts things permitted into things prohibited, mistaking extrinsic inexpediency for intrinsic unlawfulness.

² Cf. ch. viii. § 9, below, and the references there given.

of sin a primary place in human obligation — not because repentance is sufficient in itself for Christian progress, but because salvation from sin is a *sine qua non* of such progress.

The widest view of the Christian life makes it include three stages or “ways”: (a) “the purgative way,” or remedy of sin by repentance and self-discipline; (b) “the illuminative way,” or cultivation of spiritual character by the practice of virtues, both personal and social; (c) “the unitive way,” or development of personal communion with God and His saints.

A man is in a state of justification when, by reason of faith and other covenant conditions, he is accepted of God and treated as already possessing the righteousness which he is in way of acquiring through Christ. He possesses no wage-merit, for nothing which he can do can establish a just wage-claim to the benefit which is promised to him. Everlasting life is essentially a free gift from God. But members of Christ, by divine grace, both can and ought to acquire the merit of spiritual fitness to receive that gift — the merit of personal worthiness, or of character which is pleasing to God. This is the necessary basis of congenial relations between God and His personal creatures, and apart from it man’s appointed destiny cannot be attained.¹

¹ The meritorious value of good works lies in their being either the means of growth in personal fitness for divine fellowship, or the fruits and evidences of such fitness. In brief, their merit is qualitative, not quantitative. Cf. ch. x. § 11, below.

CHAPTER VIII

MAN'S PRIMITIVE STATE

I. *Various Views*

§ 1. That the moral condition of mankind is not what it ought to be, and that men's inherited tendencies and capacities neither enable nor permit them wholly to avoid wrong-doing, is, and ever has been, generally acknowledged by thoughtful men. The traditions of many races point back to a golden age in which men were better and happier; but these traditions are too vague and uncertain to afford a basis for satisfactory argument. The doctrine of man's primitive state which begins to assume articulate form in the later Old Testament literature, and which is more clearly implied in the New Testament, is quite distinctive and rests for proof upon supernatural revelation. According to this doctrine man was originally free from sin and was able to avoid sinning; and his present moral condition is due to an unnecessary violation of righteousness by his first human parents. Distinctive though this doctrine is, it has ever been accepted by all who seriously acknowledge the authority of apostolic teaching, whether they call themselves Catholics or Protestants.¹

¹ The best and most truly representative patristic statement of the catholic doctrine of man's primitive state and fall is perhaps that

The knowledge of man's primitive state which this doctrine affords, definite though it be, is limited, and a natural desire to enlarge its range has encouraged the development of speculative views on the subject. These views have not always been sufficiently distinguished from the Christian doctrine, and have caused objections to be raised against this doctrine to which in its original and really catholic form it is not properly liable. It is important, therefore, at the outset, to eliminate the speculative accretions referred to and to confine our argument to the doctrine which has commanded catholic consent.

The following opinions are not parts of the catholic doctrine and do not have to be defended in maintaining it: (a) That our first parents were highly

of St. Athanasius, *de Incarn.*, §§ 3-5. The Augustinian view contains the catholic doctrine; but in terms, and with additions, which have given that doctrine a provincial twist that must be gotten rid of, if it is either to be understood or to be reconciled with modern knowledge and thought, and with a more mature induction of scriptural teaching at large.

The history of the doctrine can be studied with the help of Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctr.*, §§ 61-62, 175, 245; F. R. Tennant, *Sources*, chh. xii-xiii, *passim*; J. B. Mozley, *Predestination*, chh. iii-iv, *passim*; Bishop Bull, *Discourses*, V (*The State of Man before the Fall*); Petavius, *de Sex . . . Dierum Opificio*, II. v-xi; P. J. Toner, *Dissertatio Historico-Theologica de Lapsu et Pecc. Originali*.

For expositions of the doctrine, see A. P. Forbes, *Thirty-Nine Arts.*, ix. pp. 140-142; J. A. Moehler, *Symbolism*, Bk. I. §§ i-iii; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. xciii-cii; Wilhelm and Scannell, *Cath. Theol.*, Pt. II. ch. iii; J. B. Mozley, *Predestination* (8vo edition), pp. 90-97, 109-112; J. Perrone, *Praelec. de Deo Creatore*, Pars III. cap. ii; *Church Quarterly Review*, July, 1877, pp. 308-314. Cf. the writer's *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 128-133 and Lec. v.

civilized and possessed wide physical and spiritual knowledge;¹ (b) that they possessed that type of active virtue and sanctity which, within our observation, is acquired only by experience with and triumph over many and diverse temptations; (c) that the Eden narrative must be interpreted historically and literally, and as determining the location of Eden and the precise conditions and circumstances of the primitive state and fall.² The significant fact that these opinions have not commanded continuous and universal consent among orthodox Christians, and the impossibility of establishing their truth by biblical evidence, alike require us to regard them as speculative accretions rather than as parts of catholic doctrine.

This doctrine leaves us free to regard our primitive parents as lacking in the active virtues of mature experience and culture — in brief, as inexperienced children, endowed by nature and grace with sufficient capacity for blameless progress, but with much to learn and with character to develop. It also leaves us free to regard the Eden narrative, in its external details at least, as a symbolical rather than a properly historical revelation. In other words, we do not have to defend the view that Eden was located on the river Euphrates; that the tree of life and the tree

¹ Bishop South went beyond catholic doctrine in saying, "An Aristotle was but the rubbish of an Adam, and Athens but the rudiments of Paradise." *Sermons*, ii.

² Cf. *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 131-132; *Authority, Eccles. and Biblical*; and references there given.

of knowledge were real trees; that Eve was literally built up from one of Adam's ribs; and that all the animals were brought to Adam and named by him. These details may be treated as the imagery and framework of a picture, the significance of which is farther to seek. Whatever may have been the nature and limits of the conscious meaning of its original human writer,¹ the meaning which it acquires when viewed in the context of the whole written Word of God is its biblical meaning, and that is its proper meaning for Christian interpretation.

Postponing a fuller statement of the catholic doctrine to a subsequent section, it is enough at this point to say that it includes three leading particulars: (*a*) covenant relations with God; (*b*) sufficient supernatural enlightenment and endowments of grace to make possible a subjection of animal passions to moral and spiritual control; (*c*) the possibility of escaping physical death. These advantages were conditional. They constituted a state of probation in which man was able either to make sinless progress or to disobey his Maker and fall from grace.

The sum of the matter is that God did not will to create responsible agents only to leave them at the outset in a state in which sin would be unavoidable — an incredible supposition to an unprejudiced

¹ Perhaps the writer intended to give actual history, but relied on traditions into which mythical elements had been incorporated — traditions which his religious standpoint and divine inspiration enabled him to purge of pagan meaning.

believer in divine righteousness. Yet He made their ability to avoid sin to be contingent upon their use of grace, because dependence upon divine assistance constitutes an essential element in the religious life for which they were created. The lower species appear to be made naturally self-sufficient in relation to their appointed functions and destinies. It is otherwise with man, who cannot obey his highest motives and rightly fulfil his distinctive functions, except in a relation of conscious dependence upon God and upon supernatural grace.¹

§ 2. In their recoil from mediæval theology and practice, sixteenth-century Protestants made the doctrine of "justification by faith only" their material principle, and this had important theological consequences. The logic of their position compelled Protestants to describe the condition of fallen man in terms of unqualified evil and of total incapacity for good. Realizing that, as created by God, human nature cannot be regarded as positively evil, they were led on to describe the fall as a radical alteration of nature. This position involved a significant modification of the doctrine of man's primitive state. If the fall consists in a subversion of human nature, it represents a fall from man's natural state rather than a loss of supernatural grace. Accordingly, Protestants have insisted that man's primitive state was purely natural.²

¹ Cf. ch. vii. § 2 (b).

² Cf. J. A. Moehler, *op. cit.*, Bk. I. Pt. I. ch. i. For protestant

This view, if logically pressed, involves far-reaching consequences. If it is true, the dependence of man upon supernatural assistance is not due to any natural lack of self-sufficiency, but to his having become dehumanized, so to speak. Religion is no longer to be regarded as essentially supernatural — a system by which the natural man is enabled to attain a supernatural level and destiny. On the contrary, its supernatural factors are wholly remedial and are due to the subversion of human nature — to the loss of an original and natural capacity and disposition to fulfil all righteousness and to enjoy God forever. In brief, it involves an ascription to primitive man of the natural self-sufficiency which Pelagius ascribed to men in their present state. Moreover, if, as Protestants in fact maintain, man was created with a positive and natural disposition for righteousness, the difficulty of accounting for his having sinned — that is, of having violated his natural disposition — is very great indeed. According to catholic theology his disposition was yet to be acquired; and while he was made capable by grace of becoming disposed to virtue, his nature contained animal propensities which required a supernaturally assisted will to make them wholly subservient to righteousness. This means that primitive man was capable by grace of sinless development, but also

expositions of man's primitive state, see J. J. van Oosterzee, *Christ. Dogmatics*, §§ 70-71; C. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, Pt. II. ch. v. Cf. J. Orr, *Image of God in Man*, pp. 243-244.

capable of failure to co-operate with grace and of sin. Divine grace is not compelling, and only a fully perfected disposition to righteousness — demanding previous moral development for its acquisition — can make a created person impeccable.

The protestant view, too frequently regarded as representing the traditional view of Christendom, has apparently had much to do with the fact that evolutionary science has seemed to many thoughtful people to require an abandonment of the whole Christian doctrine of man's primitive state and fall as hopelessly inconsistent with modern knowledge. The reasons for saying this will soon appear.

§ 3. Modern efforts to ascertain by scientific investigation as much as possible concerning prehistoric man and his state are inevitable, legitimate, and important. And their results, although often exaggerated by failure to distinguish between results and conjectures, are neither insignificant nor to be neglected. From the nature of things, however, no indisputable traces of primitive man remain which afford contemporary evidence of his original moral and spiritual condition.¹ Accordingly, any conclusions on the subject which are derived from other sources than that of supernatural revelation must be uncertain and dependent for credibility upon theoretical presuppositions.

¹ On this point, see *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 182-183; A. M. Fairbairn, *Philos. of the Christ. Religion*, p. 204; De La Saussaye, *Science of Religion*, pp. 28-29; G. T. Ladd, *Philos. of Religion*, Vol. I. pp. 134-138.

The evolutionary theory of man's origin is now presupposed in scientific discussions of the subject, and we have assumed that, so far as the physical side of man's nature is concerned, the existing state of natural knowledge requires our provisional acceptance of this theory.¹ But many physical scientists have adopted the extra-scientific and purely speculative point of view of naturalism, and maintain that the origin, primitive state, and subsequent development of man must be described in terms of purely natural evolution to the exclusion of all supernatural factors. It is this presupposition which gives plausibility to the so-called evolutionary view of sin, although some of those who have adopted it would repudiate the naturalistic philosophy, and do not realize that upon the validity of that philosophy depends the alleged scientific necessity of their view of sin.

According to this view ² the carnal tendencies which handicap all men in their moral development are wholly to be explained by the natural survival in man of animal propensities, inherited from brute ancestors. It is called the evolutionary view, but it is not the only theory of sin which reckons with evolutionary science. Some convinced evolutionists maintain a theory of sin which is as truly evolutionary as the one which we are considering, but which, while speculatively supplementing the catholic doctrine,

¹ See ch. vi. §§ 1-2, above.

² Already defined in ch. iv. § 8, in relation to the problem of evil.

leaves its validity unimpugned. What that theory is will soon appear.

§ 4. It is impracticable in a treatise of this kind to discuss at length the alleged conflict between evolutionary science and the orthodox doctrine of man's primitive state and fall. The writer has done this in a different work.¹ He must here content himself with a very brief survey of the issues involved.

Modern scientists consider it fully established (a) that, on his physical side at least, man has descended from brute ancestors, and that his carnal propensities, which so often escape moral control, are inherited from these ancestors; (b) that human civilizations, along with their moral conditions and ideals, are products of long-continued development from prehistoric and uncivilized conditions. Christian theologians can consistently accept both of these propositions, but are justified in interpreting them in the light of additional ones: (c) that supernatural factors, as well as purely natural ones, have to be allowed for in order fully to explain the origin and subsequent development of mankind; (d) that no data are available to natural science by which conclusively to determine man's original state;² (e) that an absolutely universal prevalence of savagery in any given stage of human development has not been demonstrated.³

¹ *Evolution and the Fall*, esp. Lects. v, vi.

² References are given on p. 255, note 1, above.

³ Max Müller says, *Anthropological Religion*, p. 150, "We now

It needs to be borne in mind that all scientists, whether physical or theological, accept without question the principle of continuity — the principle that all events and conditions whatsoever depend for credibility and possibility upon their having place in a rationally ordered scheme of causal sequences. And no intelligent thinker disputes the law that the same unhindered causes invariably produce the same effects.¹ But in order to determine whether an alleged event or condition is possible and credible, we must start with a defensible view of the general system of causation — the total order of things in which every event finds place. Physical science deals only with one aspect of the world-drama — its physical sequences and factors — and the fallacy of naturalism lies in regarding this aspect as all comprehensive and as exclusively determinative of causal possibilities. That such a conception of the universe is pitifully inadequate is coming to be realized by an increasing majority of scientific thinkers.² The philosophy of the universe which Christian doctrine implies is far more adequate and consistent with the data of moral and spiritual experience. This philosophy finds place for both physical and spiritual, natural and supernatural, factors in the general march of events and combines them in one

know that savage and primitive are very far from meaning the same thing.”

¹ *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 162-167.

² See R. Otto, *Naturalism and Religion*, ch. ix.

rationally ordered plan and system of divine providence.¹

Such a view of events enables us to perceive an utter lack of scientific basis for the naturalistic assertion that the occurrence of a state of innocence and grace between the evolution of man from the lower species and his ancient moral enslavement to animal passions necessarily involves a violation of continuity. If a tumultuous mountain stream is artificially controlled by human device so as to run powerful machinery, and thus to discharge functions of which, without such artificial manipulation, it is incapable, we do not conclude that nature has been violated and the causal continuity of things subverted. On the contrary, we explain the phenomenon by the coming in of new factors, factors which, although super-added to those previously operating in the stream, do not nullify them, but give them more significant and valuable application. Moreover, this interpretation of the phenomenon will not be nullified if the artificial restraints referred to are subsequently ruined by human mischief, and if the stream is thus converted into a destructive flood.

We may not say that the purpose for which streams are made is to run human machinery, but we know by the divine Word that man was made for God, and that his animal passions were therefore intended by Him to be subjected to higher control in order to

¹ *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 162-167. Cf. *Intro. to Dogm. Theol.*, ch. ii. § 5.

subserve a supernatural development and destiny. Accordingly the regulation of the natural and tumultuous current of these passions by higher factors, by factors calculated to make animal impulses serviceable for an uninterrupted development of spiritual character, did not constitute a breach in the sequence of things. The nearest approach to a breach was caused by man's own subsequent wilfulness, when by avoidable sin he destroyed the arrangements graciously made for him and caused his animal nature to resume its unregulated and tumultuous course. This catastrophe would have caused a hopeless breach of continuity if God had not from eternity provided for the exigency by including in His plan the mystery of salvation from sin.¹

II. *Its Particulars*

§ 5. The particulars of man's primitive state are made known to us by supernatural revelation, but they cannot be ascertained and established by an appeal to isolated proof-texts of Scripture. This method of argument has tended to weaken rather than to fortify men's hold upon true doctrine. The right method is to apply the catholic doctrine as a working hypothesis to the Scriptures at large, and by adequate induction to verify its agreement with pertinent data, wherever they can be found in the Bible. And in pursuing this method it ought not to be for-

¹ The problem of evil and the mystery of eternally ordained redemption from sin ought to be reckoned with together.

gotten that divine revelation is progressive, so that its earlier stages are to be viewed in relation to the completed whole. This will save us from treating the comparative inadequacies of Old Testament passages as entirely nullifying their Christian meaning and value for instruction. It will also guard us from overestimating the knowledge which these passages indicate on the part of their writers and the amount of teaching which they conveyed to their original readers. The divine or biblical meaning of Old Testament documents could not be adequately discerned until the whole course of revelation had been completed. This meaning is its Christian meaning, the meaning which it acquires when regarded from the Christian standpoint.¹

The catholic doctrine of man's primitive state is not dependent for validity on a literal and historical interpretation of the Eden narrative.² But that narrative cannot be interpreted as mere myth or mere fiction. If we concede for argument's sake that it is derived from mythical sources, we must still regard it as divinely selected and as providentially incorporated by the Holy Spirit, through the Church,

¹ Because the Bible is the memorial and record of progressive revelations from God, and the divine mind which emerges in their later stages is the mind which determined the whole process. Cf. *Authority, Eccles. and Biblical*, ch. vii. §§ 9-15, where other references appear. For the biblical argument on this subject, cf. *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 132-133. The contrary treatment of biblical evidence is given by F. R. Tennant, *Sources*, chh. i-xi.

² Cf. C. Gore, *Romans*, I. pp. 190 *et seq.* and App., note E.

into the sacred context of Holy Scripture. This imparts a higher meaning to it than its human author could have understood. Thus regarded, the narrative is perceived to derive its ultimate and permanent meaning in the divine Word from the truths of redemption and regeneration, and to contain a symbolical description of the state which Christ came to restore — the state of holy freedom from sinfulness, and of grace and immortality, which was lost by sin.¹ No doubt the grace of Christ, the second Adam, is intended to raise us above even the unfallen state of the first Adam; but the New Testament shows that Christ's first work is to save the lost — to repair a fall — and the higher advance which His grace makes possible fulfils God's eternal purpose in creating man, a purpose which would have been fulfilled in a manner known only to God, but without the intervention of pain and death, if man had not sinned. This view of things, and apparently no other, agrees with the postulate of all sound biblical exegesis, that what was revealed in many parts, and in many manners, to the Old Testament fathers, is in line with, and designedly introductory to, what has, at the end of days, been spoken unto us by the Son of God.²

§ 6. It is time to define those particulars of the doctrine of man's primitive state which have been everywhere accepted in the Catholic Church, and which are confirmed by the general tenor of revelation as exhibited in Holy Scripture.

¹ Cf. J. A. Moehler, Bk. I. § 1.

² Heb. i. 1-2.

(a) Having been made for God, and having been given to that end a rational, moral, and religious nature, although one which was not sufficient of itself to enable man to fulfil his chief end, our first human parents were at once placed in the way of successful advance towards their intended destiny. They were brought into effective relations with their Maker by means of a divinely established covenant. This covenant assured to Adam, so long as he observed its terms, what was needful for his equipment for righteousness. It thus forestalled — what would have been an incredible result of arrangements having the righteous God for their Author — the subjection of mankind, without previous human fault, to a practical necessity of incurring moral guilt. On the other hand, the covenant was conditional; for it stipulated obedience to divine precepts and left man capable of disobedience and of thereby forfeiting the advantages which the covenant assured for him. This covenant has been called a *fœdus* or compact,¹ but its terms were of divine imposing rather than of mutual agreement, for the relations between God and His creatures are necessarily determined by Himself.

(b) By created nature man is endowed with moral sense, and is thus made responsible for righteousness; but he is unequal to its fulfilment. The all-righteous

¹ On federal theology see *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, s. v. "Cocceius, Johannes, and his School"; A. Hodge, *Outline of Theol.*, ch. xxi. 15-18.

Creator could be trusted to complete His work. He endowed primitive man with superadded gifts of grace, especially the supernatural gift, *donum supernaturale*, of the Holy Spirit. These endowments sufficiently re-enforced man's spiritual intelligence, affections, and will to enable him to preserve his integrity, or the due subordination of his animal propensities to his moral and spiritual ones, and to make him capable of avoiding sin, of increasing in virtue, and of advancing successfully towards his appointed destiny. The grace thus given was "sufficient," but not compelling or "irresistible." It was capable of being forfeited by sin, and was only conditionally "efficacious," its result depending upon the free co-operation of man's will. It would indeed seem to be impossible, even with the aid of grace, for a creature to become established in actualized holiness of character and disposition except in a moral way — that is, by his voluntary practice of obedience and virtue.

(c) The normal man shrinks from physical death, and this appears to be connected with an instinctive craving for immortality, one implanted in his nature by his Creator. A continuance of the human species by natural propagation, and its future development, does not satisfy this craving, for the immortality which man desires is individual and personal. Moreover, the destiny which God has appointed for man, of personal communion with Himself, presupposes and requires personal immortality. Finally, the immortality which is pledged to the redeemed in the

New Testament is an immortality of the whole man — not of a disembodied soul. As has already been pointed out, when the man's soul is deprived of the body the man is dead.¹

Man's immortality must be attained, if at all, either by his never dying or by his rising again. But his unassisted nature is incapable of either method, and the pledge of immortality which God appears to have given when He implanted the craving for it in our nature is morally equivalent to a promise that the capacity for immortality which our nature lacks shall be imparted from above — that is, by supernatural endowment.

The catholic doctrine teaches that, if primitive man had not sinned, he would not have died; and that his final glorification would not have required a resurrection from death. He was endowed with the capacity of not dying, but remained capable of reversion to his natural mortality by sinning.²

§ 7. The supernatural advantages and promises given to man in his primitive state were conditionally given. They constituted a state of probation. This means that he was put to proof as to whether or no he would obey his Maker and advance with-

¹ Cf. ch. vi. § 9.

² Among patristic assertions of this, see Theophilus, *ad Autol.*, ii. 24; St. Athanasius, *de Incarn.*, §§ 3-4; *c. Gentes*, I. 2; St. Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, xii. 21; xiii. 24. Bishop Bull gives a catena in his *State of Man before the Fall*. J. Orr, in *God's Image in Man*, pp. 249-259, tries to show that death is not natural to man. His argument is not convincing.

out backsliding to his appointed destiny, and that the result was contingent. By grace he was fully capable of uninterrupted obedience to God and of spiritually controlling his animal passions. But his disposition towards righteousness was yet to be actualized, developed, and fixed by his free will and conduct, for grace could not determine his character prior to moral experience.

Even an impeccable person can be tempted — that is, *proved* by opportunities and inducements to sin — although his free rejection of such inducements is inevitable. But a human person acquires impeccability only by moral development and by the crystallization of a disposition for righteousness which has been gradually and morally acquired. Our first parents had not passed through this experience, and the supernatural endowments which they enjoyed, sufficient though they were to make them capable of acquiring an impeccable righteousness, did not remove either the necessity of their acquiring it by moral development or the element of contingency in their doing so. They were therefore not only liable to temptation, but also capable of yielding thereto and of sinning. Man's original righteousness was a potential righteousness — a state of grace in which, if he willed faithfully to continue, he would become actually righteous in character and disposition.

While such a doctrine raises difficult questions, it is not open to the objection sometimes urged,¹ that if

¹ *E.g.* by F. R. Tennant, *Origin of Sin*, pp. 27-28.

Adam was originally endowed with a supernatural righteousness, his holy disposition must have made it impossible for him to sin. This objection is valid only on the supposition that the grace with which he was endowed so irresistibly determined his will as to constitute a substitute for the moral development of character. Such a supposition is not only unsupported by catholic doctrine, but is intrinsically incredible. Only the eternal God can possess unalterable character independently of, and unconditioned by, contingent development. A human ego whose will is irresistibly disposed to righteousness by divine grace *ab initio* is not, properly speaking, a moral agent, for the determination of his conduct is not human but wholly divine. It is essential to the moral status of a human agent that, if he is impeccable, his being so should be the result of self-determined, and therefore contingent, moral development. The impeccable human saint is one who has become such by voluntary and self-determined response to grace, and by progressive acquisition and crystallization of character.¹

Original righteousness consists not in actualized virtue, but in a supernaturally established state which, if preserved by faithful observance on man's part of its conditions, becomes a state of actualized right-

¹ Our Lord was indeed impeccable, but because the ego or self which experienced His temptations and determined His conduct was God — not less truly so because the nature in which He experienced temptation was really human. The subject belongs to the next volume of this series.

eousness, but which can be forfeited and lost by sin. Adam was originally righteous in this sense, that he was in the way of freely becoming so — not in the sense that he either had become so or could not avoid becoming so.

How his moral and spiritual nature could be given power *ab initio* and by grace to control his animal propensities is indeed an insoluble problem; but it is not a different problem from the general mystery of grace. We cannot hope to explain how divine grace regenerates and enables us gradually to gain deliverance from the established power of sinful dispositions.¹ If we could do so, we could perhaps also explain how grace can enable a creature, as yet uncorrupted by sinful inheritance, altogether to avoid falling into sin.

§ 8. One of the strongest supporting considerations to the catholic doctrine is its bearing upon the problem of evil — the problem of retaining our belief in the righteousness of God, in view of His having created a universe in which moral evil has found place. It does not, indeed, afford a solution of this problem, for which, abstractly considered, no adequate solution is available.² But it relieves the problem of a formidable difficulty which the so-called evolutionary theory of sin has superadded. According to

¹ The operations of grace are centred in the subconscious region of the mind, and therefore escape our analysis. The subject of grace is considered in ch. x. Pt. III, below.

² On the problem of evil at large, see ch. iv, above.

this theory, God becomes responsible for constituting not merely the possibility of sin arising through human choice, but an initial and practical impossibility of sin being avoided by man.¹ And it affords no real answer to this difficulty to minimize the *degree* of culpability which attends sin in the early stages of man's moral development.² If, under the conditions originally constituted by God, man sooner or later, and unavoidably, incurs even the slightest degree of guilt, God becomes responsible for making unavoidable what ought not to be. The case is altogether different with man's present inability to avoid sin, as explained by Christian doctrine; for that inability has been caused by previous human wilfulness and is not the necessary result of God's original arrangements for man. A world in which what ought not to be has been made inevitable by its

¹ F. R. Tennant, who defends the evolutionary theory, says that, if his view of sin "sees in it something empirically inevitable for every man, . . . it by no means implies that sin is theoretically, or on a *a priori* grounds, an absolute necessity" (*Origin of Sin*, p. 113). Surely if sin is empirically inevitable it is really unavoidable; and if, as the evolutionary theory maintains, this inevitableness was part of the original state in which the divine Author of man's being placed him, how is it possible to regard as adequate Dr. Tennant's statement (p. 122) "that responsibility for the *possibility* of moral evil . . . lies with God; that responsibility for the actuality of moral evil lies with man." Cf. ch. iv. § 8, above.

² F. R. Tennant, *op. cit.*, pp. 91 *et seq.* With the general contention that mankind had to pass through moral experience before his guilt for sin could attain a high degree, we fully agree. But it is non-relevant to the question of divine responsibility for making any degree of guilt "empirically inevitable."

Creator is not such a world as can be thought to be made by Him who is at once essentially righteous, all-foreseeing, and almighty.

III. *Its Loss by Sin*

§ 9. The primitive state of grace, with its advantages, was lost by wilful sin — sin which could have been avoided. The only inspired account of that sin is contained in the Eden narrative, which need not be regarded as literally historical. It certainly has not been so regarded by all catholic writers, and such a treatment of it is full of difficulty. But, whatever may be its human source, and symbolical though its biblical meaning is, the narrative constitutes, when viewed in the light of later revelation, a sufficient and true exhibition of the essence of man's first sin — the sin by which he fell from grace. Thus interpreted, its account of this sin is also in accord with what both Christian experience and psychological investigation teach concerning the nature of sin and of the temptations which occasion its commission.¹

¹ Sin has been defined from the ethical standpoint in ch. vii. § 12, above. The biblical conception of sin is treated in Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. v. "Fall" (by J. H. Bernard) and "Sin" (by E. R. Bernard); *Dic. of Christ*, s. v. "Sin" (by J. G. Simpson); J. Laidlaw, *Bible Doctr. of Man*, ch. x; A. B. Davidson, *Theol. of the O. Test.*, ch. vii; Sanday and Headlam, *Epis. to the Romans*, *passim*.

Sin at large and Adam's sin are considered in H. P. Liddon, *Some Elem. of Religion*, Lec. iv; Chas. Gore, in *Lux Mundi*, App. ii; H. V. S. Eck, *Sin*, Pt. II; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. II. xviii-xxi; II. II. clxiii-clxv; J. Perrone, *Praelec. de Deo Creatore*, Pars III. cap. iii;

Temptation is testing and consists of opportunity and inducement to exercise one's faculties for the gratification of natural impulses, in ways or under circumstances which make such gratification unlawful — contrary to the known will of God. Natural passions are not in themselves sinful, and only become so when given rein and gratified at the cost of revolt against moral control. Similarly, to incur temptation is not itself necessarily either sinful or productive of sin.¹ Sin begins when the will yields to an inducement to act lawlessly.² The inducement itself, and the natural impulse to which it appeals, constitute for the tempted party only the occasion and raw material of sin. Actual sin requires a yielding of the will to the temptation. The avenues of temptation, or the natural impulses to which its appeal is made, are found in all parts of human nature; for every natural impulse is capable of lawless gratification.

Wilhelm and Scannell, *Cath. Theol.*, §§ 155-161; J. Müller, *The Christ. Doctr. of Sin*; J. Tulloch, same title; J. Orr, *Sin as a Problem of To-day*, chh. ii-iv.

Evolutionary views are given by F. R. Tennant, *Origin and Propagation of Sin*; and by W. E. Orchard, *Modern Theories of Sin*. For non-Christian ideas, see J. A. Macculloch, *Compar. Theol.*, ch. vii. On original sin, see references given in the next chapter.

¹ Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, q. v.; *Dic. of Christ*, q. v.

² Sin is in itself witting and willing violation of the law and will of God, whatever may be the *degrees* of realization and wilfulness. The scriptural terms used for it also describe it as missing the mark, **אָזַן**, bending aside, **אָזַן**, and rebellion from the covenant, **אָזַן**. For Hebrew and Greek terms in Scripture, see E. R. Bernard, in Hastings's *Dic. of Bible*, s. v. "Sin," pp. 529, 532. Cf. H. P. Liddon, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-151.

But they are usually summarized under the three heads of carnal, mental, and spiritual, and when sinfully indulged they are called the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life.¹ To all this should be added that knowledge of the wrongfulness of an act is necessary to make its perpetrator formally guilty, although an ignorance which is due to previous sin on his part cannot remove his responsibility.

All these elements and forms of temptation and sin are exhibited in the sacred narrative before us, except such as are due to previous sin, which were, of course, absent from man's first sin. Adam and Eve had been forbidden to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge, and they were able to perceive that disobedience to this prohibition was wrong — not less really because they could neither realize the awfulness of sin nor foresee all its future consequences. They were therefore sufficiently informed to be held responsible for disobedience. The temptation to which they yielded appealed to their whole nature. They were "tempted in all points." Eve saw, or thought she saw, that the fruit was "good for food," challenging lust of the flesh; "a delight to the eyes," evoking lust of the eye; and "to be desired to make one wise," tempting to the pride of life. There was no sin involved in the mere impulse to enjoy good food, to delight her eyes, and to become wise. The sin

¹ Cf. 1 St. John ii. 16.

lay in yielding her divinely instructed judgment to one who impugned the word of God, and in disobeying the divine command. Both she and her husband were conscious of wrong-doing, for they at once became ashamed of what had caused no shame while they were free from sense of sin.¹

§ 10. This shame afforded proof both of their guilt and of their not having become immediately hardened in sin. In estimating the degree of their guilt we must not be misled by the fact that the vast and terrible drama of human iniquity, and all its lasting consequences, resulted from their sin. We may not assume that they willed to produce such results, nor may we regard them as formally guilty of all the lawlessness to which they opened the door. They were too utterly inexperienced to have incurred such guilt, and we seem to be warranted in believing that their sin was comparatively venial in its subjective aspects. They were deceived. They could indeed have avoided being deceived, and therefore could not plead this excuse as justifying their act. But to describe their disregard of God's word, the real cause

¹ The temptation of our Lord in the wilderness had the same three-fold nature, appealing to the native impulses of His manhood. It was not less real, and did not less truly involve moral exertion to resist, because, being who He was, a failure on Christ's part to make the exertion and overcome the temptation was a moral impossibility. The Self who was tempted was God, although the avenues of appeal, and the nature in which resistance was made, were truly human. Cf. H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*, note C. The subject will be considered in the next volume.

of their error, and their consequent sin, as exhibiting the most deliberately conceived and diabolical choice of wickedness, is to read more into the narrative than it really contains. It is also to forget the teaching of all moral experience, that wickedness as well as righteousness reaches its human climax only by progressive stages.

The consequences of sin are often disproportionate to its guilt and are determined by laws of their own. A boy who seeks to frighten his sister by pointing what he carelessly assumes to be an unloaded gun at her is not formally guilty of murder because a fatal result ensues. He is indeed guilty, but only of teasing his sister and of carelessness. Sin disturbs the balance of things, and the slightest form of such disturbance may release a series of natural and moral consequences which cannot be anticipated beforehand, and therefore cannot have been either intended or desired by the sinner. The degree of his guilt is determined by the gravity of his conscious purpose or culpable lack of purpose. Our first parents were truly guilty; for their purpose, both positively and negatively considered, was culpable. But they were not formally guilty of all the consequences, for these were neither anticipated nor desired by them. Their formal guilt was apparently such as inexperienced children incur when they freely and avoidably act contrary to the limited knowledge of duty which they have acquired — a real guilt, but a limited one.

§ 11. The consequences of their sin exceed in grav-

ity all human realizing;¹ but this disproportion between their act and its consequences is neither a reason for rejecting the Christian doctrine of sin nor a proof of the imperfection of divine arrangements. The most perfect arrangements may, by reason of their purpose, depend upon a very delicate balance of forces — a balance which cannot be disturbed in the slightest degree without grave complications and unutterable evils ensuing. The reasons which have been given in this volume for acknowledging the suitability of man's primitive state for the purpose which it was intended to fulfil, combined with the supreme value of that purpose, debar us from impugning either its reality or the righteous wisdom of God in constituting it.

So far as we can perceive, no arrangements, having

¹ The first sin has the gravest consequences because it is the first and becomes the root of subsequent evil. The first seepage through a levee weakens it once for all and, unless the damage can be repaired, will in time bring about the utter ruin of the levee and will release destructive floods upon the neighboring territory. So the first upsetting of moral balance constitutes a unique disaster — one which subsequent wickedness will no doubt aggravate, but which constitutes the causal antecedent of all such wickedness, and therefore of all the evils which ensue. Such considerations are calculated to meet Dr. Tennant's objection: "It is not easy to understand how one act of sin, however momentous, could serve to dislocate at once the whole nature of man and to destroy the balance of all his faculties" (*Origin of Sin*, pp. 28-30). It should be added, however, that the dislocating consequence of Adam's sin was *not* "at once" realized. What occurred at once was a loss of grace, and the reversion of man to that insufficiency and corruptibility which pertains to his nature apart from grace.

the development of a kingdom of saints for their purpose, could from the nature of things be put into effect which would not depend upon contingent and creaturely wills for preservation from disturbance and which, if disturbed, would not be attended by far-reaching moral disaster. It is neither an imperfection of the human frame, nor a reason for condemning its Maker, that a pin prick may have fatal effect upon it, and that a careless diet may throw its functions into general disorder. Moreover, we cannot reasonably assail the arrangements which have involved the human race in the consequences of Adam's sin, until we are able to prove that a providential system could be devised in which the consequences of sin, whether moral or physical, would be confined to its original perpetrator. The purpose for which man was created requires that he should be a social being and that a certain race-solidarity, both physical and moral, should play a vital part in his history and development. The question to be faced is this: Does the enormously increased moral cost of developing the Kingdom of God which sin involves make its unavoidable possibility and foreseen actuality in the development of that kingdom a reason for denying the righteousness of God? There can be but one answer from consistent Christians. Our reasons for acknowledging the righteousness of God are so overwhelming in convincing value that whatever has been done by God we must believe has been righteously and wisely done. If we are unable to trace the

righteousness of God through all the ramifications and consequences of His operations, this is because of the limitations of our knowledge and judgment. To infer otherwise is to impugn the very source and standard of reason and moral judgment.

§ 12. The immediate effect of Adam's sin upon himself was a loss of the grace and of the supernatural advantages and privileges which had been bestowed upon him. This meant a reversion to unassisted and unrestrained nature, enslavement to animal impulses, and subjection to physical mortality.¹ It also meant a guilty conscience and a penal rupture of friendship with God. There remained in him no power to escape the slavery to sin in which he had involved himself, and he had forfeited whatever claim to future blessedness had been granted to him by the terms of the covenant which he had violated. The severity of his punishment was due to the necessity of the case, not to the degree of his guilt. The advantages which he lost were not his by natural desert, but by free and conditional gift. Their retention depended upon entire obedience to God, so that the slightest disobedience necessarily

¹ Various adverse critics of the Eden narrative call attention to what they describe as the non-fulfilment of the warning prediction: "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die" (Gen. ii. 17). The criticism is more specious than valid. The prediction was potentially fulfilled by Adam's loss of immortality. He did at once enter into the state of corruptibility, the state described by the language of the burial office: "In the midst of life we are in death." Adam died in effect when he began to die — became corruptible.

involved their forfeiture; and the seriousness of the loss could not be pleaded as a reason for reversing the eternal law which makes unremedied sin fatal to the enjoyment of God.

In brief, Adam became liable to endless disaster; but by the loving kindness of God he was dealt with as a subject of mercy — as one who had been deceived by the devil rather than as one who had deliberately intended to defy his Maker and to forsake righteousness. But sin had complicated the situation, and it was neither right nor possible to restore the peculiar conditions of a world into which sin had not entered. A slower method of advance had to be provided. Henceforth man's hope must rest in remedial measures and in a disciplinary dispensation of repentance, suffering, and death, which was to be made saving, and therefore temporary, by the death and victory over death of God's own beloved Son.

Such were the consequences of Adam's sin to himself; but they could not be confined to him. He could not transmit to his posterity the supernatural advantages which he had lost, and his children have inherited from him only his natural capacities. As has been shown, these capacities do not, without supernatural aid, enable men so to control their carnal propensities as to avoid sin. Moreover, the children of Adam are not only in that state of moral helplessness which is involved in the insufficiency of human nature when left to itself, but they live in

a world which has been morally contaminated by previous human sin, a world in which it is plainly impossible to repeat the experiment of Eden with each new-born child. The social solidarity of the race forbids such a method. Human sin involves humanity at large in conditions which make further sin inevitable, and the resources of divine mercy constitute the only basis of salvation from sin and of attainment by man of his originally appointed destiny.

CHAPTER IX

MAN'S FALLEN STATE

I. *The Catholic Doctrine*

§ 1. Using terms partly dictated by modern scientific thought, we have described man's fall as a reversion from a state of supernatural grace to the natural condition to which his evolution from the lower species had brought him — a state in which, by the design of his Creator, he was not self-sufficient, but dependent for ability to advance in righteousness to his appointed destiny upon superadded gifts of grace. It was God's eternal purpose to endow him with these gifts, and it was human sin that nullified them when they had been given. Such terms as we have borrowed from modern sources depend for suitability, of course, upon the truth of the evolutionary hypothesis — that form of it which is generally accepted in the scientific world and which has been provisionally adopted in this volume.

But whatever may be the ultimate fate of this hypothesis, the definition which we have given contains the catholic doctrine, and it is the catholic doctrine alone to which the writer absolutely and unqualifiedly commits himself. The correct inter-

pretation of this doctrine is determined by the catholic meaning or meanings of the phrase "original sin," which, since the time of St. Augustine, has been generally employed in defining it. In its more comprehensive sense original sin means in catholic theology a state inherited from our first human parents in which we are deprived of the supernatural grace and original righteousness with which they were endowed before they sinned, and are naturally prone to sin. As thus defined original sin affords a fairly comprehensive description of catholic doctrine concerning man's fallen state.¹

It is to be observed that this doctrine contains two leading particulars: the loss of what was supernatural in man's primitive state and the natural incapacity to avoid sin to which man becomes subject when deprived of sanctifying grace. The phrase "original sin" has at times been employed with less comprehensive meaning than that above explained; being used formerly to signify man's tendency to sin, or con-

¹ On original sin, see *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 133-149; and *Lec. vi*; Treatises on *The Thirty-nine Articles*, art. ix, by A. P. Forbes, Harold Browne, E. C. S. Gibson, and E. T. Green; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. II. lxxxix-lxxxiii; J. A. Moehler, *Symbolism*, Bk. I. ch. ii; Wilhelm and Scannell, *Cath. Theol.*, §§ 162-165; J. Perrone, *Praelec. de Deo Creatore*, Pars III. capp. iv-v; Ad. Tanqueray, *de Deo Creatore*, cap. III. art. iii; F. X. Schoupe, *Elem. Theol. Dogm.*, Tr. VII. §§ 192-206, 250-255; J. B. Mozley, *Lecs. and Other Theol. Papers*, ix-x; T. B. Strong, *Manual of Theol.*, pp. 250 et seq.; P. J. Toner, *Dissertatio . . . de Lapsu et Peccato Originali*. Treatments of the biblical evidence and the history of the doctrine are mentioned in §§ 5, 6, below.

cupiscence,¹ and subsequently to describe his loss of sanctifying grace.² But this difference is one of terminology, for both the loss of grace and the inherited tendency to sin are acknowledged by all catholic writers.

The loss of sanctifying grace, and of the original righteousness³ which that grace constituted in Adam, carries with it the loss of all supernatural advantages of the primitive state: (a) the original covenant and its privileges; (b) the capacity to avoid sin and to please God; (c) the ability to escape physical death. These advantages, being supernatural, were personal. If, previous to sin, they could have been transmitted to Adam's offspring, they must have been handed on by supernatural means. But once lost, there remained nothing for Adam to transmit except his unassisted natural gifts and tendencies; and these, according to catholic doctrine, in obedience to the laws of natural propagation, he did transmit without substantial loss.

§ 2. But for reasons which are partly apparent man was created in such wise as to be naturally lack-

¹ The *material* aspect, which constituted the basis of St. Augustine's notion of original sin and serves as its definition in our *Articles of Religion*, ix.

² The *formal* aspect, enunciated by St. Anselm and set forth by the Council of Trent, Session V. On the history of the change, see P. J. Toner's two articles on "St. Anselm's Definition of Original Sin" and on "Matter and Form of Original Sin," in *Irish Theol. Quarterly*, Oct., 1908 and April, 1911, respectively.

³ Called *justitia* in Latin theology.

ing in self-sufficiency and to be dependent upon supernatural assistance for ability to maintain his integrity, to fulfil righteousness, and to become worthy of his heavenly destiny.¹ In his natural state — not designed to be left to itself — man is an unfinished product, and, when deprived of the grace which is required for his development, he becomes, by reason of the power which his animal propensities acquire over his moral and spiritual ones, a self-corrupting product — “far gone from original righteousness.” This is the natural state of every child of Adam — a state which is called concupiscence. It is also often described in terms of “sin” and “guilt.”

We need, however, to avoid taking these last terms literally in such a connection. They constitute an extension of the terminology of “original sin”; and the fact that original sin is always distinguished in catholic theology from actual sin shows that the terminology is to be taken symbolically and analogically. Catholic writers can be cited as saying that all men have sinned in Adam,² that we inherit Adam’s sin, and that we are all by natural inheritance guilty of Adam’s sin. These are extreme expressions, and, if employed, should be intended only as branches

¹ See ch. vii. § 2 (b); ch. viii. § 1 *fin.*

² The Vulgate, in Rom. v. 12, renders ἐφ’ ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, “for that all sinned,” by *in quo omnes peccaverunt*, “in whom [Adam] all have sinned.” St. Augustine (*contra Duas Epp. Pelag.*, iv. 7. c. 4; *c. Jul.*, vi. 75) thought he was repeating St. Paul’s language in maintaining that all have sinned in Adam. Cf. Sanday and Headlam, *Epis. to the Romans, in loc.*

of the symbolism found in St. Paul's Epistles and preserved in the theological phrase "original sin." It is certain that no catholic consent can be found for such contentions, literally taken, as that every new-born child has sinned, that he has received the personal guilt of Adam, and that prior to any moral experience of his own he is personally responsible — to be blamed — for Adam's sin.¹

They ought to be taken as vivid forms of assertion that our present natural condition is caused by sin — not by our sin, but by Adam's — and tends thereto.² It is sinful in causation and result and tends to reproduce personal sin and guilt in each generation of Adam's posterity. But sin is not actual except for one who personally commits it, and guilt is not personal for one who has not actually sinned. In this analogical sense, also, we ought to interpret the expressions which, if literally taken, imply that God is angry with each new-born child, because of his inherited condition. Properly used and understood, they can mean no more than that the natural state

¹ *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 194-197.

² Our ninth article thus accounts for what it describes as St. Paul's confession "that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin." The Council of Trent, Session V, says, "This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood it to be called sin because in the regenerate it is truly and properly sin, but because it is of sin, and inclines to sin." The two statements are not mutually contradictory, nor does the qualifying clause in the language of Trent, "in the regenerate," imply that it is truly and properly sin in unregenerate infants. Cf. *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Concupiscence."

of infants is one which, *if they were accountable for it*, would deserve divine wrath — a state, also, which has been caused by a sin which rightly evoked the displeasure of God. Catholic doctrine leaves us entirely free to regard unregenerate infants as the subjects of divine compassion and mercy, provided we acknowledge that in their natural condition they are incapable of fulfilling the pleasure of God and of enjoying Him.¹

The self-corrupting insufficiency of man's nature when deprived of primitive grace is described by what are called the wounds of the fall. These wounds constitute the ways in which our natural moral insufficiency and lack of "integrity" exhibits itself in the several faculties of the soul.² (a) The wound of "blindness" signifies our intellectual incapacity to discern and judge spiritual things, and the consequent tendency of our consciences to err and to become inactive. (b) The wounds of "concupiscence" and (c) "malice" describe the dominance of carnal passions, shown respectively in their appetitive and revulsive ways. (d) The wound of "weakness" is our lack of will-power to control the natural affections and desires and faithfully to fulfil righteousness.

¹ St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. II. lxxxvii. 8. *Per contra*, F. X. Schouppe, *op. cit.*, Tr. VII. §§ 250-255. The citation by St. Thomas from Ezek. xviii. 20, "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father," expresses the conclusion to be drawn from revelation in its completed form and the judgment of Christian consciences.

² St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. II. lxxxv. 3; A. P. Forbes, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-150.

To these spiritual wounds should be added physical disease and death, to which man is naturally liable. In short, the corruptibility of man is both moral and physical; and this is the sense in which it can be said that original sin "is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam"¹ — not actualized guilt and corruption, but a state which naturally engenders them, or potential fault and corruption.

§ 3. Man's moral and physical corruptibility in significant ways disturbs his external relations.

(a) His filial relation to God is necessarily changed and made to depend for continuance in any form upon God's merciful establishment of a covenant of salvation from sin. Without such salvation he can neither become pleasing to God nor enjoy Him. In brief, fallen man inevitably sins, and thus incurs the wrath of God, as soon as he reaches the age of moral discretion, and can only be dealt with, even by a loving and merciful God, as morally unfit for communion with Him. If God shows favour to sinners, this can only be on the basis of their acceptance of a covenant sealed in blood, and of their prospective escape from sin by means of its gracious provisions.² It is involved in all this that man's religion is no

¹ *Arts of Religion*, ix.

² We are justified, accounted righteous, because of the meritorious death of Christ and our acceptance of Him through faith; and even so, our faith is accepted for righteousness only because it initiates a state in which we can become righteous by the saving grace of Christ.

longer acceptable to God unless its forms, including its central act of sacrifice, contain a propitiatory element,¹ made effectual by Christ's death, by divine appointment, and by the sinner's faith and repentance.

(b) Sin breeds sin not only by its fortifying effect upon sinful propensities, but also by enslaving the sinner to the chief instigator of sin, who is Satan. It is only through our yielding to his enticements that the devil gains control over our wills, but our inability wholly to avoid sinning has placed us all in varying degrees under his influence and moral dominion. Nor can we escape this servitude by any natural resources of our own. The victory over Satan, and our redemption from his service, so far as we can see, could only have been achieved by the intervention of God-incarnate, possessed both of divine power and of a human nature capable, by its kinship with ours, of becoming the medium of our participation in His grace.²

(c) The sin which our natural condition breeds is essentially selfish, and selfishness necessarily reduces brotherly love and upsets our relations to our fellow-men. So long as this selfishness remains uncured, the evils which disturb peace between nations and classes, and which cause poverty, the grinding of the poor, and the manifold forms of social injustice and unrest, cannot be adequately or permanently remedied. The wisest arrangements will fail to work and

¹ Cf. ch. vii. § 2 (f), above.

² On the power of Satan over men, see ch. v. § 9, above.

will require amendment so soon as selfish craftiness can devise methods of changing their intended results. The problem of social philanthropy, in ultimate analysis, is the problem of curing selfishness, which means present reduction and ultimate removal of man's proneness to sin. This cannot be achieved by social science itself or by social schemes alone, needful though these be;¹ but only by bringing mankind into the Christian covenant and by the slow operation of saving truth and grace in human hearts.

If human nature were totally depraved, that is, incapable of any good, and if even the best actions of unregenerate men were nothing but "splendid vices," there would exist in man no capacity to respond to divine grace. That which is wholly and essentially evil cannot be saved. The only remedy possible for such depravity is substitution — displacement of fallen man by another race. But catholic doctrine does not teach such depravity. Fallen man retains a natural capacity for natural good, and the Christian appeal is to that capacity. Were such capacity non-existent, pagan civilizations could never have arisen; because civilization, even in its most materialistic forms, is the fruit of dispositions and co-operative actions which, imperfect though they be, are in line with, and entitled to be called,

¹ Their value lies in restraining the manifestations of social selfishness and in alleviating their results. But they require repeated adjustment to new conditions. No sociological arrangements can produce, much less perpetuate, a Utopia.

virtues. But catholic doctrine teaches that these virtues cannot, even within their natural range, be fully developed and consistently practised by the unassisted natural man; also that, even in their natural perfection, they require to be supplemented by supernatural graces if man is to attain his appointed destiny. The consequence is that, with all their progress — and the progress of non-Christianized races is not to be denied — sin remains as an insuperable obstacle to the development of an ideal society. Only saving grace can make that possible, and even saving grace cannot perfectly achieve the result until all the members of society have become unselfish.

§ 4. Man was created to have a certain dominion over other visible creatures, and was endowed with natural capacity for acquiring such dominion. His progressive mastery of the secret laws of nature, and his invention of means to manipulate them for the fulfilment of his own ends, afford confirmatory evidences of this. But the rapidity, and even the degree, of his advance to his appointed lordship is conditioned by a mastery over his own faculties which is based upon virtuous habits. These virtues require for their perfection, as we have seen, the aid of grace; and the loss of grace by sin has both retarded human progress and limited the extent of mastery over nature which is possible for him in his fallen condition. A causal connection is apparent between Christian civilization and the increasingly rapid advance of man's dominion over nature in modern days.

This confirms the supposition here adopted that, after man's fall from grace, his material progress was hindered and could not advance beyond a certain point until the saving grace of Christ had had time to enlighten men's minds, and to fortify their self-control, on a large social scale.

There appears to be a mysterious connection of some kind between the progress of material civilization and the attainment by mankind of participation in spiritual dominion over the world to come.¹ We may at least be certain that the virtues and graces which are required for the higher forms of mastery over this world's resources are the graces and virtues which will enable perfected saints in the world to come to subject their changed bodies to their spirits and their environment to their wills. The broad fact is that man's fall from grace has rendered him incapable of attaining his heavenly destiny, and apart from the redemption achieved by Christ, and its application to us in the form of sanctifying grace, that destiny must forever be beyond man's reach.

II. *History of the Doctrine*

§ 5. We have been defining the contents and principal bearings of the catholic doctrine of sin. It remains to trace the revelation of this doctrine, as recorded in Scripture,² and to summarize its subse-

¹ This thought is, of course, highly speculative.

² The scriptural data are considered in Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. *vv.* "Fall" (by J. H. Bernard) and "Sin" (by E. R. Bernard);

quent history. By doing this we shall be able, not only to confirm its truth, but also more successfully to distinguish its proper contents from speculative accretions.

It is unnecessary to determine the precise dates at which the several Old Testament documents acquired their canonical forms and connections, in order to gain from them sufficient and substantially correct information concerning the manner in which the doctrine of sin was revealed, and concerning the more important stages of its gradual assimilation by the recipients of revelation.¹

(a) The early dealings of God with His chosen people, including the Mosaic legislation,² tended increasingly to accentuate the fact of human sinfulness and the condemnatory attitude of God towards it. The Israelites also learned through the sacri-

Dic. of Christ., s. v. "Sin" (by J. G. Simpson); J. Laidlaw, *Bible Doctr. of Man*, chh. x-xii; A. B. Davidson, *Theol. of the Old Test.*, vii; H. W. Robinson, *Christ. Doctr. of Man*, pp. 42-60; F. R. Tennant, *Sources*, chh. i-xi; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Original Sin," III; Harold Browne, *Thirty-nine Arts.*, ix. § 2; and in systematic theologies generally. Robinson and Tennant need to be read with discrimination, but give important data. For the New Testament, Sanday and Headlam, *Epis. to the Romans*, is of special value. Cf. Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. v. "Paul," ii.

¹ We assume that the historical indications in the Old Testament are at least sufficiently reliable, broadly considered, to warrant the degree of dependence upon them which is involved in our argument.

² Its date does not depend upon the dates of the documents in which it is preserved. And if these documents are as late as critics maintain, they none the less embody sufficient traditions of the Mosaic age to justify our argument.

fices which they were required to offer that sin demanded expiation by blood;¹ and at a later date they were taught by the prophets that these sacrifices were inadequate.² They were instituted to bear symbolical witness to the necessity and method of a propitiatory remedy for sin which no slaughter of animal victims could afford.³

(b) The old dispensation tended to deepen the sense of sin among the chosen people, and its universal prevalence came more and more into observation.⁴ Accordingly the Eden narrative must have assumed increasing significance and value. It undoubtedly taught pious Jews that human sin began with primitive man; that it was due to human wilfulness; that God was not responsible for its genesis; and that the ills of life, including physical death, are due to Adam's sin.⁵ But the proto-canonical books of the Old Testament neither define nor assert the causal connection between Adam's sin and the sinfulness of his posterity.

(c) The Mosaic dispensation and the teachings of the prophets continued to deepen the Jews' sense

¹ Levit. xvii. 11. Cf. Heb. ix. 22.

² Psa. xl. 6; l. 8-14; li. 16-17; Prov. xxi. 3, 27; Isa. i. 11-14; Hos. vi. 6; viii. 13; Amos v. 21-24; Mic. vi. 6-8. Cf. St. Mark xii. 33; Heb. viii. 7-13; ix. 9-14; x. 4-12.

³ Heb. ix. 7-12; x. 1. Cf. Gal. iii. 23-26.

⁴ The chief Old Testament texts on the universality of sin are Gen. vi. 5; viii. 21; 1 Kings viii. 46; 2 Chron. vi. 36; Job. iv. 17; Psa. cxxx. 3; cxliii. 2; Prov. xx. 9; Eccles. vii. 20.

⁵ Apart from the Eden narrative, the first express assertion of this occurs in the Apocrypha: Eccles. xxv. 24. Cf. xiv. 17; xl. 11; xli. 3.

of sin, which was especially developed by the Babylonian captivity. The following particulars of the Christian doctrine became accepted articles of Jewish belief: (1) the universal prevalence of sin; (2) man's natural incapacity wholly to avoid it;¹ (3) an undefined connection of this incapacity with birth and inborn propensities;² (4) acknowledgment both of human solidarity in sin and its consequences,³ and of exclusive moral responsibility of each individual for his own sinful actions,⁴ without any explanation of this antithesis.

(d) In the age immediately preceding the Incarnation, the Eden narrative appears to have been more directly considered in explaining the cause of human sinfulness. Jesus the son of Sirach says, "Of the woman came the beginning, ἀρχή, of sin, and through her, δι' αὐτήν, we all die."⁵ If it stood by itself, the first clause would not necessarily mean that Eve's sin was a *causal* beginning of human sin. But the two clauses are closely connected. They constitute one proposition, the meaning of which is that Eve's sin initiated and *caused* human sinfulness and death.

¹ F. R. Tennant, *Sources*, pp. 102-103, 111-117, seems to think that a reference of sinful inclinations to the weakness of human nature is opposed to the doctrine that Adam's sin is their causal antecedent.

² Job xv. 14, 15; Psa. li. 5.

³ Gen. xx. 9; xxvi. 10; Exod. xx. 5; xxxiv. 7; Deut. v. 9; 2 Sam. iii. 29; xxi. 5 *et seq.*; 1 Kings ii. 33; 2 Kings v. 27; Isa. vii. 17; xiv. 21; Jerem. xxxii. 18; Lam. v. 7.

⁴ Jerem. xxxi. 29-30; Ezek. xviii. 2-4, 14-20.

⁵ Ecclus. xxv. 24.

It is true that the same writer elsewhere accounts for universal sinfulness by the weakness of human nature as such.¹ But no contradiction is involved. If, as the catholic doctrine teaches, man's original capacity to avoid sin was the result of supernatural endowments, and Eve's sin caused their loss, the sinfulness of mankind can be traced with equal truth either to Eve's sin or to the natural weakness of man. Both are causal factors.²

In the *Wisdom of Solomon* the sinfulness of the Canaanites is described as "bred in them" — "a cursed seed from the beginning";³ but this falls short in its scope of the doctrine of original sin. The *Second Book of Esdras* clearly makes Adam's sin the cause of sinfulness in his posterity;⁴ but critical scholars assign this book to the first Christian century. The sum of the matter is that by the time of Christ a view of human sin had developed in Jewish schools which approaches, without being really equivalent to, the teaching of St. Paul.⁵

(e) His teaching presupposed, and required for its understanding, the revelation of regeneration and

¹ Ecclus. xv. 14 *et seq.*; xvii. 1 *et seq.*

² It is the refusal to reckon with the possibility of supernatural factors which at once explains the plausibility and vitiates the argument for the so-called evolutionary view of the origin of sin.

³ Wisd. of Sol. xii. 10-11.

⁴ Esp. ch. vii. 48. Cf. iv. 30.

⁵ On Jewish views of human sinfulness during this period, see Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. *vv.* "Fall," ii (by J. H. Bernard) and "Sin," II (by E. R. Bernard); F. R. Tennant, *Sources of the Doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin*, chh. v-x.

redemption. Christ declared that He came to save that which was lost — which had fallen away.¹ He also taught that no man could enter the Kingdom of God except by being born anew of water and of the Spirit.² This plainly connected man's sinfulness and spiritual incapacity with a cause antedating natural birth; and the Eden narrative, the authority of which Christ accepted in another connection,³ became for Christian believers the inspired description of this cause. Christ was accepted, in the light both of His teaching and of His victory over sin and death, as one who came to recover fallen men through their regenerative incorporation into His life-giving and sanctifying Manhood. Out of this revelation emerges the doctrine of the second Adam; and what Christ was seen to have restored became for the Christian Church a revelation of what the first Adam had once enjoyed and lost.⁴

(f) St. Paul, in the light of redemption, set forth the doctrine of original sin in its final biblical terms.⁵ These terms are partly, at least, symbolical,⁶ and he

¹ St. Matt. xviii. 11.

² St. John iii. 5-6. Cf. i. 12-13.

³ In connection with the institution of marriage: St. Matt. xix. 4-6. Cf. St. Mark x. 6-9.

⁴ Cf. ch. viii. § 5, above.

⁵ Chiefly in Rom. v. 12 *et seq.* Cf. 1 Cor. xv. 20-22, 45, 47; Ephes. ii. 3. Sanday and Headlam, *Epis. to the Romans*, pp. 130-147, should be consulted.

⁶ On this point it is said in Sanday and Headlam, *op. cit.*, p. 147, "He uses the only kind of language available to his own intelligence and that of his contemporaries. But if the language which he does

uses the word "sin" sometimes for personal acts of sin and sometimes for that in us which makes us prone to commit them. His two uses of the word are crystallized in catholic theology in the terms "actual sin" and "original sin." Interpreting St. Paul broadly and in these terms, we find him teaching¹ that through Adam's actual sin, original sin, slavery to sin, entered into the world, driving all men into actual sin and death. Original sin was in the world even before the law gave occasion to actual sin, although it was not imputed — guilt was not personally incurred — apart from actual sin against the law. „But freedom from actual sin does not remove death — previously described as a consequence of original sin — which reigns uninterruptedly over all. He proceeds to teach that through Adam's trespass judgment came unto all men to condemnation.² As he expressly declares that sin is not imputed to men prior to the law and to their disobedience thereof,³ he cannot mean that the state inherited from Adam — original sin — is condemned as constituting personal guilt.

use is from that point of view abundantly justified, then the application which St. Paul makes of it is equally justified. He too expresses truth through symbols, and in the days when men can dispense with symbols his teaching may be obsolete, but not before." It may well be added in view of what F. R. Tennant says, *Origin of Sin*, pp. 146-149, that if he shows traces of his rabbinical training in his treatment of the problem of sin, his Christian point of view and his inspiration give to his language a significant value which is independent of our estimate of rabbinical ideas. Cf. A. J. Mason, in *Journal of Theol. Studies*, July, 1904, pp. 485-487.

¹ In Rom. v. 12-14.

² In verse 18.

³ In verse 13.

He can only mean that it is condemned as representing incapacity to avoid actual sin when the law offers occasion for its commission. The same use of the word "sin" for man's innate tendency to sin — "original sin" — is found in his eloquent description of the internal conflict between sin and the will to do good from which Christ came to deliver us.¹

The teaching of St. Paul practically completes the data available for a systematic statement of the biblical doctrine of sin; but neither he nor any other biblical writer undertook such a statement. The task was left for future theologians.

§ 6. The order in which the several doctrines which had been received from the Apostles were given technical and definitive form in the ancient Church was determined by the course of heresy. So long as a traditional doctrine was not publicly misinterpreted or assailed within the Church, the ancients did not feel the need of protecting it by technical definition. Lacking such definitions, but whole-heartedly loyal to apostolic traditions, they wrote with the uncritical freedom which was to be expected before experience had taught them the need of caution in their choice of phrases, and had trained them in the difficult art of giving proportionate emphasis to opposite aspects of truth.²

¹ In ch. vii. 7-25.

² On the history of the doctrine of sin, see J. B. Mozley, *Augustinian Doctr. of Predestination*, ch. iv.; Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctr.*, §§ 63, 108-111, 177-178, 246-248, 298; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Early Hist. of Christ. Doctr.*, ch. xvii; R. Seeberg, *Hist. of Doctrine*, *passim*;

Previous to the Pelagian controversy of the fifth century, writers of established reputation for orthodoxy employed language concerning the doctrine of sin which, when tested by later and technical standards, appears one-sided and unsound. But during the period mentioned there occurred no formal departure from apostolic doctrine. It was generally acknowledged, on the one hand, that Adam's sin had affected his descendants; depriving them of grace and of immortality; and, on the other hand, that human nature remains capable of good, each individual being possessed of freedom and being responsible for his own acts of sin only.¹ The Easterns especially took an optimistic view of human nature, although they connected its capacity for good with hidden operations of the spermatic Logos, whom they believed to extend His enlightening influence even among the heathen.² In speaking of what had been inherited from Adam they emphasized the loss of

W. Bright, *Age of the Fathers*, chh. xxxiii-xxxiv (affords a just view of Augustinianism); *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Original Sin," III-IV; H. Browne, *Thirty-Nine Arts.*, ix. § 1; F. R. Tennant, *Sources*, chh. xii-xiii; *Origin and Propag. of Sin*, Lects. ii-iii; W. E. Orchard, *Modern Theories of Sin*, II.

¹ Cf. J. B. Mozley, *op. cit.*, pp. 398-400 and note XV. For an illustration of Eastern emphasis on human freedom, see St. Cyril Jerus., *Catech.*, ii. 1; iv. 18.

² Cf. J. H. Newman, *Arians*, ch. i. § iii. 5; R. L. Ottley, *Incarnation*, Vol. I. pp. 202-203; J. B. Mozley, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-117. In view of this aspect of their thought, we may not attribute to the Alexandrian fathers the notion that man can avoid sin without divine assistance.

grace rather than the effect of that loss on human nature, and refused to attribute Adam's personal guilt to his offspring. Yet they explained the physical ills of life and physical mortality by Adam's sin. St. Athanasius gave an important statement as to the corruptibility into which mankind has fallen through the loss of grace which Adam's sin brought about.¹

The Westerns were more inclined to emphasize the degradation and incapacity for good of fallen mankind. Tertullian may be regarded as to some extent the originator of the Augustinian position.² He first spoke of an original fault, *vitium originis*, which he seems to have regarded as a kind of second and evil nature received from Adam. But he did not attribute guilt to unregenerate infants, and for that reason felt free to approve of the postponement of Baptism to later years. In his *Confessions* St. Augustine adopted the view, which he afterwards developed, that it is wholly God's gift that we fulfil His commandments.³

Careful study of Christian literature previous to the time of St. Augustine abundantly confirms the asser-

¹ *De Incarn.*, 4-5. Origen's view that the general tendency to sin is due to causes in a previous state of existence of souls, *de Princip.* I. vii. 4, etc., gained no lodgment in catholic thought at large.

² Of significant passages, note *de Anima*, 40-41; *de Testim. Animae*, 3. Cf. F. R. Tennant, *Sources*, pp. 328-336.

³ In Bk. x. 40, he said, "Give what Thou commandest, and then command what Thou wilt" — a sentence which roused the opposition of Pelagius.

tion that during that period the consensus of catholic writers concerning the primitive state and fall of man is limited to the particulars which have been set forth in this volume as constituting the catholic doctrine. The views which are especially associated with the name of St. Augustine, and which reach their sharpest articulation in modern Calvinism, whatever may be said for or against them as speculative opinions, are not primitive and never have received the approval of the whole Church.¹

§ 7. For an adequate treatment of Augustinianism we must refer our readers elsewhere.² We can only summarize its distinctive particulars. Its development by St. Augustine was caused by the heretical length to which Pelagius and his followers went in repudiating his already exaggerated language concerning men's dependence upon divine grace for capacity to will and fulfil righteousness. The Pelagian position involved the following contentions: (a) Adam's sin has no injurious effect upon his off-

¹ Such being an undeniable fact, it is idle to reject the catholic doctrine because of arguments which can be urged against the Augustinian additions to it. Augustinian theology, however, retains the catholic doctrine even while overlaying it with speculative additions.

² On St. Augustine's position at large, see references on p. 31, note 1, above. His predestinarian views are set forth in ch. i. § 9, above. On his view of sin, see W. Bright, *Anti-Pelagian Treatises of St. Augustine*, Introd.; J. B. Mozley, *op. cit.*, esp. chh. v-viii; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-312; Jas. Orr, *Progress of Doctrine*, Lec. v, esp. pp. 138-152; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Augustine," IV; H. B. Workman, *Christ. Thought to the Reformation*, pp. 121-127.

spring; (b) Infants are born in Adam's original state; (c) Men are naturally capable of fulfilling the will of God. Although Pelagius at first succeeded by shifty evasions in deceiving Eastern prelates as to the nature of his position, it soon became evident that his view was opposed not less truly to Eastern orthodoxy than to Western.

But the task of vindicating the catholic doctrines of sin and grace fell chiefly to St. Augustine; and the speculative additions to catholic doctrine which he made — additions which had sad effects upon much later Western theology — ought not to make us forget the critical value of his part in demonstrating the dangerous and heretical nature of Pelagianism. His own error lay in one-sided exaggeration of certain aspects of catholic doctrine, but his devoted attachment to the Church and her sacramental system prevented him from running into positive heresy.¹

He accepted the traditional doctrine of both East and West that Adam's original state was one of grace, freedom, and capacity to avoid sin, and ability by obedience and grace to escape physical death. His view of the consequences of Adam's sin includes the following particulars: (a) This sin has brought on his

¹ Protestant writers rightly detect an inconsistency between St. Augustine's sacramental doctrine and the doctrine of irresistible grace which he elaborated in the Pelagian and semi-Pelagian controversy. Cf. J. Orr, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-144. B. B. Warfield, in Hastings, *Encyc. of Religion*, s. v. "Augustine," says that "the Reformation . . . was just the ultimate triumph of Augustine's doctrine of grace over Augustine's doctrine of the Church."

posterity a loss of grace — not distinctively Augustinian, but catholic doctrine; (b) The traditional doctrine that man is reduced to his natural corruptibility by the loss of grace was developed into the view that “human nature was altered for the worse”;¹ (c) Fallen man is by nature inclined to sin to that degree that no capacity to choose the good remains, and moral freedom is lost; (d) Not only is the tendency to sin transmitted, but sin itself and its guilt as well, for all have sinned in Adam;² (e) Man’s recovery is entirely the work of grace, which determines his will from within to righteousness, and does so irresistibly;³ (f) The determination of who shall thus be saved is wholly the result of a divine and eternal predestination, whereby some are chosen for righteousness and glory and the rest are “left”;⁴ (g) Unbaptized infants are lost.⁵

¹ *De Civ. Dei*, xiv. 1. Cf. xiii. 3.

² Cf. p. 283, note 2, above, on his misinterpretation of St. Paul’s “For that all sinned.”

³ He maintained in terms that the will co-operates freely with grace. But he means by this that it is conscious of no external constraint in doing so. The determining effect of grace is from within. He denied that the will of the elect could in the end resist grace. Cf. J. B. Mozley, *op. cit.*, ch. viii for a full discussion of this, with abundant citations.

⁴ *De Dono Perseverantiae*, xiv; *De Correptione et Gratia*, vii — both quoted by J. B. Mozley, *op. cit.*, pp. 134–137 (cf. the whole ch. v.).

The negative view of evil, as having a deficient — not efficient — cause, affords the explanation of St. Augustine’s refusal to speak of predestination to damnation.

⁵ *De Peccatorum Meritis . . . sive de Baptismo Parvulorum*, pas-

The Pelagian and semi-Pelagian controversies reached their formal termination in 529 A.D., when the Council of Orange adopted definitions which, silently avoiding the more extreme positions of St. Augustine, gained general acceptance.¹ But that writer's genius and influence gave a provincial twist to Western theology on the subjects of sin and grace from which it has never wholly escaped, and modern Calvinism is a logical development of Augustinianism, with his sacramental teaching left out.

Moreover, St. Augustine adopted a terminology which has held its own even among those who avoid the more individualistic elements of his position, and it has become too strongly entrenched in theological literature to be abandoned by any writer who wishes to escape the dangers which attend theological insularity. St. Augustine's reverence for the written Word led him to borrow his terminology as far as practicable from Scripture — from St. Paul's Epistles. His mistake lay in giving the terms which he thus appropriated a literal force and a technical value which they do not have in Scripture. By so doing he not only deviated from St. Paul, but, because of the general adoption of his method of employing Pauline terms, he made the interpretation of that

sim. In ch. 21 [xvi] he says that "such infants as quit the body without being baptized will be involved in the mildest condemnation of all."

¹ The proceedings, with the Latin text and an English outline of its twenty-five canons, are given by C. J. Hefele, *Hist. of the Councils* (transl.), Vol. IV. pp. 152-167.

writer's epistles unnecessarily difficult. However, the fact that the terms to which we refer are biblical in source makes it possible to rectify their objectionable and peculiarly Augustinian meanings in theology by reverting to the biblical use of them. Accurate exegesis establishes the fact that this use was to some degree symbolical,¹ and one which affords no warrant for the theory of transmitted personal guilt and the peculiarly Augustinian views connected therewith.

§ 8. These views have, however, never ceased to have supporters, and in modern days have gained formal recognition and a new lease of life in protestant and Calvinistic confessions. Without being wholly repudiated, they gain no undeniable affirmation in the Anglican *Articles of Religion*, and are unsupported by the Tridentine decrees. Yet many catholic writers, both Roman and Anglican, have been influenced by them, and it is not at all surprising that the Augustinian form of the doctrine of sin is widely taken to represent accurately the orthodox faith of both catholic and protestant Christendom. This has meant a popular identification of Christian doctrine with the Calvinistic view of sin; and modern thought on the subject has been determined to an important degree by a growing belief that this view is inconsistent with enlightened conceptions of God,

¹ Cf. Sanday and Headlam, *Epis. to the Romans*, p. 147, quoted on p. 295, note 6, above. On the infelicity of the phrase "original sin" — *i.e.* for technical use — see W. Bright, *Age of the Fathers*, Vol. II. pp. 170-171.

with justice, and with modern scientific knowledge.

In justice to many of those who cherish the memory of John Calvin, it should be borne in mind that not all the views that are called Calvinistic are to-day accepted as such by Calvinists in general. Like all influential systems, Calvinism has been caricatured and has been both supported and attacked in forms that Calvinists in general would disown. Moreover, the system has, so to speak, sloughed off some of its sixteenth-century elements, and its confessional articles are now given a less rigid interpretation by its supporters.

But the doctrine of sin which with some excuse is widely regarded as properly Calvinistic, and which accounts for the discredit which the whole doctrine of the primitive state and fall of man has incurred in our time, may be summarized as follows: (*a*) In his primitive state man was by nature disposed to righteousness, physically immortal, and possessed of a highly developed intelligence. (*b*) Adam's sin was an act of the most outrageous iniquity, and it not only incurred the wrath of God, but also altered his nature for the worse, making it wholly inclined to evil and for the first time naturally subject to physical death. (*c*) Both the personal guilt of Adam and the resulting change of nature were transmitted to Adam's offspring, so that all men are by natural heredity totally depraved, personally guilty from birth, subjects of divine wrath, and justly liable to ever-

lasting punishment. (d) For the exhibition of His mercy God has unconditionally predestined particular men, without reference to foreseen response to grace on their part, to be subjects of election, of irresistible grace through Christ, of final perseverance, and of glorification. The rest He has unconditionally predestined to damnation for the exhibition of His justice. Those who are of the elect cannot escape salvation and the rest cannot secure it. (e) Christ died only for the elect, who alone receive the promised benefits of the Sacraments. (f) Even infants who die unregenerate are damned.¹

Modern scholars are of course able to perceive that not all these particulars are essential elements in the universal and primitive faith of Christendom; but owing partly to the fact that the terminology of the doctrine of sin has acquired a Calvinistic connotation in modern thought, and partly to their failure to distinguish carefully and reckon with the doctrine which can rightly claim catholic consent, their attitude on the whole subject is apt to be determined, often more than they realize, by the contradiction which they detect between the view of sin above described and the conclusions of evolutionary science. Even among those who write from a theolog-

¹ Cf. pp. 32-33, above, on the predestinarian aspects of Calvinism, where references are given. The doctrine of original sin appears in *Westminster Confess.*, ch. vi, and *Canons of Dort*, c. 3. The Lutheran doctrine (equally emphatic as to the depravity of fallen man) appears in *Augsburg Confess.*, Arts. 2, 18; *Apol. to the Augsburg Confess.*, art. 1.

ical standpoint certain scholars have thus been led to follow what can only be considered to be a false scent. They have felt constrained to abandon the whole doctrine of a primitive state of righteousness and subsequent fall in favour of the so-called evolutionary theory of sin, a theory which has been elsewhere defined.¹

It seems clear that a dehumanizing subversion of man's nature by sin will inevitably be regarded by scientists as an incredible cataclysm, for their investigations lead them to believe that man's present natural condition can be explained by progressive evolution, an evolution which leaves no place for a subversion of human nature. The catholic doctrine does not assert a subversion of nature, and the primitive state of grace which it teaches does not constitute a disturbance of natural evolution, but has relation to a supernatural utilization and control of natural functions with which natural science is not concerned. A loss of grace which leaves human nature in the condition to which scientists believe natural evolution has brought it, cannot rightly be regarded as an interruption of evolution.

¹ In ch. viii. § 3. This view accounts for the origin of man's sinfulness wholly by the survival in human nature of animal impulses, which, originally innocent in their gratification, ought in man to be subjected to moral control. Owing, however, to the undeveloped state of man's moral powers, he is practically unable to avoid yielding in some measure to his animal impulses. The result is a conflict between "nature and nurture" which can only be gradually remedied by man's spiritual development. Cf. F. R. Tennant, *Origin and Propag. of Sin*, Lec. iii.

Once more, the protestant form of the doctrine of original sin seems to depend for truth upon the transmission of acquired characters,¹ and the possibility of such transmission, although not conclusively disproved, is denied by many scientists of the first rank.² If Adam's sin altered his nature this alteration was an acquired character and could not be naturally transmitted. It has been urged in reply to this objection that the change in man's nature which Adam's sin caused is in line with disease rather than with acquired characters, and that diseases are often inherited.³ By Adam's sin his nature, it is said, was corrupted to its very roots, and therefore the disorder was transmitted to offspring.⁴ The answer is plausible, but is not apt to convince a biological scientist, for he is unable to believe that sin — viewed as an inevitable attendant upon a purely natural evolution — can produce such a radical effect upon human nature. The catholic doctrine escapes the whole difficulty, for the corruptibility of human nature

¹ An acquired character is a modification of attributes proper to a species, which arises in an individual through causes operating within its own lifetime.

² August Weismann (*Essays upon Heredity and Evolution Theory*) first developed the arguments against its transmission. Cf. R. H. Lock, *Recent Progress in the Study of Variation*, etc., pp. 59-72; Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, s. v. "Acquired Characters"; H. Calderwood, *Evolution*, pp. 40-42. The writer has discussed the subject, and its bearing on the doctrine of original sin, in *Evolution and the Fall*, pp. 65-68, 204-213.

³ Cf. *Evolution and the Fall*, p. 206, and the references there given.

⁴ So urges J. Orr (*God's Image*, pp. 237-248) in this connection.

which it asserts to have been caused by Adam's sin is not described as a change of nature or as an acquired character, but as an original and natural corruptibility, the results of which, if man had not sinned, could have been prevented, by the assistance of supernatural grace, from being realized.

The catholic doctrine asserts a coming in of supernatural factors in man's primitive state, and naturalistic philosophers regard this as impossible. But, as is elsewhere shown, natural science, *qua* science, does not prove its impossibility and affords no information which is inconsistent with its actuality.¹

III. *Difficulties and Values*

§ 9. We have already reckoned in passing with some of the chief arguments that have been made against the Christian doctrine of sin. It seems desirable, however, to give a brief general survey of objections and of replies which can be made to them, and then to set forth the practical value of the doctrine. First, however, it is worth while to clear the field of false issues by reminding ourselves that certain propositions, popularly associated with the doctrine of sin, are speculative accretions, which do not have to be maintained or defended by those who accept the original catholic doctrine.

(a) This doctrine does not assert that Adam's sin caused any substantial alteration of human nature,

¹ Cf. ch. viii. §§ 3-4, where further references are given.

and therefore does not imply a transmission of acquired characters. The corruptibility, physical and moral, which it asserts to have been caused by sin may be regarded as the original and natural corruptibility of human nature, which in man's primitive state was in the way of being supernaturally transcended, but which necessarily resumed its course with the loss of grace. No cataclysm in man's natural history has to be maintained, but only the loss of superadded gifts from above.

(b) The theory that new-born infants inherit the personal guilt of Adam, and for that reason are subjects of divine anger, in the ordinary meaning of such terms, and justly doomed to penal misery forever unless saved by baptismal regeneration, can be dismissed as an accretion which requires no defence on our part.

(c) The same can rightly be said of what is ordinarily understood by the phrase "total depravity." So far from maintaining, we repudiate the supposition that the natural and fallen man is wholly evil, bereft of all moral freedom, and utterly incapable of good. We gladly acknowledge the natural virtues which are exhibited by many of the unregenerate. What has been lost by the fall, according to catholic doctrine, is the ability wholly to avoid sin and to acquire those distinctive and heavenly virtues by which alone men are sufficiently equipped for their supernatural destiny and are enabled fully to please God.

(d) We need not be concerned to defend the doctrine of irresistible grace, which we have elsewhere maintained to be fatal to any real distinction between the will of God and the creature's will. It destroys the reality of human virtue, considered as properly pertaining to human agents. The absence of external compulsion cannot constitute real freedom in the elect, if the cause of the will's inclination to good is wholly divine — the human factor being entirely excluded. The natural man has a real will, capable of natural good. The work of grace is to enlarge its capacity for good and to supply internal impulses which, when not resisted, make possible, without necessitating, that species of good-will which makes for man's supernatural end. A will that is truly free must to a real extent be self-determined.

(e) Finally, while obliged to acknowledge the eternal predestination of creaturely events by the will of God, we also maintain the counter-truth of contingency in human conduct; and we refuse to give the doctrine of predestination either a more definite formulation than revelation enables us to make or a more exclusively determinative part in the conduct and destiny of individual men than the revealed doctrine of human probation, and of judgment according to works, permits.

All objections to the doctrine of sin which either are based upon, or owe their apparent force to, the supposition that that doctrine includes or implies one or other of these speculative views may be safely

dismissed. They have no bearing on the catholic doctrine herein maintained.

§ 10. We come to objections which cannot thus be dismissed. In discussing them we shall have to repeat what has been said in other connections.

(a) It is objected that our doctrine leaves the ultimate problem of evil unsolved. This is true; but to any one who realizes that sin, even in its slightest manifestations and least culpable forms, is something which ought not to be, any doctrine concerning it must be attended by difficulty, unless it is capable of explaining the abstract possibility of what ought not to be in a world created and governed by a perfectly righteous, all-wise, and almighty God. Apparently no solution of this problem can be conveyed to the human mind. At all events, no theory of sin, whether humanly devised or divinely revealed, affords such solution.¹ Accordingly, if we find that the catholic doctrine of sin leaves the problem unsolved, this fact ought not to be taken as militating against its truth, unless either the doctrine is advanced as a complete explanation of evil, which is not the case, or it is found to add new difficulties and unwarranted complexities to the problem, which also is contrary to fact. In reality, while not at all concerned with abstract problems, but with describing for practicable purposes the relation in which sinners stand to their Maker, the doctrine in question relieves the problem of evil of one serious difficulty

¹ Cf. ch. iv. esp. §§ 9-11, above.

— that which is caused by the supposition that the inevitability of man's sin and guilt inheres in the original conditions under which man was placed by God. It certainly reduces the difficulty otherwise felt, in acknowledging the perfection of divine righteousness and justice, to learn that our incapacity to avoid incurring divine condemnation for sin is due not to the will of God, but to a human act of sin which divine grace had made avoidable.

(b) It is objected that, if Adam was made righteous, whether naturally so or by divine grace, his sinning — contrary to his disposition and character — becomes unaccountable.¹ Such an objection presupposes the theory that Adam's original righteousness was an established disposition or an actualized moral and spiritual character. This is not involved in the catholic doctrine, which leaves us free to regard Adam's righteousness as potential — a state of grace which enabled him to actualize righteousness, if he continued faithful to the terms of the divine covenant.

(c) A third objection is based upon the lack of analogy for so serious a disturbance of human conditions by one act of sin — an act the culpability of which cannot rightly be regarded as very great in view of the child-like inexperience of our first parents who committed it.² Such an argument implies that the consequences of a sin depend for their seriousness

¹ Urged by F. R. Tennant, *Origin and Propag. of Sin*, pp. 27-28.

² Also urged by F. R. Tennant, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-30.

upon its degree of personal culpability — a supposition contrary to the teachings of human experience, which affords countless instances of lifelong disaster and irreparable moral damage to others, brought about by slight acts of moral carelessness. Failure to say the right word at a critical moment may drive another into a course of wickedness the contaminating results of which may be exceedingly widespread and permanent. The smallest sin has consequences which we can never fully ascertain — consequences which may increase in geometrical proportion, as a little snowball grows when rolled in a snowbank. One sin breeds other sins with ever-continuing fruitfulness, and its consequences include all the results of the sins which it breeds, whether directly or remotely.

The consequences of Adam's sin are indeed unique; but that is neither because of unique culpability on his part, nor because of any deviation from the laws which control all moral developments. His sin was unique in consequences because it was the first sin, the initiation of a malific influence which irreversible laws have caused to contaminate a race. But there was no immediate and incredible cataclysm. Neither Adam nor his children were dehumanized and converted into incarnate devils. There was a loss of grace, without which sinlessness is impossible. Therefore human insufficiency bred sin, and sin bred more sin. Men fell little by little; and their sinfulness, when added to their want of intellectual development, constituted prehistoric savagery. There is nothing in-

credible in this — nothing contrary to the laws which are still observed to determine moral developments.

(d) It is objected that the doctrine which we maintain leaves unexplained the alleged infection of children's souls with hereditary tendencies to sin. Theologians have abandoned traducianism, which seemed to afford a clue to the difficulty, in favour of creationism, which makes each soul a fresh creation by God. Can we believe, it is asked, that God imparts sinful tendencies to every soul which He creates? ¹ This objection is really superficial. No one denies that children do inherit psychical traits and tendencies from their parents, and a failure of catholic doctrine to explain how cannot invalidate our experience of the fact. ² Creationism is not catholic doctrine, but a speculative opinion which can be abandoned without altering the doctrine of sin. But assuming that it is a true opinion, it raises no insuperable difficulty. The interaction between soul and body is generally acknowledged. Bodily conditions produce noticeable effects upon the mind and will. Each soul begins its functioning under physical conditions which it cannot escape, and which are inherited. These physical conditions sufficiently

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 31-38. Dr. Tennant uses Weismann's denial of the transmission of acquired characters in connection with it — a denial which we have shown to be non-relevant to the problem as viewed from the standpoint of catholic doctrine.

² The psychical inheritance involved in original sin is merely a transmission of the psychical nature of the human species *without any supernatural gift superadded.*

account for the power which carnal impulses exercise over the mind and will of each child of man.¹

§ 11. Modern science, as we have seen, is thought by some to destroy the credibility of the traditional doctrine of a fall from primitive righteousness. The difficulties which it is said to bring to light, so far as applicable to the catholic doctrine, can be reduced to two heads — the evidences of prehistoric savagery and the violation of continuity, which the traditional doctrine is said to involve. Both objections depend for validity upon a naturalistic exclusion of supernatural factors from the world-drama, and such exclusion is extra-scientific. As we have elsewhere shown, the Christian view of history is more adequate and more agreeable to moral and spiritual experience than is the naturalistic philosophy; and it affords a rational and credible place for supernatural factors in man's primitive state and subsequent experience.

(e) The objection which is thought to be involved in the evidences of prehistoric savagery is that these evidences afford the only available indications of man's primitive state, and point to conditions which would naturally prevail when man had just been evolved from brute ancestors, and before the newborn moral powers had had time to be developed by experience.

The answer, which has already been hinted at, is twofold. In the first place, there is no direct evidence that prehistoric savagery represents man's

¹ Cf. H. P. Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, p 102.

primitive state. Primitive man built no lasting structures and employed no permanent tools; and if the bones of the first man were to come to light, there would be no means by which either to identify them as belonging to the first human being or to determine his original condition.¹ In the second place, the objection assumes that the supernatural factors which Christian doctrine hypothecates in man's primitive state must be denied. No evidence is given to substantiate this denial, which is not based upon scientific knowledge, but upon a naturalistic and unprovable presupposition. It is assumed without proof that natural evolution supplies the only factors which can rationally be reckoned with in determining man's original condition. The falsity of this presupposition has been sufficiently indicated.²

(f) It is this presupposition, however, which gives plausibility to the objection that the doctrine of a fall from original righteousness and grace involves a breach of continuity in the causal sequences by which all events are controlled. Whether an alleged event involves, or does not involve, the breach of continuity referred to depends upon the nature of the world-plan. Until we arrive at a true conception of this, we are in no position to determine what factors may operate in its realization; and upon a determination of this question depends our ability

¹ Cf. p. 255, note 1, above, for references on this point.

² In ch. viii. § 4.

to conclude intelligently what can happen without a violation of causal sequences.

The issue lies between two conceptions of the world-plan, the naturalistic and the Christian. The first wears the livery of physical science, but is none the less extra-scientific and fails to do justice to the phenomena of moral and spiritual experience. The latter, the Christian conception, is more adequate. It affords a rational view of all human experience, without in the slightest degree reducing the value and significance of the results of physical and biological investigation. Once adopted, it establishes the moral likelihood of the primitive state which catholic doctrine defines, and therefore removes the difficulty which we are considering. That savagery is in line with natural evolution from brute conditions can be freely acknowledged from the Christian standpoint, without this acknowledgment militating against the doctrine that man was created for a supernatural estate and was endowed with superadded gifts pertaining thereto until avoidable sin on his part caused him to lose them.¹

¹ Cf. ch. iii. §§ 9-12, on the significance of the existing visible order, the principle of continuity, and the futility of naturalism. References are there given.

The late Aubrey Moore, *Essays Scientific and Phil.*, pp. 64-65, points to the moral disorder under which all men labour as "a great exception in the order of nature," and accentuates the belief "that this disorder . . . could not have been meant by God." From the evolutionary standpoint — which requires that each species shall be able to obey the laws of its being — it is a clear breach of continuity. Obviously, therefore, it cannot be described as an inevitable

§ 12. The practical importance of the doctrine with which we have been concerned in this and in the preceding chapter is made apparent by reasons which are too plain to require more than the briefest statement.

A rejection of the doctrine of the fall carries with it serious modifications of other Christian doctrines. All revealed truths are mutually connected, and we cannot reject one of them without weakening our hold upon others.

(a) It is acknowledged, for example, that the doctrine of baptismal remission of sins is involved. Baptism is declared by this doctrine to be needed by all — even by those who die in infancy. And its divinely instituted purpose is taught to be the imparting of a sanctifying grace of deliverance from the sinfulness inherited from Adam by means of incorporation into the second Adam.¹ The remission which it is said to secure is not only of actual sin, but also

by-product of evolution consistently with the principle of continuity. It must have come through a cause that is rather an interference with the plan of God than a necessary incident of it. We hold that it came through avoidable sin on man's part — avoidable by reason of the grace which God bestowed to complete the needed equipment of primitive man. Dr. Tennant attempts to reply to Aubrey Moore's language (*Origin of Sin*, pp. 185-187), but, in our judgment, *misses the point*.

¹ Acts ii. 38; xxii. 16; Tit. iii. 5; Gal. iii. 27. Cf. St. John iii. 5; Col. ii. 10-13. In the last passage the condition from which Baptism initiates our deliverance is described in terms of uncircumcision of flesh and being dead in trespasses — obviously the condition which St. Paul calls sin, and derives from Adam, in Rom. v. 12-14.

of original sin. As applied to the latter, the phrase "remission of sin" is, of course, symbolic, for original sin is sin only in a derivative and symbolic sense. But that Baptism is the means by which we are placed in a state in which we can in time utterly escape from the sin-breeding entail of Adam is Christian doctrine. It presupposes the doctrine of the fall, and if that doctrine is false, the doctrine of Baptism requires fundamental modification from its scriptural form.¹

(b) The same reasoning applies to the general doctrine of redemption. The terms in which that doctrine is exhibited in the New Testament plainly presuppose the doctrine of the fall. The modern notion that sin is merely a necessary incident in man's upward progress, if it were true, would render absolutely untenable the explanation of the Incarnation and the death of Christ which the Scriptures contain and upon which Christian teaching in general has for nineteen centuries been based.²

(c) The inspired authority of St. Paul's doctrine, and indirectly of all the Bible, is at stake. If St. Paul merely set forth rabbinical speculations in Christian dress, when he expounded his doctrine of the first

¹ Dr. Tennant acknowledges that the modern view which he supports does preclude remission of original sin. *Origin of Sin*, pp. xii, 230-231.

² That it has been the catholic faith that Christ died on account of original as well as actual sin can hardly be gainsaid. Disputes as to how far this doctrine is undeniably present in particular texts cease to have critical importance beside this consensus as to the teaching of Scripture at large.

and the second Adam, it is impossible to accept any of his teaching except on its merits as judged by ourselves. The fifth chapter of the *Epistle to the Romans* comes to us as a concluding and definitive part of the Word of God.¹ It requires intelligent interpretation, no doubt, but to reject its indisputable tenor is plainly to take issue with the doctrine of biblical inspiration.

(d) We have elsewhere shown how incredible is the supposition that a righteous Creator should from the outset leave man morally helpless — in a state in which, without previous and avoidable human sin to explain the difficulty, he is practically unable to escape becoming morally culpable before his Maker. Such a state of things obviously ought not to be, and if we must believe that God is responsible for its establishment, the difficulty of believing that He is righteous — that He is God — is immensely increased. The doctrine of a primitive state of grace — of the original capacity of man by grace wholly to avoid sin — and of the loss of this advantage by avoidable human fault, appears to be necessary to prevent the problem of evil from becoming a nightmare.

(e) The Christian sense of sin has always been connected with, and appears to be dependent for

¹ If it were given as descriptive of an early stage in revelation, it might indeed be treated as having the defects of early teaching. But St. Paul was obviously inspired to write in the light of the full revelation of Christ.

intensity and spiritual effect upon, belief in innate sinful tendencies and in their having been induced by Adam's sin. This belief deepens the sense of sin's power and of the supreme need of a salvation which will change us within by imparting a new and regenerating principle. The whole spiritual attitude and life of the believer is thus determined. If the doctrine of original sin is false, this attitude is wrong. *Vice versa*, if the Christian attitude is right, the doctrine of original sin which it presupposes is true.

An abandonment of this doctrine, whether Pelagian or evolutionist, has invariably been followed by a tendency to take a lighter view of sin. At first blush Pelagianism seems calculated to deepen the sense of responsibility and guilt by emphasizing personal freedom and power to avoid sin. But the actual result is to withdraw attention from a multitude of sins in which deliberate wilfulness is not obvious and to cause an underestimate of the change which is required in us before we can become pure within and serve God with entirely sanctified hearts. The so-called evolutionary view of sin likewise minimizes the evil which demands remedy.¹ If sin is

¹ In dealing with this difficulty Dr. Tennant, *op. cit.*, pp. xix-xxvii, correctly insists that the degree of *formal guilt* for sin depends upon the degree of capacity to perceive its wickedness. But he surely underestimates the moral capacity of very young children and of undeveloped races. Cf. A. J. Mason, in *Journal of Theol. Studies*, July 1904, pp. 492-493. Moreover, he utterly ignores the *material* aspect of sin. Tendencies which become sins when translated into action cannot safely be regarded as intrinsically

merely an anachronism which the race will outgrow, it cannot have the awful meaning which is implied in the death of God-made-man — a death professedly submitted to for its remedy. The fact is notorious that the modern abandonment of the Christian doctrine of sin has been followed by a light-hearted optimism which is fraught with disaster, if the abandoned doctrine is true.¹

non-moral. They unfit men for divine fellowship, whether actualized in conduct or not. And in so far as they inevitably lead on to formal sin, they constitute very grave elements in the problem of sin, and rightly intensify the Christian's sense of its seriousness. One who limits the data for estimating sin to actions to which formal guilt is attached is practically certain to minimize sin. Cf. A. J. Mason, as cited, pp. 493-498, a valuable passage.

¹ Cf. Chas. Gore, *The New Theology and the Old Religion*, Lec. iv; H. P. Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, Lec. iv, *passim*.

CHAPTER X

SALVATION AND PROGRESS

I. *Preparation*

§ 1. Sin constitutes an apparent violation of the principle of continuity and of the divine plan. If it represented successful purpose, it would be a triumph of unreason and perversity against eternal law and progress — against God. An intelligent and consistent believer in the wisdom and power of God cannot acknowledge the possibility of such an outcome. The cause of sinners must be a losing cause, and the divine permission of sin must be justified by its overthrow, by such an absolute defeat of it that the very actions which are designed to thwart the will of God will be absorbed, overruled, and utilized, in accordance with eternal purpose, for the fulfilment of the divine plan. This plan is to be consummated through the development in time of a kingdom of perfect human persons. The enslavement of mankind to sinful desires cannot, therefore, be rightly regarded as final; nor can unassisted natural development be considered to afford possibilities of escape from this enslavement. Purely natural progress merely changes the form, without reducing the power, of sinful desires. These considerations justify the

conclusion that some form of salvation from sin — a salvation from above — is the inevitable sequence of man's fall from grace.¹

The external operations of God are governed by a wisdom which is perfect, and therefore self-coherent in manifestation. A fundamental uniformity of method pervades even the most diverse scenes in the world-drama. So far as men can ascertain this method, it appears to be controlled by orderly involution and evolution — by the emerging of divinely supplied factors and potentialities, and by their bringing about innovating effects, upward changes, and purposeful development.² We find that this method prevails not only in natural, but also in spiritual development, and not only in the process by which man was created and endowed in his original condition with sufficient supernatural grace for spiritual progress, but also in the method of his salvation from sin and of his progress towards his supernatural destiny.

¹ It is not meant that God was either under any external necessity, or without real freedom, in saving mankind (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III. i. 2; xlv. 1), but that, in view both of the eternal nature of God and of His purpose in creating man, it is incredible that He should have abandoned him to the destructive consequences of the fall.

² We say "emerging" rather than "imparting" to conform our phrase more obviously to the presupposition of divine immanence. God is in all things and operates from their centre. It needs to be added that He is other and higher than that in which He is immanent, and "involution" is a real imparting to finite things of potentialities of which their nature as such was not previously possessed.

The method of salvation which has been revealed to us may be described as an involution of the regenerating and sanctifying grace contained in the perfected and glorified Manhood of Jesus Christ, which, under appropriate moral and spiritual conditions, brings about a renewal of human development after the divine likeness "unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ."¹ This plan is fulfilled in an orderly way through the following stages: (a) The training of a chosen race in order that it may be capable of receiving and extending to mankind the dispensation of salvation;² (b) The taking of our nature by God's own eternal Son, and its being perfected for sanctifying purposes through endowment with grace, temptation, obedience, propitiatory suffering, and victory over death; (c) A new covenant, wherein grace is imparted to us by the Holy Spirit from the glorified Manhood of Christ, and in which men are enabled through union with Christ to obtain pardon for sin and escape from its power, and advance through death to the perfection and the life with God for which they were originally created.

All the remaining volumes of this series, if God permits their completion, will be devoted to the vast subject which we have outlined in a paragraph. But our present treatment of man will be somewhat trun-

¹ Ephes. iv. 13.

² Gal. iii. 24; iv. 1-5. Cf. Heb. i. 1-2; viii. 5; x. 1. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III. i. 5.

cated, and this volume will not have the formal completeness which each volume in the series is intended to have, unless certain parts of the outline which we have given are expanded so far at least as the limits of a concluding chapter will permit.¹

§ 2. Salvation from sin is a work of grace, and grace cannot operate in human hearts except in a moral way, and upon those who do not resist its influence. But sin not only represents resistance to grace, but creates a world in which continued resistance is inevitable — a world in which spiritual blindness, disordered affections, and moral weakness and perversity prevail.² In order, therefore, that men should listen to the divine call to repentance and open their hearts to saving grace, they must acquire through much moral experience a sense of sin and of the need of salvation from it, and must be divinely prepared, both morally and mentally, for the revelation of salvation. Moreover, because of the moral and spiritual solidarity of mankind, both the method of salvation and the preparation for it must be social. The preparation must have effect upon human societies, racial and political, before the

¹ Except in certain matters which are not again to be discussed with the same fulness, the giving of references will be largely postponed to later volumes.

² There is a social heredity as well as that which is involved in parentage. Its working supplies a re-enforcing factor in human degeneration. But it is a mistake to confuse social heredity with the teaching of St. Paul concerning our derivation of concupiscence from Adam.

revelation of salvation can appeal with full effect to individual men. This explains why the manifestation of Jesus Christ was so long delayed — why He did not come until the fulness of time.¹

The preparation was achieved by means of protracted and providentially controlled human experience, and was both mental and moral. Had mankind become wholly depraved, no experience could have had moral value. But men retained a certain capacity for moral judgment and, with all their blindness and unreadiness for the grace of salvation, they were capable of slowly learning the lessons which they had to learn before they could assimilate the Gospel of salvation. The good that remained in them enabled the Spirit to operate in their hearts—not with saving effect, but with restraining influence and with educational results. These operations of the Spirit were hidden, except among the Chosen People, because the divine plan required that the nations in general should be largely given over to their own devices, and should learn by prolonged natural experience the futility of unassisted human developments

¹ On the necessity and nature of the preparation of mankind for Christ, see W. Bright, *St. Leo on the Incarn.*, note 17 (giving patristic views) and pp. 9-10 (St. Leo's view); E. S. Talbot, in *Lux Mundi*, IV; D. R. Breed, *Hist. of the Preparation of the World for Christ*; C. J. Ellicott, *Foundations of Sac. Study*, 1st Series, pp. 153-157; A. J. Mason, *Faith of the Gospel*, ch. v. §§ 1-3; H. P. Liddon, *Advent Serms.*, pp. 115-121; J. B. Lightfoot, *Epis. to the Gal.*, on iv. 4, 11; Alfred Edersheim, *Life and Times of Jesus*, etc., Bk. I (the last stage of preparation); Darwell Stone, *Outlines of Christ. Dogma*, pp. 50-54. Cf. ch. vii. § 3, above.

and the vanity of creaturely substitutes for true religion.

This "dispensation of paganism"¹ could never enable the nations to find God, but it did teach men to seek after Him. Religion fell short of its proper function, but, in spite of prevailing sin and error, embodied much truth, and in this manner prepared the way for the reception of the Gospel.² Mighty empires gave evidence of the advance of human civilization, but their decay taught the inadequacy of the factors by which they were created, whether the violence of the Babylonian Empire, the wealth of the Persian, the intelligence of the Greek, or the polity of the Roman. Yet each was overruled from above to prepare the way. In particular, Greek philosophy developed the forms of thought and language which were needed for the proclamation and definition of the truths of salvation, and the Roman polity afforded suitable social and practical conditions for their dissemination.

We have but hinted at aspects of ancient history which are now widely understood, and which have received attention from many writers. The fact that the conditions prevailing in the Roman world at the time when the Gospel was revealed and began to be preached were peculiarly suitable for its proclamation is too apparent to intelligent students of history to require argument. And that world seemed

¹ References are given on p. 298, note 2, above.

² Cf. ch. vii. § 4, above.

to be in a state of expectancy, waiting for the Christ, and prepared gradually to recognize the truth of His message and the power of saving grace.¹

§ 3. The Roman world was not the whole human world, but its readiness for the Gospel enabled the visible kingdom of grace to gain the strong footing which it had to gain in order permanently to hold its own and gradually to extend itself among the rest of mankind. This wider extension has had to wait for further preparation of backward races and, in particular, for the development of suitable relations between Christianized and heathen races.²

The progress of human civilization, of preparation for the Gospel, and of its propagation, has obeyed laws which control all human developments. No new and enlightening influence can operate at once and with equal effect upon all mankind. Every propaganda must first enlighten an inner circle, chosen and prepared to become a missionary body and leavening infusion, from which radiating influences shall operate to widen more and more the area of enlightenment. The divine method was adapted to this law of human education. The principle of election was adopted. A chosen race was called out from the

¹ The powers that seemed to prevail were indeed unready. The world never more defiantly exploited evil ideals, and the triumph of Christianity in the Roman world was a demonstration of divine power. Cf. H. P. Liddon, *Divinity of Our Lord*, pp. 141-147.

² Conditions appear now to be ripening rapidly for the universal extension of Christianity — a consummation, however, which is seriously hindered by Christian divisions, the disgrace of Christendom.

rest of the nations and put to a peculiar schooling, in order that it might be capable of being intrusted with the message of salvation and of correctly propagating the Gospel. The Israelites were chosen for this function — that they might become vessels of salvation to the Gentiles.¹ They were not chosen because of their merits, for they were continually falling short in their obedience, but because of divine wisdom. In spite of their backslidings, the Israelites had a unique capacity for religious development, and the end in view rather than their deservings appears to have caused their election.²

§ 4. The preparation of the Chosen People had to be partly moral and partly mental. Morally they were prepared by statutes and judgments. The statutes which they received from God were partly ceremonial and partly moral. The ceremonial law selected, reformed, and consecrated existing ritual, sacrificial and other, to express, accentuate, and perpetuate the religious and moral relations in which sinful men should stand towards God.³ In particular the lesson that death — shedding of blood — constitutes the wages of sin was enforced by bloody sin offerings,⁴ which, although they could not put away sin,⁵ placed

¹ Deut. vii. 6; Rom. ix. 4-5. With which cf. Gen. xii. 3; xxii. 18; Isa. xlix. 6; Acts ix. 15; xxvi. 17, 18; Ephes. iii. 6.

² St. Athanasius, *de Incarn.*, § 12, says that the Jewish prophets "were for all the world a holy school of the knowledge of God." See J. H. Kurtz, *Hist. of the Old Covenant*, Vol. I. pp. 125-129.

³ Jas. Robertson, in *Book by Book*, pp. 36-37.

⁴ Heb. ix. 22. Cf. Rom. vi. 23.

⁵ Heb. ix. 9-10; x. 1-4.

their sincere offerers in the moral attitude which prepared them for salvation through the death of Christ.

The moral law, partly by its contents and partly by Israel's experienced inability to fulfil its requirements, operated through the ages to deepen the sense of sin and of its power. It also gave to the Israelites a unique realization of the righteousness of God, of the necessity of inward cleansing, and of the need of a divine Saviour and Redeemer from sin.¹

The judgments and punishments with which Israel's backslidings were visited tended more and more to enforce the lessons inculcated by the ceremonial and moral law, while the ever-recurring mercy which followed upon national repentance sustained belief in the love of God and in the promise that a Deliverer should arise under whose sway the law should be written on men's hearts and righteousness and peace should evermore prevail.² The Babylonian captivity proved to be a turning point in the Chosen People's moral preparation. Henceforth the claims of God upon their allegiance were abundantly acknowledged by the Jews, and although some cen-

¹ Rom. iii. 20; vii. 7-13. Cf. Hastings, *Dic. of the Bible*, s. vv. "Law (in Old Testament)," last column (by S. R. Driver), and "Law (in New Testament)," II. B. d. (by J. Denny). The law makes actual sin to abound, that is, brings the innate evil of original sin to the surface, that it may be realized and the remedy of grace be welcomed.

² Isa. lix. 20-21; Jerem. xxxi. 33 (with Heb. viii. 10; x. 16; Rom. xi. 26-27).

turies of discipline remained necessary, this discipline operated to develop devout circles of faithful ones who were looking for the promised Messiah and were ready, when He appeared, to receive Him and to become both the firstfruits of His grace and propagandists in the Gentile world.

§ 5. The Chosen People were mentally prepared partly by objective and symbolic experience¹ and partly by Messianic prophecy. Their ritual was prefigurative of Christ's priesthood and of the covenant of which it was to be the vital centre. To mention leading particulars, the national sin offering of the day of atonement, which was offered but once in the yearly round and gave validity to all other sacrificial ritual, prefigured the death which Christ endured once for all, and by which His ever-continuing priesthood is consecrated and made effectual. The daily burnt offerings symbolized the self-oblation to God which ever constitutes the bounden duty and service of creatures, and the paschal feast set forth the communion with God which feeding at God's board secures for His children. Both the burnt offerings and the peace offerings were accompanied by shedding of blood, for sinful men cannot approach their Maker except they plead the atoning

¹ On Old Testament symbolism, see A. Jukes, *Types of Genesis; Law of Offerings*; A. J. Maas, *Christ in Type and Prophecy*; E. W. Osborne, *The Saviour King* (for children, but valuable); *Christ in the Law* (pub. by Masters); L. Ragg, *Aspects of the Atonement*. The Epistle to the Hebrews affords notable sanction for the symbolic interpretation of the Old Testament ritual.

blood-shedding upon which their reconciliation with God is based. All this sacrificial ritual pointed to a pure offering in which it was to be recapitulated in a new form and given effect. In the Christian Eucharist the death which Christ suffered once for all is proclaimed and applied, the self-oblation of creatures is effectually offered, and its participants became mutually united participators in divine communion and fellowship.¹

The very history of the Israelites was overruled to teach things to come, and their leaders became types of the coming Saviour. The meaning of it all was for the time indeed enigmatical.² But that their history was prophetic was acknowledged by the Israelites,³ and they were prepared by it as by a kindergarten school to recognize the Christ when He came and to assimilate the mysteries of the kingdom.

All this teaching was embodied, and given such progressive articulation as was practicable and desirable before Christ's coming, in Messianic prophecies.⁴

¹ The Old Testament sacrifices prefigured, the death of Christ fulfilled and consecrated, the heavenly priesthood perpetuates, and the Eucharist represents and applies the one only true sacrifice of Jesus Christ. The subject belongs to later volumes.

² The prophets did not fully understand their own prophecies: 1 St. Pet. i. 10-12.

³ Psa. lxxviii bears witness to the parabolic and enigmatical significance of Israel's history. Cf. *Authority, Eccles. and Biblical*, ch. vii. §§ 12, 14-15.

⁴ On Messianic prophecy, see Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, s. xv. "Messiah" (by V. H. Stanton), "Prophecy and Prophets," C. ii. 2 (by A. B. Davidson); *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, s. v. "Messiah, Messianism"

These prophecies were not given as precise foretellings of future events, but gained their anticipative value from being inspired forthtellings of the laws by which the progress of the spiritual history of mankind is divinely governed. This method of regarding prophecy enables us to understand at once the general limitations of Messianic prophecy and the occasional approximation of prophetic description to the exact details of future events. Prophecy was not designed to gratify curiosity beforehand, or to remove the probational ignorance of the future to which men are conveniently subjected. Its value lay in rightly disposing men's minds towards the future, and in helping them to recognize the Messiah when He came. Messianic prophecies, in brief, were shadows thrown backward upon the mirror of inspired intelligence by the great event towards which the faithful Jew was learning to look with increasing hope.¹

(by C. von Orelli); E. W. Hengstenberg, *Christology of the Old Test.* (an elaborate work); Franz Delitzsch, *Messianic Prophecies in Historical Succession*; F. H. Woods, *The Hope of Israel*; C. A. Briggs, *Messianic Prophecy*; *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Messias" (by L. W. Geddes); A. B. Davidson, *Old Test. Prophecy*, chh. xvii-xxiv; P. J. Gloag, *The Messianic Prophecies*; A. F. Kirkpatrick, *The Doctrine of the Prophets*.

¹ On the state of this hope when Christ came, see Jas. Drummond, *The Jewish Messiah*; E. Schuerer, *Hist. of the Jewish People*, Div. II. Vol. II. § 29; Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, Extra Vol., s. v. "Development of Doctrine," etc. (by W. Fairweather), pp. 295-302.

II. *Redemption*

§ 6. Adam's sin had a twofold effect. It disturbed the relations between man and God and it altered man's internal condition for the worse,¹ so as to hinder its development and reduce its possibilities to a purely earthly level. The method of salvation was designed to reverse these effects — to bring men into a new covenant wherein they could offer satisfaction for sin, and to impart to them a new principle of life, containing potentialities of sanctification and renewed development.²

In accordance with this method, God, in the person of His only-begotten Son, took our nature upon Himself, thereby filling it with the fulness of sanctifying grace, and by temptation and suffering perfected it for saving purposes, so as to make it a suitable vehicle of regenerating and sanctifying grace to those to whom it is sacramentally imparted.

Moreover, the suffering and death to which the God-man submitted was an endurance of the consequences of sin by God Himself, and was the making of that full and perfect satisfaction for the sins of men which they could never have made. But this

¹ The change was one of *condition* — from the sufficiency of grace to the moral insufficiency of unassisted human nature. Human *nature itself* was unaltered.

² That is, the method of involution and evolution, which appears to have governed the previous history of creation, is continued on a higher level and in a manner determined by the necessity of remedying sin.

substitution is only preparatory to identification of the Sufferer with those who become members of His body in Baptism. And it is this union between Christ and His members, accompanied by their fulfilment of the conditions of faith, repentance, and suffering worthy of repentance, which enables fallen men to obtain the benefits of His death and to make satisfaction for their sins.

Christ could not be holden of death, but, rising again, He assumed in heaven the central place in time and space, where He now exercises the ever-continuing and ever-prevailing priesthood in our behalf to which His death has once for all consecrated Him.

§ 7. Thus a new covenant, sealed in the blood of Christ, has been established. In it effectual provision is made for our life-giving union with Christ, our participation in His propitiatory death, our consequent restoration to divine favour, and our advance by purgation and spiritual growth, through death and victory over death, to the glorious destiny eternally designed for us.

Like the old covenant, and in harmony with the social nature and destiny of mankind, the new covenant is social in form and application. The Church of Christ — one, holy, catholic, and apostolic — is of its essence. God's people are chosen for a social destiny and a heavenly kingdom. That kingdom is entered on earth, and the visible Church militant is the earthly part and training-school of the Church

in glory. Thus the social aspect of redemption and of everlasting life is present from the beginning.

The Church is the body of Christ mystically and socially extended. By Baptism we are at once made members of Christ and of His Church, for these phrases express inseparable aspects of one event. The central and continuing public function of the Church — the Holy Eucharist — unites us socially in formal appropriation of the benefits of Christ's death, and in corporate oblation of ourselves to God by means of the memorial of Christ's death which the Eucharist effects. Every department of the life of the redeemed is dominated by this social relation, for we are not brought to God as separate individuals, but as citizens of a kingdom, an *ecclesia* of God.

The Church also constitutes the leaven whereby alone the kingdoms of this world can become the Kingdom of Christ. Its earthly corruptions delay the consummation, but nothing can take its place. The life of Jesus Christ and of His Spirit is in it, so that it recovers itself from age to age and renews the work of drawing the redeemed into the divine society wherein their appointed glory is to be consummated. Individual salvation and self-realization requires social development, and the visible Church is the only society wherein such development can be directed towards its true and spiritual goal. Such is the plan of salvation.

III. *Grace*

§ 8. The factor without which man's spiritual progress cannot be achieved is called grace — a vital principle of purification, illumination, and sanctification, which now resides in the body of Christ and is imparted to us by means of our incorporation therein.¹

The New Testament word for "grace," χάρις, the etymological meaning of which is "pleasing,"² often has a fuller meaning in Scripture, signifying a special gift of God³ — the factor by which we are raised above the natural and carnal level and are saved. It is sometimes spoken of by theological writers as if it were a concrete thing or substance, but there is no warrant for such a notion. It would be truer to

¹ The doctrine of grace in relation to human freedom and to the primitive and subsequent states of mankind has received attention in chh. i, viii, ix, above. We are here concerned with its nature and effects, and with the various technical distinctions pertaining to the subject. See St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. II. cix–cxiv; A. P. Forbes, *Thirty-Nine Arts.*, ix. pp. 156–160; A. G. Mortimer, *Cath. Faith and Practice*, Vol. I. pp. 114–120; Blunt, *Dic. of Theol.*, q. v.; *Cath. Encyc.*, q. v. (quite full); Wilhelm and Scannell, *Cath. Theol.*, Bk. III. Pt. II, and Bk. VI; F. X. Schouppe, *Elem. Theol. Dogm.*, Tr. IX. For various biblical uses of the term, see Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, q. v. (by A. Stewart); *Dic. of Christ*, q. v. (by J. C. Lambert); Sanday and Headlam, *Epis. to the Romans*, in i. 5.

² Χαίρω, to rejoice, be pleased. Cf. J. H. Thayer, *Gk.-Eng. Lex. of the N. T.*, s. vv. χαίρω and χάρις.

³ Cf. the related term Χάρισμα, a gift of grace. On which see J. H. Thayer, *op. cit.*, q. v.; Sanday and Headlam, *op. cit.*, pp. 358–360.

say that it signifies a special and invisible method of divine operation, and to describe it as a gift means that God gives to us the benefit of such special operations within the soul. When we speak of instruments of grace we should mean the external things and actions by the appointed use of which God enables us to obtain these benefits. Grace does not change human nature *in se*, but elevates its condition, assists it, and conduces to its perfection after its kind. Therefore grace cannot be rightfully described as a resident force,¹ as if its bestowal made it to be a natural property of man.² It is rather a gift, a conditional endowment, capable both of bestowal and withdrawal without essential alteration of human nature.

These considerations will perhaps make more clear the conventional definition of grace as a "free and supernatural gift of God, bestowed upon rational creatures and pertaining in some manner to ever-

¹ It cannot be brought within the sphere to which the law of the conservation of energies applies. Cf. ch. iii. § 12; ch. vi. § 2 (*e-f*), above. The term "force" can be applied to it only in the moral sense. Its method of operation is concealed in the subconscious region; but, if we may make inferences from what we observe in our conscious moral functioning, for the assistance of which grace is given, we may say that it manipulates the forces which are resident in our nature, assisting us in directing them without being classifiable with them. Cf. article "On Brain Science in Relation to Religion," in *Church Quarterly Rev.*, Oct., 1881.

² It is not an "acquired character," in the biological sense of that term. It may indeed confer permanent *supernatural* "character" — e.g. in Baptism, Confirmation, and Holy Order — but pertains to individuals only. It cannot be transmitted by natural propagation.

lasting life" — that is, to the supernatural destiny for which such creatures are made. The gift is free, for, apart from grace, man cannot become worthy of grace and cannot earn its bestowal as a wage. It is a gift that is superadded to man's natural endowments. It is bestowed only upon rational creatures, for they alone are capable of advancing by means of it to the everlasting life with reference to which it is given. It is also necessary for man, if he is to fulfil the end for which he was made, and therefore it is inevitably bestowed upon those who do not by sin wilfully exclude themselves from the benefit. This does not mean that God is under external necessity to confer grace, but merely that such bestowal is involved in the fulfilment of His eternal purpose in creating mankind. Grace is always a *free* gift.

Grace is subdivided and distinguished in theology according to its effects. Controversy and speculation have combined to multiply these distinctions to an unnecessary and confusing extent. We give only the more significant ones.

External grace consists in the influences which flow from external helps provided in the Church, such as scriptural reading, sermons, ceremonial, etc., but which do not of themselves change man's internal state and spiritual capacity. *Internal* grace is grace in the strict use of that term, consisting of supernatural endowments by which either the internal state of the soul is changed, or its spiritual

powers are enlarged, or both. The distinctions which follow pertain to internal grace.

Gratia gratum faciens signifies grace given for the benefit of its recipient, to make him pleasing to God, and *Gratia gratis data* is grace given for administering grace to others, conferred in Holy Order. *Habitual* or sanctifying grace changes the state of the soul and its relation to God, regenerating, justifying, and sanctifying;¹ while *actual* grace imparts power to rule our lower nature and to act in accordance with the will of God.² Grace is called *prevenient*³ in its original bestowal and *concomitant*⁴ when the will responds and co-operates with it. It is *sufficient*, as enabling men to turn to God and fulfil His will, and becomes *efficacious* when rightly co-operated with. Grace can become *irresistible* in created persons only when the disposition for righteousness which it enables them to acquire has been fully developed and crystallized by habitual reliance upon it. Impeccability cannot be derived *ab initio* from without, but is a

¹ Habitual grace is sometimes divided into *first* grace, by which men are brought into a state of sanctifying grace, or restored to it; and *second* grace, by which an existing state of grace is renewed and developed. Baptism and Penance are instruments of first grace. See A. P. Forbes, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-158. The other Sacraments confer second grace.

² Habitual grace includes actual grace, but actual grace may be given previously to the bestowal of habitual grace, and through other than sacramental channels.

³ Called also "antecedent" and "exciting." The will cannot turn to God without such grace.

⁴ Also called "assisting" and "co-operating."

moral achievement, the final triumph of a will that perseveres to the end in grace and in self-discipline.¹

§ 9. Habitual or sanctifying grace² is derived from the body of Christ by sacramental means, and its first bestowal places us in a state of justification, or acceptance with God, which is based upon what Christ has done for us and begins to do in us. A continuous and sanctifying work of grace in us, made possible by Christ's death, is the condition and moral warrant of our being treated as righteous by God. In other words, we are accounted for what Christ's death and His sanctifying work in us puts us in the way of becoming.³ Being made potentially righteous

¹ Our Lord's impeccability was neither a gift from without nor a moral achievement. It was the inevitable mark of His being personally divine. The grace of His Manhood was derived from His Person; and since its action was not less the action of a divine Person because human, it was inevitably sinless. God cannot sin in any sphere in which He may condescend to act. The fact that this rather enhances than reduces the power of His example will be shown in our next volume.

² Originally imparted to Adam, but lost by sin.

³ On justification, see A. P. Forbes, *Nicene Creed*, pp. 231-235; *Thirty-nine Arts.*, xi-xii; J. H. Newman, *Lecs. on Justification*; M. F. Sadler, *Justification of Life*; J. A. Moehler, *Symbolism*, Bk. I. Pt. I. ch. iii; E. B. Pusey, *Eirenicon*, Pt. III., pp. 57-69; Wm. Forbes, *Considerationes Modestae*, Vol. I (Anglo-Cath. Lib.); St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. II. cxiii; Jos. Pohle, in *Cath. Encyc.*, q. v.; Wilhelm and Scannell, Bk. VI. ch. ii; *Trid. Sess.*, VI. cap. vii. For St. Paul's teaching, which may not rightly be isolated from his doctrine of sanctification, see Sanday and Headlam, *Ep. to the Romans*, *passim*, in particular, pp. 147-153; H. P. Liddon, *Epis. to the Romans*, *passim* (not to be depended upon for details of exegesis, but sound in its conclusions as to the general mind of St. Paul); M. F. Sadler, *Epis.*

in Christ, we are conditionally treated as actually so — the condition being our perseverance in the sanctifying grace whereby we are enabled to advance from a righteousness which is merely potential to one which is actual. That God should continue forever to treat as righteous those who fail in the end actually to become so is contrary to Scripture, to catholic doctrine, and to enlightened reason.

The English word “justify” and the Latin *justificare*, from which it is derived, connote, in certain connections, the idea of making righteous. But this is not the meaning of *δικαίω*, the term employed by St. Paul. That term is forensic and means to reckon as righteous, to acquit. St. Paul’s doctrine of justification, therefore, is concerned with our being accounted righteous, as distinguished from our being made so. Modern scholarship has conclusively established this.

But to stop with this acknowledgment would be quite misleading. The doctrine of grace — sanctifying grace — is the presupposition and complement in St. Paul, as it is in catholic theology, of the doctrine of justification; and his doctrine of grace accounts for, and establishes the moral value of, his doctrine of justification. It is by grace that we become sub-

to the Romans, esp. Excursus I (to be classed with Liddon’s Commentary); R. S. Franks, in Hastings, *Dic. of Christ*, q. v. (includes a history of the doctrine); D. W. Simon, in Hastings, *Dic. of Bible*, q. v.; W. P. Du Bose, *Gospel in St. Paul*; J. P. Whitney, *The Reformation*, pp. 464–469 (a useful and untechnical note on various mediæval and sixteenth-century views).

jects of justification, and this grace is sanctifying — the potential principle of our becoming actually righteous. We are justified — accounted righteous — before we are actually so, and through an imputation to us of the righteousness of Christ. But the mystery which prevents such imputation from being an immoral make-believe is the fact that the justified have become members of Christ and participators in His sanctifying grace — potentially Christ-like. God justifies us — treats us as righteous — because His treatment of an incipient reality is determined by the nature of that reality in its full growth. The babe is reckoned at the full value of the man, because it is the beginning of the man. The adopted child of God when fullgrown becomes fit to be the friend of God, and therefore, even at the childish stage, is accepted by Him.

§ 10. Justification initiates sanctification, and sanctification affords the explanation and fulfils the implied promise of justification. The two mysteries cannot be mutually isolated, and the causes of justification are in effect one with the causes of sanctification.

The *efficient cause* is the Holy Spirit, by whose operation we are made members of Christ and sharers in His sanctifying grace. The *meritorious cause*, by which this grace has been obtained for us, is the obedience and death of Jesus Christ, the merits of which are alone adequate for our reconciliation with God. The *subjective cause* in us, itself made possible by grace, is faith; and the faith which justifies, or secures our

justification by God, is that kind of believing acceptance of Christ for our Saviour which constitutes the fruitful principle of charity and good works — that is, of righteousness. Without such fruitfulness faith is dead and cannot justify. Infants can be justified because the grace of regeneration which they receive in Baptism¹ is the causal antecedent of faith, and also of charity and good works. The *formal cause* or definitive standard of justification is righteousness;² the righteousness of Christ made potential in us, and therefore imputed to us as constituting the law and standard of our growth in grace.

The state of acceptance which is initiated by justification is appropriately called a state of justification. It is also called a state of salvation — not

¹ Regeneration is confused with conversion in Protestant theology. The two are distinct and do not necessarily occur together. One is not converted by Baptism, but, according to the New Testament, the being born anew of the Holy Spirit is thereby accomplished (St. John iii. 3-7). Regeneration is our acquisition of a new vital principle or germ, resident in the body of Christ, which becomes the basis in us of cleansing, of sanctification, and of immortality. Conversion is the effect of divine grace upon man's moral aims — a change of dominant purpose. If such a term were used in the spiritual order, regeneration might be described as a *biological* change, brought about by the involution of a new vital factor; whereas conversion is in its own nature wholly a *moral* change. Conversion is indeed an effect of grace, but may either precede or follow regeneration and may be so gradual as to be incapable of being dated. It may also be reversed. Regeneration is an instantaneous infusion by God of the capacity for Christian growth and immortality, accomplished once for all. The subject will be taken up in a subsequent volume.

² The Latin equivalent is *justitia*.

because our salvation has been completed, but because the state referred to affords the condition and assistance by which we are enabled to work out our salvation. This state can be lost, and its preservation depends upon the continued efficacy of the original causes of justification — that is, upon our continued dependence upon, and co-operation with, sanctifying grace, whereby we bring forth the fruits without which justifying faith is dead. By sin we fall from justifying grace, and until we repent we cease to be justified. These possibilities account for the theological distinctions between first and second justification. Our first justification is our initial reception into a state of justification, and our second justification is our renewal in that state.

§ 11. The grace by which we are justified is sanctifying,¹ and the fruit of this grace in those who co-operate therewith is sanctification and fitness for divine fellowship, sometimes called merit.

Sanctification, or making holy, may be said to have three elements: *viz.* consecration, purification, and assimilation to the divine character. The element of consecration, or separation from carnal things to God,² is conspicuous from the beginning; for the

¹ This is why justification and sanctification are inseparable. But they are not, in St. Paul's terminology, the same thing. Sanday and Headlam, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-39, are certainly right on this point.

² Separation is the root idea of the word "holiness." The element of ethical perfection in its meaning is of later development, due to the perception that those who are set apart to God should be like Him. See *Being and Attrib. of God*, ch. xii. § 7; G. T. Ladd, *Philos.*

mystery of our first justification is in itself such separation. But every renewal of grace is a renewal of consecration. The element of purification from sin is required in order to make good our consecration, for sin is a barrier which must be removed before our union with God can be fully consummated.

Inasmuch as this removal of sin is essentially a moral process, it cannot be achieved at once, nor apart from habitual repentance and self-discipline, made possible and effectual by grace. But sanctification can never be limited in scope to consecration and purification from sin. If we are to become the friends of God on mutually congenial terms — no other friendship can either please God or satisfy us — we must acquire the spiritual character of God, as translated into human terms in the Person of Jesus Christ. In brief, we must acquire positive and supernatural graces of character which can only be developed by the aid of sanctifying grace. The promise and potency of this is contained in our first justification, and is actualized by lifelong practice in the obedience of faith.

The fitness for divine friendship which sanctifying grace enables us to acquire is merit — the only merit which human agents can claim in relation to the gift of everlasting life. Merit is a word of several mean-

of Religion, ch. xxxiv; St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, I. II. lxxxi. 8; *Cath. Encyc.*, q. v.; J. H. Thayer, *op. cit.*, s. v. *dyos*. Sanctification in its full Christian sense signifies the whole process by which we are called out from the world and developed after the likeness of God in Christ.

ings. The meaning in which its ascription to us has been rightly condemned by many writers is that of moral claim upon God, because of the wage-value of our good works. We can acquire no such merit. Our best works are reduced in value by their spiritual imperfections; and in any case the value of the gift of eternal life immeasurably exceeds the wage-value of the fullest life of Christian endeavour. The only future wages which we can really earn is death. "The wages of sin is death, but the gift" — it is a gift and not wages — "of God is eternal life."¹ The whole conception of quantitative merit of good works is contrary to Scripture.²

What we have said is consistent with acknowledging a meritorious quality in good works, but it is not a wage-value, properly speaking. Works are meritorious in relation to everlasting life and are rewarded, not for their quantitative value, but for their spiritual quality — either as springing from and revealing a meritorious disposition and character, or as

¹ Rom. vi. 23.

² Our Lord's words are conclusive: "When ye shall have done all the things that are commanded of you, say, 'We are unprofitable servants'" (St. Luke xvii. 10). The judgment to come is not described as on account of our works, but according to them. Even if we have in mind the covenant promise of eternal life as the reward of faithful service, the quantitative aspect is not to be pressed. The reward is neither on account of the amount of our service nor withheld from those whose opportunity of work is comparatively small (cf. the parable of the labourers in the vineyard, St. Matt. xx. 1-16). Works of supererogation are impossible for those who come under the law, "Be ye perfect"; for to be this is to do all we can.

calculated to produce such character in those who perform them.¹ In brief, merit inheres in the character which lies behind, or is developed by, good works — not in the good works themselves, as measured by quantitative standards. The merit of personal character is a moral fitness for the reception of gifts and privileges. This may justify the giving of priceless rewards. Thus a worthy child may merit to inherit a vast fortune from his father, even though quite incapable of earning it. His merit has no relation to wages or to wage-claims. It cannot be estimated by quantitative standards at all; but it invites, and affords just reason for, any reward, however great, which his father may promise and is able to bestow. Moral judgment, in ultimate analysis, is concerned with this kind of merit — with personal character and virtue rather than with external works achieved. And such merit must constitute the warrant and determinative principle of rewards and punishments established by the perfect Judge of mankind.² But this merit, it has ever to be remembered, is not within the reach of mankind except by reason

¹To fail in such good works as lie within our providential opportunities is to fall short in the acquiring such character; and good works include philanthropy, or works of mercy, physical as well as spiritual — the *practice* of brotherly love.

²The judgment is according to works because they reveal and afford evidence of personal worth. The covenant promise is not a pledge to reward works in proportion to their own value, but to give eternal life to those whose works, whether many or few, great or small, reveal the workers' faith and character built thereon. Cf. St. James ii. 17-18, 22.

of Christ's death and by virtue of His sanctifying grace. Yet the very purpose of Christ's death, and of His present work in our souls, is to place the merit of moral fitness for divine communion and fellowship within our reach; and the acquisition of this worthiness is the obligatory aim and final result of true Christian progress. It is also the proper explanation of the necessity of good works.¹

This progress, although determined as to its direction, is not completed during our earthly lives; and we are to be judged according to the deeds done in the body, because these deeds are probational in value. They determine and foreshadow the characters and dispositions which will ultimately be established in us. But Christian perfection requires for its attainment not only the operation of sanctifying grace, by which our lives are given Christian value, but also the surgery of death and mysteries of sanctification after death, concerning which our knowledge

¹ Roman Catholic and Protestant writers fail to meet each other's contentions understandingly because the mechanical aspect of good works dominates their terminology. The writer believes that Roman theologians do injustice to their deeper mind. Certainly Protestants are right in rejecting wage-merit, but are led by their reaction to overlook the significance of good works in personally fitting men for the enjoyment of God. They do not do full justice to the commendation of good works in the New Testament. The Roman Catholic position can be studied in *Cath. Encyc.*, s. v. "Merit"; the Protestant position in *Schaff-Herzog Encyc.*, q. v. Cf. J. A. Moehler, *Symbolism*, §§ xxi-xxvi; A. P. Forbes, *Thirty-Nine Arts.*, xii. The writer is conscious of taking a different line of approach from the customary one, but believes that his position does justice to the real truth of both sides of sixteenth-century controversy.

is exceedingly slight. But we have reason to be confident of this thing, that He who begins the good work of sanctification in His elect on this side of the grave "will perfect it until the day of Jesus Christ."¹

§ 12. The principle of election which has determined the separation of a peculiar people to be prepared for Christ, and to become the first recipients of the covenant of grace, continues to operate in determining what peoples and what individuals shall enjoy its privileges in this world.² In the New Testament the elect and the baptized are one and the same. To them the promises have been made and to them alone have the appointed means of sanctification been in fact extended. What about the non-elect? This question is not answered in Scripture, and the Church has no authoritative message to declare concerning it. The nearest approach to an answer which is possible is that "Of His own will" the Father "brought us forth by the word of truth, that we should be a kind of firstfruits of His creatures."³

In this volume an effort has been made to assign the whole subject of predestination and election to its proper and subordinate place, as a mystery which neither the proportion of faith as exhibited in Scripture nor the probational welfare of souls permits to be pushed to the front and elaborated upon. Unfortunately, however, uninspired and one-sided theological speculation has added to the doctrine of election

¹ Phil. i. 6.

² Cf. ch. i. § 8 (a)-(b), above.

³ St. James i. 18.

certain deductions which are incapable of scriptural verification, and which imply a capricious partiality in God's dealings with mankind that is inconsistent with belief in His boundless love and perfect justice. As St. Augustine seemed to remember, there is no doctrine of unconditional and eternal reprobation in Scripture. If, as Scripture declares, the elect are "firstfruits," this truth seems to imply that there will be later fruits; and the doctrine of redemption requires us to believe that Christ's death constitutes the basis, and His grace the enabling principle, of spiritual recovery for all mankind. How many will ultimately be saved — whether those who are not of the elect will be gathered in due season; whether all the saved will share in the heavenly privileges which are promised to the elect; and in what manner those who die in ignorance of the Gospel will be dealt with in the world to come — these questions with deliberate emphasis we refuse to debate or determine in a treatise of Dogmatic Theology. It is sufficient, and it is safest, to confess our ignorance and to cherish the joyful belief that election will not in the end be capable of being described as proceeding from partiality, or as other than a method of perfect wisdom, employed by Him whose essence is boundless love. The Judge of all the earth will do right.



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